1856 lines
61 KiB
Rust
1856 lines
61 KiB
Rust
// Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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#[cfg(feature = "sqlite-cryptostore")]
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::{
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collections::{BTreeMap, HashMap, HashSet},
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convert::{TryFrom, TryInto},
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mem,
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result::Result as StdResult,
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sync::Arc,
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};
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use api::r0::{
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keys::{claim_keys, get_keys, upload_keys, DeviceKeys, OneTimeKey},
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sync::sync_events::Response as SyncResponse,
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to_device::{
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send_event_to_device::IncomingRequest as OwnedToDeviceRequest, DeviceIdOrAllDevices,
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},
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};
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use matrix_sdk_common::{
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api,
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events::{
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forwarded_room_key::ForwardedRoomKeyEventContent,
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room::{encrypted::EncryptedEventContent, message::MessageEventContent},
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room_key::RoomKeyEventContent,
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room_key_request::RoomKeyRequestEventContent,
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Algorithm, AnySyncRoomEvent, AnyToDeviceEvent, EventType, SyncMessageEvent, ToDeviceEvent,
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},
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identifiers::{DeviceId, DeviceKeyAlgorithm, DeviceKeyId, RoomId, UserId},
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locks::RwLock,
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uuid::Uuid,
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Raw,
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};
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use serde_json::Value;
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use tracing::{debug, error, info, instrument, trace, warn};
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#[cfg(feature = "sqlite-cryptostore")]
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use super::store::sqlite::SqliteStore;
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use super::{
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device::Device,
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error::{EventError, MegolmError, MegolmResult, OlmError, OlmResult},
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olm::{
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Account, GroupSessionKey, IdentityKeys, InboundGroupSession, OlmMessage,
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OutboundGroupSession,
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},
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store::{memorystore::MemoryStore, Result as StoreResult},
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verification::{Sas, VerificationMachine},
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CryptoStore,
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};
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/// A map from the algorithm and device id to a one-time key.
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///
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/// These keys need to be periodically uploaded to the server.
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pub type OneTimeKeys = BTreeMap<DeviceKeyId, OneTimeKey>;
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/// State machine implementation of the Olm/Megolm encryption protocol used for
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/// Matrix end to end encryption.
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pub struct OlmMachine {
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/// The unique user id that owns this account.
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user_id: UserId,
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/// The unique device id of the device that holds this account.
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device_id: Box<DeviceId>,
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/// Our underlying Olm Account holding our identity keys.
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pub(crate) account: Account,
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/// Store for the encryption keys.
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/// Persists all the encryption keys so a client can resume the session
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/// without the need to create new keys.
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store: Arc<RwLock<Box<dyn CryptoStore>>>,
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/// The currently active outbound group sessions.
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outbound_group_sessions: HashMap<RoomId, OutboundGroupSession>,
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/// A state machine that is responsible to handle and keep track of SAS
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/// verification flows.
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verification_machine: VerificationMachine,
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}
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// #[cfg_attr(tarpaulin, skip)]
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impl std::fmt::Debug for OlmMachine {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
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f.debug_struct("OlmMachine")
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.field("user_id", &self.user_id)
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.field("device_id", &self.device_id)
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.finish()
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}
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}
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impl OlmMachine {
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const MAX_TO_DEVICE_MESSAGES: usize = 20;
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/// Create a new memory based OlmMachine.
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///
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/// The created machine will keep the encryption keys only in memory and
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/// once the object is dropped the keys will be lost.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that owns this machine.
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///
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/// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device that owns this machine.
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#[allow(clippy::ptr_arg)]
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pub fn new(user_id: &UserId, device_id: &DeviceId) -> Self {
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let store: Box<dyn CryptoStore> = Box::new(MemoryStore::new());
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let store = Arc::new(RwLock::new(store));
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let account = Account::new(user_id, device_id);
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OlmMachine {
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user_id: user_id.clone(),
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device_id: device_id.into(),
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account: account.clone(),
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store: store.clone(),
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outbound_group_sessions: HashMap::new(),
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verification_machine: VerificationMachine::new(account, store),
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}
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}
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/// Create a new OlmMachine with the given `CryptoStore`.
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///
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/// The created machine will keep the encryption keys only in memory and
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/// once the object is dropped the keys will be lost.
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///
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/// If the store already contains encryption keys for the given user/device
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/// pair those will be re-used. Otherwise new ones will be created and
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/// stored.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that owns this machine.
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///
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/// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device that owns this machine.
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///
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/// * `store` - A `Cryptostore` implementation that will be used to store
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/// the encryption keys.
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pub async fn new_with_store(
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user_id: UserId,
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device_id: Box<DeviceId>,
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mut store: Box<dyn CryptoStore>,
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) -> StoreResult<Self> {
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let account = match store.load_account().await? {
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Some(a) => {
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debug!("Restored account");
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a
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}
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None => {
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debug!("Creating a new account");
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Account::new(&user_id, &device_id)
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}
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};
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let store = Arc::new(RwLock::new(store));
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let verification_machine = VerificationMachine::new(account.clone(), store.clone());
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Ok(OlmMachine {
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user_id,
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device_id,
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account,
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store,
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outbound_group_sessions: HashMap::new(),
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verification_machine,
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})
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "sqlite-cryptostore")]
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#[instrument(skip(path, passphrase))]
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/// Create a new machine with the default crypto store.
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///
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/// The default store uses a SQLite database to store the encryption keys.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that owns this machine.
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///
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/// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device that owns this machine.
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pub async fn new_with_default_store<P: AsRef<Path>>(
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user_id: &UserId,
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device_id: &DeviceId,
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path: P,
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passphrase: &str,
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) -> StoreResult<Self> {
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let store =
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SqliteStore::open_with_passphrase(&user_id, device_id, path, passphrase).await?;
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OlmMachine::new_with_store(user_id.to_owned(), device_id.into(), Box::new(store)).await
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}
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/// The unique user id that owns this identity.
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pub fn user_id(&self) -> &UserId {
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&self.user_id
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}
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/// The unique device id of the device that holds this identity.
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pub fn device_id(&self) -> &DeviceId {
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&self.device_id
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}
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/// Get the public parts of the identity keys.
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pub fn identity_keys(&self) -> &IdentityKeys {
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self.account.identity_keys()
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}
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/// Should account or one-time keys be uploaded to the server.
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pub async fn should_upload_keys(&self) -> bool {
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self.account.should_upload_keys().await
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}
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/// Update the count of one-time keys that are currently on the server.
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fn update_key_count(&self, count: u64) {
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self.account.update_uploaded_key_count(count);
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}
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/// Receive a successful keys upload response.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `response` - The keys upload response of the request that the client
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/// performed.
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#[instrument]
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pub async fn receive_keys_upload_response(
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&self,
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response: &upload_keys::Response,
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) -> OlmResult<()> {
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if !self.account.shared() {
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debug!("Marking account as shared");
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}
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self.account.mark_as_shared();
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let one_time_key_count = response
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.one_time_key_counts
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.get(&DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519);
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let count: u64 = one_time_key_count.map_or(0, |c| (*c).into());
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debug!(
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"Updated uploaded one-time key count {} -> {}, marking keys as published",
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self.account.uploaded_key_count(),
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count
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);
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self.update_key_count(count);
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self.account.mark_keys_as_published().await;
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self.store
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.write()
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.await
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.save_account(self.account.clone())
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.await?;
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Get the user/device pairs for which no Olm session exists.
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///
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/// Returns a map from the user id, to a map from the device id to a key
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/// algorithm.
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///
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/// This can be used to make a key claiming request to the server.
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///
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/// Sessions need to be established between devices so group sessions for a
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/// room can be shared with them.
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///
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/// This should be called every time a group session needs to be shared.
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///
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/// The response of a successful key claiming requests needs to be passed to
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/// the `OlmMachine` with the `receive_keys_claim_response()`.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// `users` - The list of users that we should check if we lack a session
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/// with one of their devices.
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pub async fn get_missing_sessions(
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&self,
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users: impl Iterator<Item = &UserId>,
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) -> OlmResult<BTreeMap<UserId, BTreeMap<Box<DeviceId>, DeviceKeyAlgorithm>>> {
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let mut missing = BTreeMap::new();
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for user_id in users {
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let user_devices = self.store.read().await.get_user_devices(user_id).await?;
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for device in user_devices.devices() {
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let sender_key = if let Some(k) = device.get_key(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::Curve25519) {
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k
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} else {
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continue;
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};
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let sessions = self.store.write().await.get_sessions(sender_key).await?;
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let is_missing = if let Some(sessions) = sessions {
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sessions.lock().await.is_empty()
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} else {
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true
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};
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if is_missing {
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if !missing.contains_key(user_id) {
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let _ = missing.insert(user_id.clone(), BTreeMap::new());
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}
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let user_map = missing.get_mut(user_id).unwrap();
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let _ = user_map.insert(
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device.device_id().into(),
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DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519,
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);
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}
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}
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}
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Ok(missing)
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}
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/// Receive a successful key claim response and create new Olm sessions with
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/// the claimed keys.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `response` - The response containing the claimed one-time keys.
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pub async fn receive_keys_claim_response(
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&self,
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response: &claim_keys::Response,
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) -> OlmResult<()> {
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// TODO log the failures here
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for (user_id, user_devices) in &response.one_time_keys {
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for (device_id, key_map) in user_devices {
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let device: Device = match self
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.store
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.read()
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.await
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.get_device(&user_id, device_id)
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.await
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{
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Ok(Some(d)) => d,
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Ok(None) => {
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warn!(
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"Tried to create an Olm session for {} {}, but the device is unknown",
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user_id, device_id
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);
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continue;
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}
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Err(e) => {
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warn!(
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"Tried to create an Olm session for {} {}, but \
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can't fetch the device from the store {:?}",
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user_id, device_id, e
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);
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continue;
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}
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};
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info!("Creating outbound Session for {} {}", user_id, device_id);
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let session = match self.account.create_outbound_session(device, &key_map).await {
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Ok(s) => s,
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Err(e) => {
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warn!("{:?}", e);
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continue;
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}
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};
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if let Err(e) = self.store.write().await.save_sessions(&[session]).await {
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error!("Failed to store newly created Olm session {}", e);
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continue;
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}
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// TODO if this session was created because a previous one was
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// wedged queue up a dummy event to be sent out.
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// TODO if this session was created because of a key request,
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// mark the forwarding keys to be sent out
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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async fn handle_devices_from_key_query(
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&self,
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device_keys_map: &BTreeMap<UserId, BTreeMap<Box<DeviceId>, DeviceKeys>>,
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) -> StoreResult<Vec<Device>> {
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let mut changed_devices = Vec::new();
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for (user_id, device_map) in device_keys_map {
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self.store
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.write()
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.await
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.update_tracked_user(user_id, false)
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.await?;
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for (device_id, device_keys) in device_map.iter() {
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// We don't need our own device in the device store.
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if user_id == &self.user_id && device_id == &self.device_id {
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continue;
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}
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if user_id != &device_keys.user_id || device_id != &device_keys.device_id {
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warn!(
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"Mismatch in device keys payload of device {} from user {}",
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device_keys.device_id, device_keys.user_id
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);
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continue;
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}
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let device = self
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.store
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.read()
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.await
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.get_device(&user_id, device_id)
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.await?;
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let device = if let Some(mut device) = device {
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if let Err(e) = device.update_device(device_keys) {
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warn!(
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"Failed to update the device keys for {} {}: {:?}",
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user_id, device_id, e
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);
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continue;
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}
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device
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} else {
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let device = match Device::try_from(device_keys) {
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Ok(d) => d,
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Err(e) => {
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warn!(
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"Failed to create a new device for {} {}: {:?}",
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user_id, device_id, e
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);
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continue;
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}
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};
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info!("Adding a new device to the device store {:?}", device);
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device
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};
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changed_devices.push(device);
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}
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let current_devices: HashSet<&DeviceId> =
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device_map.keys().map(|id| id.as_ref()).collect();
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let stored_devices = self
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.store
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.read()
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.await
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.get_user_devices(&user_id)
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.await
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.unwrap();
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let stored_devices_set: HashSet<&DeviceId> = stored_devices.keys().collect();
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let deleted_devices = stored_devices_set.difference(¤t_devices);
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for device_id in deleted_devices {
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if let Some(device) = stored_devices.get(device_id) {
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device.mark_as_deleted();
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self.store.write().await.delete_device(device).await?;
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}
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}
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}
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Ok(changed_devices)
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}
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|
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/// Receive a successful keys query response.
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///
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/// Returns a list of devices newly discovered devices and devices that
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/// changed.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `response` - The keys query response of the request that the client
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/// performed.
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pub async fn receive_keys_query_response(
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&self,
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response: &get_keys::Response,
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) -> OlmResult<Vec<Device>> {
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let changed_devices = self
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.handle_devices_from_key_query(&response.device_keys)
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.await?;
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self.store
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.write()
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.await
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.save_devices(&changed_devices)
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.await?;
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Ok(changed_devices)
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}
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|
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/// Get a tuple of device and one-time keys that need to be uploaded.
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///
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/// Returns an empty error if no keys need to be uploaded.
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pub async fn keys_for_upload(
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&self,
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) -> StdResult<(Option<DeviceKeys>, Option<OneTimeKeys>), ()> {
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self.account.keys_for_upload().await
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}
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|
|
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/// Try to decrypt an Olm message.
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///
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/// This try to decrypt an Olm message using all the sessions we share
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/// have with the given sender.
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async fn try_decrypt_olm_message(
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&self,
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sender: &UserId,
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sender_key: &str,
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message: &OlmMessage,
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) -> OlmResult<Option<String>> {
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let s = self.store.write().await.get_sessions(sender_key).await?;
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|
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// We don't have any existing sessions, return early.
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let sessions = if let Some(s) = s {
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s
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} else {
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return Ok(None);
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};
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|
|
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let mut session_to_save = None;
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let mut plaintext = None;
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|
|
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for session in &mut *sessions.lock().await {
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let mut matches = false;
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|
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// If this is a pre-key message check if it was encrypted for our
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// session, if it wasn't decryption will fail so no need to try.
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if let OlmMessage::PreKey(m) = &message {
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matches = session.matches(sender_key, m.clone()).await?;
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|
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if !matches {
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continue;
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}
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}
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let ret = session.decrypt(message.clone()).await;
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|
|
|
if let Ok(p) = ret {
|
|
plaintext = Some(p);
|
|
session_to_save = Some(session.clone());
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Decryption failed with a matching session, the session is
|
|
// likely wedged and needs to be rotated.
|
|
if matches {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Found a matching Olm session yet decryption failed
|
|
for sender {} and sender_key {}",
|
|
sender, sender_key
|
|
);
|
|
return Err(OlmError::SessionWedged);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let Some(session) = session_to_save {
|
|
// Decryption was successful, save the new ratchet state of the
|
|
// session that was used to decrypt the message.
|
|
trace!("Saved the new session state for {}", sender);
|
|
self.store.write().await.save_sessions(&[session]).await?;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(plaintext)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn decrypt_olm_message(
|
|
&self,
|
|
sender: &UserId,
|
|
sender_key: &str,
|
|
message: OlmMessage,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<(Raw<AnyToDeviceEvent>, String)> {
|
|
// First try to decrypt using an existing session.
|
|
let plaintext = if let Some(p) = self
|
|
.try_decrypt_olm_message(sender, sender_key, &message)
|
|
.await?
|
|
{
|
|
// Decryption succeeded, de-structure the plaintext out of the
|
|
// Option.
|
|
p
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Decryption failed with every known session, let's try to create a
|
|
// new session.
|
|
let mut session = match &message {
|
|
// A new session can only be created using a pre-key message,
|
|
// return with an error if it isn't one.
|
|
OlmMessage::Message(_) => {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Failed to decrypt a non-pre-key message with all
|
|
available sessions {} {}",
|
|
sender, sender_key
|
|
);
|
|
return Err(OlmError::SessionWedged);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OlmMessage::PreKey(m) => {
|
|
// Create the new session.
|
|
let session = match self
|
|
.account
|
|
.create_inbound_session(sender_key, m.clone())
|
|
.await
|
|
{
|
|
Ok(s) => s,
|
|
Err(e) => {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Failed to create a new Olm session for {} {}
|
|
from a prekey message: {}",
|
|
sender, sender_key, e
|
|
);
|
|
return Err(OlmError::SessionWedged);
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Save the account since we remove the one-time key that
|
|
// was used to create this session.
|
|
self.store
|
|
.write()
|
|
.await
|
|
.save_account(self.account.clone())
|
|
.await?;
|
|
session
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Decrypt our message, this shouldn't fail since we're using a
|
|
// newly created Session.
|
|
let plaintext = session.decrypt(message).await?;
|
|
|
|
// Save the new ratcheted state of the session.
|
|
self.store.write().await.save_sessions(&[session]).await?;
|
|
plaintext
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
trace!("Successfully decrypted a Olm message: {}", plaintext);
|
|
|
|
Ok(self.parse_decrypted_to_device_event(sender, &plaintext)?)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Parse a decrypted Olm message, check that the plaintext and encrypted
|
|
/// senders match and that the message was meant for us.
|
|
fn parse_decrypted_to_device_event(
|
|
&self,
|
|
sender: &UserId,
|
|
plaintext: &str,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<(Raw<AnyToDeviceEvent>, String)> {
|
|
// TODO make the errors a bit more specific.
|
|
let decrypted_json: Value = serde_json::from_str(&plaintext)?;
|
|
|
|
let encrytped_sender = decrypted_json
|
|
.get("sender")
|
|
.cloned()
|
|
.ok_or_else(|| EventError::MissingField("sender".to_string()))?;
|
|
let encrytped_sender: UserId = serde_json::from_value(encrytped_sender)?;
|
|
let recipient = decrypted_json
|
|
.get("recipient")
|
|
.cloned()
|
|
.ok_or_else(|| EventError::MissingField("recipient".to_string()))?;
|
|
let recipient: UserId = serde_json::from_value(recipient)?;
|
|
|
|
let recipient_keys: BTreeMap<DeviceKeyAlgorithm, String> = serde_json::from_value(
|
|
decrypted_json
|
|
.get("recipient_keys")
|
|
.cloned()
|
|
.ok_or_else(|| EventError::MissingField("recipient_keys".to_string()))?,
|
|
)?;
|
|
let keys: BTreeMap<DeviceKeyAlgorithm, String> = serde_json::from_value(
|
|
decrypted_json
|
|
.get("keys")
|
|
.cloned()
|
|
.ok_or_else(|| EventError::MissingField("keys".to_string()))?,
|
|
)?;
|
|
|
|
if recipient != self.user_id || sender != &encrytped_sender {
|
|
return Err(EventError::MissmatchedSender.into());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if self.account.identity_keys().ed25519()
|
|
!= recipient_keys
|
|
.get(&DeviceKeyAlgorithm::Ed25519)
|
|
.ok_or(EventError::MissingSigningKey)?
|
|
{
|
|
return Err(EventError::MissmatchedKeys.into());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let signing_key = keys
|
|
.get(&DeviceKeyAlgorithm::Ed25519)
|
|
.ok_or(EventError::MissingSigningKey)?;
|
|
|
|
Ok((
|
|
Raw::from(serde_json::from_value::<AnyToDeviceEvent>(decrypted_json)?),
|
|
signing_key.to_owned(),
|
|
))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Decrypt a to-device event.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns a decrypted `ToDeviceEvent` if the decryption was successful,
|
|
/// an error indicating why decryption failed otherwise.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `event` - The to-device event that should be decrypted.
|
|
async fn decrypt_to_device_event(
|
|
&self,
|
|
event: &ToDeviceEvent<EncryptedEventContent>,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<Raw<AnyToDeviceEvent>> {
|
|
info!("Decrypting to-device event");
|
|
|
|
let content = if let EncryptedEventContent::OlmV1Curve25519AesSha2(c) = &event.content {
|
|
c
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn!("Error, unsupported encryption algorithm");
|
|
return Err(EventError::UnsupportedAlgorithm.into());
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let identity_keys = self.account.identity_keys();
|
|
let own_key = identity_keys.curve25519();
|
|
let own_ciphertext = content.ciphertext.get(own_key);
|
|
|
|
// Try to find a ciphertext that was meant for our device.
|
|
if let Some(ciphertext) = own_ciphertext {
|
|
let message_type: u8 = ciphertext
|
|
.message_type
|
|
.try_into()
|
|
.map_err(|_| EventError::UnsupportedOlmType)?;
|
|
|
|
// Create a OlmMessage from the ciphertext and the type.
|
|
let message =
|
|
OlmMessage::from_type_and_ciphertext(message_type.into(), ciphertext.body.clone())
|
|
.map_err(|_| EventError::UnsupportedOlmType)?;
|
|
|
|
// Decrypt the OlmMessage and get a Ruma event out of it.
|
|
let (decrypted_event, signing_key) = self
|
|
.decrypt_olm_message(&event.sender, &content.sender_key, message)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
debug!("Decrypted a to-device event {:?}", decrypted_event);
|
|
|
|
// Handle the decrypted event, e.g. fetch out Megolm sessions out of
|
|
// the event.
|
|
if let Some(event) = self
|
|
.handle_decrypted_to_device_event(
|
|
&content.sender_key,
|
|
&signing_key,
|
|
&decrypted_event,
|
|
)
|
|
.await?
|
|
{
|
|
// Some events may have sensitive data e.g. private keys, while we
|
|
// want to notify our users that a private key was received we
|
|
// don't want them to be able to do silly things with it. Handling
|
|
// events modifies them and returns a modified one, so replace it
|
|
// here if we get one.
|
|
Ok(event)
|
|
} else {
|
|
Ok(decrypted_event)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn!("Olm event doesn't contain a ciphertext for our key");
|
|
Err(EventError::MissingCiphertext.into())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Create a group session from a room key and add it to our crypto store.
|
|
async fn add_room_key(
|
|
&self,
|
|
sender_key: &str,
|
|
signing_key: &str,
|
|
event: &mut ToDeviceEvent<RoomKeyEventContent>,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<Option<Raw<AnyToDeviceEvent>>> {
|
|
match event.content.algorithm {
|
|
Algorithm::MegolmV1AesSha2 => {
|
|
let session_key = GroupSessionKey(mem::take(&mut event.content.session_key));
|
|
|
|
let session = InboundGroupSession::new(
|
|
sender_key,
|
|
signing_key,
|
|
&event.content.room_id,
|
|
session_key,
|
|
)?;
|
|
let _ = self
|
|
.store
|
|
.write()
|
|
.await
|
|
.save_inbound_group_session(session)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
let event = Raw::from(AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomKey(event.clone()));
|
|
Ok(Some(event))
|
|
}
|
|
_ => {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Received room key with unsupported key algorithm {}",
|
|
event.content.algorithm
|
|
);
|
|
Ok(None)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Create a new outbound group session.
|
|
///
|
|
/// This also creates a matching inbound group session and saves that one in
|
|
/// the store.
|
|
async fn create_outbound_group_session(&mut self, room_id: &RoomId) -> OlmResult<()> {
|
|
let (outbound, inbound) = self.account.create_group_session_pair(room_id).await;
|
|
|
|
let _ = self
|
|
.store
|
|
.write()
|
|
.await
|
|
.save_inbound_group_session(inbound)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
let _ = self
|
|
.outbound_group_sessions
|
|
.insert(room_id.to_owned(), outbound);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Encrypt a room message for the given room.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Beware that a group session needs to be shared before this method can be
|
|
/// called using the `share_group_session()` method.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Since group sessions can expire or become invalid if the room membership
|
|
/// changes client authors should check with the
|
|
/// `should_share_group_session()` method if a new group session needs to
|
|
/// be shared.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `room_id` - The id of the room for which the message should be
|
|
/// encrypted.
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `content` - The plaintext content of the message that should be
|
|
/// encrypted.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Panics
|
|
///
|
|
/// Panics if a group session for the given room wasn't shared beforehand.
|
|
pub async fn encrypt(
|
|
&self,
|
|
room_id: &RoomId,
|
|
content: MessageEventContent,
|
|
) -> MegolmResult<EncryptedEventContent> {
|
|
let session = self.outbound_group_sessions.get(room_id);
|
|
|
|
let session = if let Some(s) = session {
|
|
s
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!("Session wasn't created nor shared");
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
if session.expired() {
|
|
panic!("Session is expired");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(session.encrypt(content).await)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Encrypt the given event for the given Device
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `reciepient_device` - The device that the event should be encrypted
|
|
/// for.
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `event_type` - The type of the event.
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `content` - The content of the event that should be encrypted.
|
|
async fn olm_encrypt(
|
|
&self,
|
|
recipient_device: &Device,
|
|
event_type: EventType,
|
|
content: Value,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<EncryptedEventContent> {
|
|
let sender_key = if let Some(k) = recipient_device.get_key(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::Curve25519) {
|
|
k
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Trying to encrypt a Megolm session for user {} on device {}, \
|
|
but the device doesn't have a curve25519 key",
|
|
recipient_device.user_id(),
|
|
recipient_device.device_id()
|
|
);
|
|
return Err(EventError::MissingSenderKey.into());
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let mut session = if let Some(s) = self.store.write().await.get_sessions(sender_key).await?
|
|
{
|
|
let session = &s.lock().await[0];
|
|
session.clone()
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Trying to encrypt a Megolm session for user {} on device {}, \
|
|
but no Olm session is found",
|
|
recipient_device.user_id(),
|
|
recipient_device.device_id()
|
|
);
|
|
return Err(OlmError::MissingSession);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let message = session.encrypt(recipient_device, event_type, content).await;
|
|
self.store.write().await.save_sessions(&[session]).await?;
|
|
|
|
message
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Should the client share a group session for the given room.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns true if a session needs to be shared before room messages can be
|
|
/// encrypted, false if one is already shared and ready to encrypt room
|
|
/// messages.
|
|
///
|
|
/// This should be called every time a new room message wants to be sent out
|
|
/// since group sessions can expire at any time.
|
|
pub fn should_share_group_session(&self, room_id: &RoomId) -> bool {
|
|
let session = self.outbound_group_sessions.get(room_id);
|
|
|
|
match session {
|
|
Some(s) => !s.shared() || s.expired(),
|
|
None => true,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Invalidate the currently active outbound group session for the given
|
|
/// room.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns true if a session was invalidated, false if there was no session
|
|
/// to invalidate.
|
|
pub fn invalidate_group_session(&mut self, room_id: &RoomId) -> bool {
|
|
self.outbound_group_sessions.remove(room_id).is_some()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO accept an algorithm here
|
|
/// Get to-device requests to share a group session with users in a room.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// `room_id` - The room id of the room where the group session will be
|
|
/// used.
|
|
///
|
|
/// `users` - The list of users that should receive the group session.
|
|
pub async fn share_group_session<'a, I>(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
room_id: &RoomId,
|
|
users: I,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<Vec<OwnedToDeviceRequest>>
|
|
where
|
|
I: IntoIterator<Item = &'a UserId>,
|
|
{
|
|
self.create_outbound_group_session(room_id).await?;
|
|
let session = self.outbound_group_sessions.get(room_id).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
if session.shared() {
|
|
panic!("Session is already shared");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO don't mark the session as shared automatically only, when all
|
|
// the requests are done, failure to send these requests will likely end
|
|
// up in wedged sessions. We'll need to store the requests and let the
|
|
// caller mark them as sent using an UUID.
|
|
session.mark_as_shared();
|
|
|
|
let mut devices = Vec::new();
|
|
|
|
for user_id in users {
|
|
for device in self
|
|
.store
|
|
.read()
|
|
.await
|
|
.get_user_devices(user_id)
|
|
.await?
|
|
.devices()
|
|
{
|
|
// TODO abort if the device isn't verified
|
|
devices.push(device.clone());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let mut requests = Vec::new();
|
|
let key_content = session.as_json().await;
|
|
|
|
for device_map_chunk in devices.chunks(OlmMachine::MAX_TO_DEVICE_MESSAGES) {
|
|
let mut messages = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
|
|
for device in device_map_chunk {
|
|
let encrypted = self
|
|
.olm_encrypt(&device, EventType::RoomKey, key_content.clone())
|
|
.await;
|
|
|
|
let encrypted = match encrypted {
|
|
Ok(c) => c,
|
|
Err(OlmError::MissingSession)
|
|
| Err(OlmError::EventError(EventError::MissingSenderKey)) => {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
Err(e) => return Err(e),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
if !messages.contains_key(device.user_id()) {
|
|
messages.insert(device.user_id().clone(), BTreeMap::new());
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let user_messages = messages.get_mut(device.user_id()).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
user_messages.insert(
|
|
DeviceIdOrAllDevices::DeviceId(device.device_id().into()),
|
|
serde_json::value::to_raw_value(&encrypted)?,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
requests.push(OwnedToDeviceRequest {
|
|
event_type: EventType::RoomEncrypted,
|
|
txn_id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
|
messages,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(requests)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn add_forwarded_room_key(
|
|
&self,
|
|
_sender_key: &str,
|
|
_signing_key: &str,
|
|
_event: &ToDeviceEvent<ForwardedRoomKeyEventContent>,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<()> {
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
// TODO
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Receive and properly handle a decrypted to-device event.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `sender_key` - The sender (curve25519) key of the event sender.
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `signing_key` - The signing (ed25519) key of the event sender.
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `event` - The decrypted to-device event.
|
|
async fn handle_decrypted_to_device_event(
|
|
&self,
|
|
sender_key: &str,
|
|
signing_key: &str,
|
|
event: &Raw<AnyToDeviceEvent>,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<Option<Raw<AnyToDeviceEvent>>> {
|
|
let event = if let Ok(e) = event.deserialize() {
|
|
e
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn!("Decrypted to-device event failed to be parsed correctly");
|
|
return Ok(None);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match event {
|
|
AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomKey(mut e) => {
|
|
Ok(self.add_room_key(sender_key, signing_key, &mut e).await?)
|
|
}
|
|
AnyToDeviceEvent::ForwardedRoomKey(e) => {
|
|
self.add_forwarded_room_key(sender_key, signing_key, &e)?;
|
|
Ok(None)
|
|
}
|
|
_ => {
|
|
warn!("Received a unexpected encrypted to-device event");
|
|
Ok(None)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn handle_room_key_request(&self, _: &ToDeviceEvent<RoomKeyRequestEventContent>) {
|
|
// TODO handle room key requests here.
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn handle_verification_event(&self, mut event: &mut AnyToDeviceEvent) {
|
|
if let Err(e) = self.verification_machine.receive_event(&mut event).await {
|
|
error!("Error handling a verification event: {:?}", e);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Get the to-device requests that need to be sent out.
|
|
pub fn outgoing_to_device_requests(&self) -> Vec<OwnedToDeviceRequest> {
|
|
self.verification_machine.outgoing_to_device_requests()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Mark an outgoing to-device requests as sent.
|
|
pub fn mark_to_device_request_as_sent(&self, request_id: &str) {
|
|
self.verification_machine.mark_requests_as_sent(request_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Get a `Sas` verification object with the given flow id.
|
|
pub fn get_verification(&self, flow_id: &str) -> Option<Sas> {
|
|
self.verification_machine.get_sas(flow_id)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Handle a sync response and update the internal state of the Olm machine.
|
|
///
|
|
/// This will decrypt to-device events but will not touch events in the room
|
|
/// timeline.
|
|
///
|
|
/// To decrypt an event from the room timeline call `decrypt_room_event()`.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `response` - The sync latest sync response.
|
|
#[instrument(skip(response))]
|
|
pub async fn receive_sync_response(&self, response: &mut SyncResponse) {
|
|
self.verification_machine.garbage_collect();
|
|
|
|
let one_time_key_count = response
|
|
.device_one_time_keys_count
|
|
.get(&DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519);
|
|
|
|
let count: u64 = one_time_key_count.map_or(0, |c| (*c).into());
|
|
self.update_key_count(count);
|
|
|
|
for user_id in &response.device_lists.changed {
|
|
if let Err(e) = self.mark_user_as_changed(&user_id).await {
|
|
error!("Error marking a tracked user as changed {:?}", e);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for event_result in &mut response.to_device.events {
|
|
let mut event = if let Ok(e) = event_result.deserialize() {
|
|
e
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Skip invalid events.
|
|
warn!("Received an invalid to-device event {:?}", event_result);
|
|
continue;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
info!("Received a to-device event {:?}", event);
|
|
|
|
match &mut event {
|
|
AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomEncrypted(e) => {
|
|
let decrypted_event = match self.decrypt_to_device_event(e).await {
|
|
Ok(e) => e,
|
|
Err(err) => {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Failed to decrypt to-device event from {} {}",
|
|
e.sender, err
|
|
);
|
|
// TODO if the session is wedged mark it for
|
|
// unwedging.
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
*event_result = decrypted_event;
|
|
}
|
|
AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomKeyRequest(e) => self.handle_room_key_request(e),
|
|
AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationAccept(..)
|
|
| AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationCancel(..)
|
|
| AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationKey(..)
|
|
| AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationMac(..)
|
|
| AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationRequest(..)
|
|
| AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationStart(..) => {
|
|
self.handle_verification_event(&mut event).await;
|
|
}
|
|
_ => continue,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Decrypt an event from a room timeline.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `event` - The event that should be decrypted.
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `room_id` - The ID of the room where the event was sent to.
|
|
pub async fn decrypt_room_event(
|
|
&self,
|
|
event: &SyncMessageEvent<EncryptedEventContent>,
|
|
room_id: &RoomId,
|
|
) -> MegolmResult<Raw<AnySyncRoomEvent>> {
|
|
let content = match &event.content {
|
|
EncryptedEventContent::MegolmV1AesSha2(c) => c,
|
|
_ => return Err(EventError::UnsupportedAlgorithm.into()),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let session = self
|
|
.store
|
|
.write()
|
|
.await
|
|
.get_inbound_group_session(room_id, &content.sender_key, &content.session_id)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
// TODO check if the Olm session is wedged and re-request the key.
|
|
let session = session.ok_or(MegolmError::MissingSession)?;
|
|
|
|
// TODO check the message index.
|
|
// TODO check if this is from a verified device.
|
|
let (decrypted_event, _) = session.decrypt(event).await?;
|
|
|
|
trace!("Successfully decrypted Megolm event {:?}", decrypted_event);
|
|
// TODO set the encryption info on the event (is it verified, was it
|
|
// decrypted, sender key...)
|
|
|
|
Ok(decrypted_event)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Mark that the given user has changed his devices.
|
|
///
|
|
/// This will queue up the given user for a key query.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Note: The user already needs to be tracked for it to be queued up for a
|
|
/// key query.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns true if the user was queued up for a key query, false otherwise.
|
|
pub async fn mark_user_as_changed(&self, user_id: &UserId) -> StoreResult<bool> {
|
|
if self.store.read().await.tracked_users().contains(user_id) {
|
|
self.store
|
|
.write()
|
|
.await
|
|
.update_tracked_user(user_id, true)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
Ok(true)
|
|
} else {
|
|
Ok(false)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Update the tracked users.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `users` - An iterator over user ids that should be marked for
|
|
/// tracking.
|
|
///
|
|
/// This will mark users that weren't seen before for a key query and
|
|
/// tracking.
|
|
///
|
|
/// If the user is already known to the Olm machine it will not be
|
|
/// considered for a key query.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Use the `mark_user_as_changed()` if the user really needs a key query.
|
|
pub async fn update_tracked_users<'a, I>(&self, users: I)
|
|
where
|
|
I: IntoIterator<Item = &'a UserId>,
|
|
{
|
|
for user in users {
|
|
if self.store.read().await.tracked_users().contains(user) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let Err(e) = self
|
|
.store
|
|
.write()
|
|
.await
|
|
.update_tracked_user(user, true)
|
|
.await
|
|
{
|
|
warn!("Error storing users for tracking {}", e);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Should the client perform a key query request.
|
|
pub async fn should_query_keys(&self) -> bool {
|
|
!self.store.read().await.users_for_key_query().is_empty()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Get the set of users that we need to query keys for.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns a hash set of users that need to be queried for keys.
|
|
pub async fn users_for_key_query(&self) -> HashSet<UserId> {
|
|
self.store.read().await.users_for_key_query().clone()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod test {
|
|
static USER_ID: &str = "@bob:example.org";
|
|
|
|
use matrix_sdk_common::js_int::uint;
|
|
use std::{
|
|
collections::BTreeMap,
|
|
convert::{TryFrom, TryInto},
|
|
time::SystemTime,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
use http::Response;
|
|
use serde_json::json;
|
|
|
|
use crate::{
|
|
machine::{OlmMachine, OneTimeKeys},
|
|
verify_json, Device,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
use matrix_sdk_common::{
|
|
api::r0::{keys, to_device::send_event_to_device::IncomingRequest as OwnedToDeviceRequest},
|
|
events::{
|
|
room::{
|
|
encrypted::EncryptedEventContent,
|
|
message::{MessageEventContent, TextMessageEventContent},
|
|
},
|
|
AnySyncMessageEvent, AnySyncRoomEvent, AnyToDeviceEvent, EventType, SyncMessageEvent,
|
|
ToDeviceEvent, Unsigned,
|
|
},
|
|
identifiers::{event_id, room_id, user_id, DeviceId, DeviceKeyAlgorithm, UserId},
|
|
Raw,
|
|
};
|
|
use matrix_sdk_test::test_json;
|
|
|
|
fn alice_id() -> UserId {
|
|
user_id!("@alice:example.org")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn alice_device_id() -> Box<DeviceId> {
|
|
"JLAFKJWSCS".into()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn user_id() -> UserId {
|
|
UserId::try_from(USER_ID).unwrap()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn response_from_file(json: &serde_json::Value) -> Response<Vec<u8>> {
|
|
Response::builder()
|
|
.status(200)
|
|
.body(json.to_string().as_bytes().to_vec())
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn keys_upload_response() -> keys::upload_keys::Response {
|
|
let data = response_from_file(&test_json::KEYS_UPLOAD);
|
|
keys::upload_keys::Response::try_from(data).expect("Can't parse the keys upload response")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn keys_query_response() -> keys::get_keys::Response {
|
|
let data = response_from_file(&test_json::KEYS_QUERY);
|
|
keys::get_keys::Response::try_from(data).expect("Can't parse the keys upload response")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn to_device_requests_to_content(requests: Vec<OwnedToDeviceRequest>) -> EncryptedEventContent {
|
|
let to_device_request = &requests[0];
|
|
|
|
let content: Raw<EncryptedEventContent> = serde_json::from_str(
|
|
to_device_request
|
|
.messages
|
|
.values()
|
|
.next()
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.values()
|
|
.next()
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.get(),
|
|
)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
content.deserialize().unwrap()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn get_prepared_machine() -> (OlmMachine, OneTimeKeys) {
|
|
let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id());
|
|
machine.account.update_uploaded_key_count(0);
|
|
let (_, otk) = machine
|
|
.keys_for_upload()
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Can't prepare initial key upload");
|
|
let response = keys_upload_response();
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
(machine, otk.unwrap())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn get_machine_after_query() -> (OlmMachine, OneTimeKeys) {
|
|
let (machine, otk) = get_prepared_machine().await;
|
|
let response = keys_query_response();
|
|
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_query_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
(machine, otk)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn get_machine_pair() -> (OlmMachine, OlmMachine, OneTimeKeys) {
|
|
let (bob, otk) = get_prepared_machine().await;
|
|
|
|
let alice_id = alice_id();
|
|
let alice_device = alice_device_id();
|
|
let alice = OlmMachine::new(&alice_id, &alice_device);
|
|
|
|
let alice_deivce = Device::from_machine(&alice).await;
|
|
let bob_device = Device::from_machine(&bob).await;
|
|
alice
|
|
.store
|
|
.write()
|
|
.await
|
|
.save_devices(&[bob_device])
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
bob.store
|
|
.write()
|
|
.await
|
|
.save_devices(&[alice_deivce])
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
(alice, bob, otk)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn get_machine_pair_with_session() -> (OlmMachine, OlmMachine) {
|
|
let (alice, bob, one_time_keys) = get_machine_pair().await;
|
|
|
|
let mut bob_keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
|
|
let one_time_key = one_time_keys.iter().next().unwrap();
|
|
let mut keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
keys.insert(one_time_key.0.clone(), one_time_key.1.clone());
|
|
bob_keys.insert(bob.device_id.clone(), keys);
|
|
|
|
let mut one_time_keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
one_time_keys.insert(bob.user_id.clone(), bob_keys);
|
|
|
|
let response = keys::claim_keys::Response {
|
|
failures: BTreeMap::new(),
|
|
one_time_keys,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
alice.receive_keys_claim_response(&response).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
(alice, bob)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn get_machine_pair_with_setup_sessions() -> (OlmMachine, OlmMachine) {
|
|
let (alice, bob) = get_machine_pair_with_session().await;
|
|
|
|
let bob_device = alice
|
|
.store
|
|
.read()
|
|
.await
|
|
.get_device(&bob.user_id, &bob.device_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let event = ToDeviceEvent {
|
|
sender: alice.user_id.clone(),
|
|
content: alice
|
|
.olm_encrypt(&bob_device, EventType::Dummy, json!({}))
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
bob.decrypt_to_device_event(&event).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
(alice, bob)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn create_olm_machine() {
|
|
let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id());
|
|
assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn receive_keys_upload_response() {
|
|
let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id());
|
|
let mut response = keys_upload_response();
|
|
|
|
response
|
|
.one_time_key_counts
|
|
.remove(&DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
|
|
response
|
|
.one_time_key_counts
|
|
.insert(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519, uint!(10));
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
|
|
response
|
|
.one_time_key_counts
|
|
.insert(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519, uint!(50));
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(!machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn generate_one_time_keys() {
|
|
let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id());
|
|
|
|
let mut response = keys_upload_response();
|
|
|
|
assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
assert!(machine.account.generate_one_time_keys().await.is_ok());
|
|
|
|
response
|
|
.one_time_key_counts
|
|
.insert(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519, uint!(50));
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(machine.account.generate_one_time_keys().await.is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_device_key_signing() {
|
|
let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id());
|
|
|
|
let mut device_keys = machine.account.device_keys().await;
|
|
let identity_keys = machine.account.identity_keys();
|
|
let ed25519_key = identity_keys.ed25519();
|
|
|
|
let ret = verify_json(
|
|
&machine.user_id,
|
|
machine.device_id.as_str(),
|
|
ed25519_key,
|
|
&mut json!(&mut device_keys),
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(ret.is_ok());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn tests_session_invalidation() {
|
|
let mut machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id());
|
|
let room_id = room_id!("!test:example.org");
|
|
|
|
machine
|
|
.create_outbound_group_session(&room_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(machine.outbound_group_sessions.get(&room_id).is_some());
|
|
|
|
machine.invalidate_group_session(&room_id);
|
|
|
|
assert!(machine.outbound_group_sessions.get(&room_id).is_none());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_invalid_signature() {
|
|
let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id());
|
|
|
|
let mut device_keys = machine.account.device_keys().await;
|
|
|
|
let ret = verify_json(
|
|
&machine.user_id,
|
|
machine.device_id.as_str(),
|
|
"fake_key",
|
|
&mut json!(&mut device_keys),
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(ret.is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_one_time_key_signing() {
|
|
let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id());
|
|
machine.account.update_uploaded_key_count(49);
|
|
|
|
let mut one_time_keys = machine.account.signed_one_time_keys().await.unwrap();
|
|
let identity_keys = machine.account.identity_keys();
|
|
let ed25519_key = identity_keys.ed25519();
|
|
|
|
let mut one_time_key = one_time_keys.values_mut().next().unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let ret = verify_json(
|
|
&machine.user_id,
|
|
machine.device_id.as_str(),
|
|
ed25519_key,
|
|
&mut json!(&mut one_time_key),
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(ret.is_ok());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_keys_for_upload() {
|
|
let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id());
|
|
machine.account.update_uploaded_key_count(0);
|
|
|
|
let identity_keys = machine.account.identity_keys();
|
|
let ed25519_key = identity_keys.ed25519();
|
|
|
|
let (device_keys, mut one_time_keys) = machine
|
|
.keys_for_upload()
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Can't prepare initial key upload");
|
|
|
|
let ret = verify_json(
|
|
&machine.user_id,
|
|
machine.device_id.as_str(),
|
|
ed25519_key,
|
|
&mut json!(&mut one_time_keys.as_mut().unwrap().values_mut().next()),
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(ret.is_ok());
|
|
|
|
let ret = verify_json(
|
|
&machine.user_id,
|
|
machine.device_id.as_str(),
|
|
ed25519_key,
|
|
&mut json!(&mut device_keys.unwrap()),
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(ret.is_ok());
|
|
|
|
let mut response = keys_upload_response();
|
|
response.one_time_key_counts.insert(
|
|
DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519,
|
|
(one_time_keys.unwrap().len() as u64).try_into().unwrap(),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let ret = machine.keys_for_upload().await;
|
|
assert!(ret.is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_keys_query() {
|
|
let (machine, _) = get_prepared_machine().await;
|
|
let response = keys_query_response();
|
|
let alice_id = user_id!("@alice:example.org");
|
|
let alice_device_id: &DeviceId = "JLAFKJWSCS".into();
|
|
|
|
let alice_devices = machine
|
|
.store
|
|
.read()
|
|
.await
|
|
.get_user_devices(&alice_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(alice_devices.devices().peekable().peek().is_none());
|
|
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_query_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let device = machine
|
|
.store
|
|
.read()
|
|
.await
|
|
.get_device(&alice_id, alice_device_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(device.user_id(), &alice_id);
|
|
assert_eq!(device.device_id(), alice_device_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_missing_sessions_calculation() {
|
|
let (machine, _) = get_machine_after_query().await;
|
|
|
|
let alice = alice_id();
|
|
let alice_device = alice_device_id();
|
|
|
|
let missing_sessions = machine
|
|
.get_missing_sessions([alice.clone()].iter())
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
assert!(missing_sessions.contains_key(&alice));
|
|
let user_sessions = missing_sessions.get(&alice).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(user_sessions.contains_key(&alice_device));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_session_creation() {
|
|
let (alice_machine, bob_machine, one_time_keys) = get_machine_pair().await;
|
|
|
|
let mut bob_keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
|
|
let one_time_key = one_time_keys.iter().next().unwrap();
|
|
let mut keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
keys.insert(one_time_key.0.clone(), one_time_key.1.clone());
|
|
bob_keys.insert(bob_machine.device_id.clone(), keys);
|
|
|
|
let mut one_time_keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
one_time_keys.insert(bob_machine.user_id.clone(), bob_keys);
|
|
|
|
let response = keys::claim_keys::Response {
|
|
failures: BTreeMap::new(),
|
|
one_time_keys,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
alice_machine
|
|
.receive_keys_claim_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let session = alice_machine
|
|
.store
|
|
.write()
|
|
.await
|
|
.get_sessions(bob_machine.account.identity_keys().curve25519())
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
assert!(!session.lock().await.is_empty())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_olm_encryption() {
|
|
let (alice, bob) = get_machine_pair_with_session().await;
|
|
|
|
let bob_device = alice
|
|
.store
|
|
.read()
|
|
.await
|
|
.get_device(&bob.user_id, &bob.device_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let event = ToDeviceEvent {
|
|
sender: alice.user_id.clone(),
|
|
content: alice
|
|
.olm_encrypt(&bob_device, EventType::Dummy, json!({}))
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let event = bob
|
|
.decrypt_to_device_event(&event)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.deserialize()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
if let AnyToDeviceEvent::Dummy(e) = event {
|
|
assert_eq!(e.sender, alice.user_id);
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!("Wrong event type found {:?}", event);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_room_key_sharing() {
|
|
let (mut alice, bob) = get_machine_pair_with_session().await;
|
|
|
|
let room_id = room_id!("!test:example.org");
|
|
|
|
let to_device_requests = alice
|
|
.share_group_session(&room_id, [bob.user_id.clone()].iter())
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let event = ToDeviceEvent {
|
|
sender: alice.user_id.clone(),
|
|
content: to_device_requests_to_content(to_device_requests),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let alice_session = alice.outbound_group_sessions.get(&room_id).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let event = bob
|
|
.decrypt_to_device_event(&event)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.deserialize()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
if let AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomKey(event) = event {
|
|
assert_eq!(event.sender, alice.user_id);
|
|
assert!(event.content.session_key.is_empty());
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!("expected RoomKeyEvent found {:?}", event);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let session = bob
|
|
.store
|
|
.write()
|
|
.await
|
|
.get_inbound_group_session(
|
|
&room_id,
|
|
alice.account.identity_keys().curve25519(),
|
|
alice_session.session_id(),
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
|
|
assert!(session.unwrap().is_some());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_megolm_encryption() {
|
|
let (mut alice, bob) = get_machine_pair_with_setup_sessions().await;
|
|
let room_id = room_id!("!test:example.org");
|
|
|
|
let to_device_requests = alice
|
|
.share_group_session(&room_id, [bob.user_id().clone()].iter())
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let event = ToDeviceEvent {
|
|
sender: alice.user_id.clone(),
|
|
content: to_device_requests_to_content(to_device_requests),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
bob.decrypt_to_device_event(&event).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let plaintext = "It is a secret to everybody";
|
|
|
|
let content = MessageEventContent::Text(TextMessageEventContent::plain(plaintext));
|
|
|
|
let encrypted_content = alice.encrypt(&room_id, content.clone()).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let event = SyncMessageEvent {
|
|
event_id: event_id!("$xxxxx:example.org"),
|
|
origin_server_ts: SystemTime::now(),
|
|
sender: alice.user_id().clone(),
|
|
content: encrypted_content,
|
|
unsigned: Unsigned::default(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let decrypted_event = bob
|
|
.decrypt_room_event(&event, &room_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.deserialize()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
match decrypted_event {
|
|
AnySyncRoomEvent::Message(AnySyncMessageEvent::RoomMessage(SyncMessageEvent {
|
|
sender,
|
|
content,
|
|
..
|
|
})) => {
|
|
assert_eq!(&sender, alice.user_id());
|
|
if let MessageEventContent::Text(c) = &content {
|
|
assert_eq!(&c.body, plaintext);
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!("Decrypted event has a missmatched content");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
_ => panic!("Decrypted room event has the wrong type"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|