2104 lines
71 KiB
Rust
2104 lines
71 KiB
Rust
// Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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use std::collections::{BTreeMap, HashMap, HashSet};
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use std::convert::TryInto;
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use std::mem;
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#[cfg(feature = "sqlite-cryptostore")]
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::result::Result as StdResult;
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use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
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use uuid::Uuid;
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use super::error::{EventError, MegolmError, MegolmResult, OlmError, OlmResult, SignatureError};
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use super::olm::{
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Account, GroupSessionKey, IdentityKeys, InboundGroupSession, OlmMessage, OlmUtility,
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OutboundGroupSession, Session,
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};
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use super::store::memorystore::MemoryStore;
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#[cfg(feature = "sqlite-cryptostore")]
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use super::store::sqlite::SqliteStore;
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use super::{device::Device, store::Result as StoreError, CryptoStore};
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use matrix_sdk_common::api;
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use matrix_sdk_common::events::{
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collections::all::RoomEvent,
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room::encrypted::{
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CiphertextInfo, EncryptedEvent, EncryptedEventContent, MegolmV1AesSha2Content,
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OlmV1Curve25519AesSha2Content,
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},
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room::message::MessageEventContent,
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to_device::{
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AnyToDeviceEvent as ToDeviceEvent, ToDeviceEncrypted, ToDeviceForwardedRoomKey,
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ToDeviceRoomKey, ToDeviceRoomKeyRequest,
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},
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Algorithm, EventJson, EventType,
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};
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use matrix_sdk_common::identifiers::{DeviceId, RoomId, UserId};
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use api::r0::keys;
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use api::r0::{
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keys::{AlgorithmAndDeviceId, DeviceKeys, KeyAlgorithm, OneTimeKey, SignedKey},
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sync::sync_events::Response as SyncResponse,
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to_device::{send_event_to_device::Request as ToDeviceRequest, DeviceIdOrAllDevices},
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};
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use serde_json::{json, Value};
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use tracing::{debug, error, info, instrument, trace, warn};
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/// A map from the algorithm and device id to a one-time key.
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///
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/// These keys need to be periodically uploaded to the server.
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pub type OneTimeKeys = BTreeMap<AlgorithmAndDeviceId, OneTimeKey>;
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/// State machine implementation of the Olm/Megolm encryption protocol used for
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/// Matrix end to end encryption.
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pub struct OlmMachine {
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/// The unique user id that owns this account.
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user_id: UserId,
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/// The unique device id of the device that holds this account.
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device_id: DeviceId,
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/// Our underlying Olm Account holding our identity keys.
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account: Account,
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/// The number of signed one-time keys we have uploaded to the server. If
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/// this is None, no action will be taken. After a sync request the client
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/// needs to set this for us, depending on the count we will suggest the
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/// client to upload new keys.
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uploaded_signed_key_count: Option<AtomicU64>,
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/// Store for the encryption keys.
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/// Persists all the encryption keys so a client can resume the session
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/// without the need to create new keys.
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store: Box<dyn CryptoStore>,
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/// Set of users that we need to query keys for. This is a subset of
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/// the tracked users in the CryptoStore.
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users_for_key_query: HashSet<UserId>,
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/// The currently active outbound group sessions.
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outbound_group_sessions: HashMap<RoomId, OutboundGroupSession>,
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}
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#[cfg_attr(tarpaulin, skip)]
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impl std::fmt::Debug for OlmMachine {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
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f.debug_struct("OlmMachine")
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.field("user_id", &self.user_id)
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.field("device_id", &self.device_id)
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.finish()
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}
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}
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impl OlmMachine {
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const ALGORITHMS: &'static [&'static Algorithm] = &[
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&Algorithm::OlmV1Curve25519AesSha2,
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&Algorithm::MegolmV1AesSha2,
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];
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const MAX_TO_DEVICE_MESSAGES: usize = 20;
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/// Create a new memory based OlmMachine.
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///
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/// The created machine will keep the encryption keys only in memory and
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/// once the object is dropped the keys will be lost.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that owns this machine.
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///
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/// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device that owns this machine.
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pub fn new(user_id: &UserId, device_id: &str) -> Self {
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OlmMachine {
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user_id: user_id.clone(),
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device_id: device_id.to_owned(),
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account: Account::new(),
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uploaded_signed_key_count: None,
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store: Box::new(MemoryStore::new()),
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users_for_key_query: HashSet::new(),
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outbound_group_sessions: HashMap::new(),
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}
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}
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/// Create a new OlmMachine with the given `CryptoStore`.
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///
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/// The created machine will keep the encryption keys only in memory and
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/// once the object is dropped the keys will be lost.
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///
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/// If the store already contains encryption keys for the given user/device
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/// pair those will be re-used. Otherwise new ones will be created and
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/// stored.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that owns this machine.
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///
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/// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device that owns this machine.
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///
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/// * `store` - A `Cryptostore` implementation that will be used to store
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/// the encryption keys.
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pub async fn new_with_store(
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user_id: &UserId,
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device_id: &str,
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mut store: impl CryptoStore + 'static,
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) -> StoreError<Self> {
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let account = match store.load_account().await? {
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Some(a) => {
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debug!("Restored account");
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a
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}
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None => {
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debug!("Creating a new account");
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Account::new()
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}
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};
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Ok(OlmMachine {
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user_id: user_id.clone(),
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device_id: device_id.to_owned(),
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account,
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uploaded_signed_key_count: None,
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store: Box::new(store),
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users_for_key_query: HashSet::new(),
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outbound_group_sessions: HashMap::new(),
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})
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}
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#[cfg(feature = "sqlite-cryptostore")]
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#[instrument(skip(path, passphrase))]
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/// Create a new machine with the default crypto store.
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///
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/// The default store uses a SQLite database to store the encryption keys.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that owns this machine.
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///
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/// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device that owns this machine.
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pub async fn new_with_default_store<P: AsRef<Path>>(
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user_id: &UserId,
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device_id: &str,
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path: P,
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passphrase: String,
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) -> StoreError<Self> {
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let store =
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SqliteStore::open_with_passphrase(&user_id, device_id, path, passphrase).await?;
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OlmMachine::new_with_store(user_id, device_id, store).await
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}
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/// The unique user id that owns this identity.
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pub fn user_id(&self) -> &UserId {
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&self.user_id
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}
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/// The unique device id of the device that holds this identity.
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pub fn device_id(&self) -> &DeviceId {
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&self.device_id
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}
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/// Get the public parts of the identity keys.
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pub fn identity_keys(&self) -> &IdentityKeys {
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self.account.identity_keys()
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}
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/// Should account or one-time keys be uploaded to the server.
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pub async fn should_upload_keys(&self) -> bool {
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if !self.account.shared() {
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return true;
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}
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// If we have a known key count, check that we have more than
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// max_one_time_Keys() / 2, otherwise tell the client to upload more.
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match &self.uploaded_signed_key_count {
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Some(count) => {
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let max_keys = self.account.max_one_time_keys().await as u64;
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let key_count = (max_keys / 2) - count.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
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key_count > 0
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}
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None => false,
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}
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}
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/// Update the count of one-time keys that are currently on the server.
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fn update_key_count(&mut self, count: u64) {
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match &self.uploaded_signed_key_count {
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Some(c) => c.store(count, Ordering::Relaxed),
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None => self.uploaded_signed_key_count = Some(AtomicU64::new(count)),
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}
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}
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/// Receive a successful keys upload response.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `response` - The keys upload response of the request that the client
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/// performed.
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#[instrument]
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pub async fn receive_keys_upload_response(
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&mut self,
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response: &keys::upload_keys::Response,
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) -> OlmResult<()> {
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if !self.account.shared() {
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debug!("Marking account as shared");
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}
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self.account.mark_as_shared();
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let one_time_key_count = response
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.one_time_key_counts
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.get(&keys::KeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519);
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let count: u64 = one_time_key_count.map_or(0, |c| (*c).into());
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debug!(
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"Updated uploaded one-time key count {} -> {}, marking keys as published",
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self.uploaded_signed_key_count
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.as_ref()
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.map_or(0, |c| c.load(Ordering::Relaxed)),
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count
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);
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self.update_key_count(count);
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self.account.mark_keys_as_published().await;
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self.store.save_account(self.account.clone()).await?;
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Get the user/device pairs for which no Olm session exists.
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///
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/// Returns a map from the user id, to a map from the device id to a key
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/// algorithm.
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///
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/// This can be used to make a key claiming request to the server.
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///
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/// Sessions need to be established between devices so group sessions for a
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/// room can be shared with them.
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///
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/// This should be called every time a group session needs to be shared.
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///
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/// The response of a successful key claiming requests needs to be passed to
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/// the `OlmMachine` with the `receive_keys_claim_response()`.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// `users` - The list of users that we should check if we lack a session
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/// with one of their devices.
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pub async fn get_missing_sessions(
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&mut self,
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users: impl Iterator<Item = &UserId>,
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) -> OlmResult<BTreeMap<UserId, BTreeMap<DeviceId, KeyAlgorithm>>> {
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let mut missing = BTreeMap::new();
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for user_id in users {
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let user_devices = self.store.get_user_devices(user_id).await?;
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for device in user_devices.devices() {
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let sender_key = if let Some(k) = device.get_key(KeyAlgorithm::Curve25519) {
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k
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} else {
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continue;
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};
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let sessions = self.store.get_sessions(sender_key).await?;
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let is_missing = if let Some(sessions) = sessions {
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sessions.lock().await.is_empty()
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} else {
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true
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};
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if is_missing {
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if !missing.contains_key(user_id) {
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let _ = missing.insert(user_id.clone(), BTreeMap::new());
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}
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let user_map = missing.get_mut(user_id).unwrap();
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let _ = user_map.insert(
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device.device_id().to_owned(),
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KeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519,
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);
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}
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}
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}
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Ok(missing)
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}
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/// Receive a successful key claim response and create new Olm sessions with
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/// the claimed keys.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `response` - The response containing the claimed one-time keys.
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pub async fn receive_keys_claim_response(
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&mut self,
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response: &keys::claim_keys::Response,
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) -> OlmResult<()> {
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// TODO log the failures here
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for (user_id, user_devices) in &response.one_time_keys {
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for (device_id, key_map) in user_devices {
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let device = if let Some(d) = self
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.store
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.get_device(&user_id, device_id)
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.await
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.expect("Can't get devices")
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{
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d
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} else {
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warn!(
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"Tried to create an Olm session for {} {}, but the device is unknown",
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user_id, device_id
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);
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continue;
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};
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let one_time_key = if let Some(k) = key_map.values().next() {
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match k {
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OneTimeKey::SignedKey(k) => k,
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OneTimeKey::Key(_) => {
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warn!(
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"Tried to create an Olm session for {} {}, but
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the requested key isn't a signed curve key",
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user_id, device_id
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);
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continue;
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}
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}
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} else {
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warn!(
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"Tried to create an Olm session for {} {}, but the
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signed one-time key is missing",
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user_id, device_id
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);
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continue;
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};
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let signing_key = if let Some(k) = device.get_key(KeyAlgorithm::Ed25519) {
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k
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} else {
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warn!(
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"Tried to create an Olm session for {} {}, but the
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device is missing the signing key",
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user_id, device_id
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);
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continue;
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};
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if self
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.verify_json(user_id, device_id, signing_key, &mut json!(&one_time_key))
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.is_err()
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{
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warn!(
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"Failed to verify the one-time key signatures for {} {}",
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user_id, device_id
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);
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continue;
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}
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let curve_key = if let Some(k) = device.get_key(KeyAlgorithm::Curve25519) {
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k
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} else {
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warn!(
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"Tried to create an Olm session for {} {}, but the
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device is missing the curve key",
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user_id, device_id
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);
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continue;
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};
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info!("Creating outbound Session for {} {}", user_id, device_id);
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let session = match self
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.account
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.create_outbound_session(curve_key, &one_time_key)
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.await
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{
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Ok(s) => s,
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Err(e) => {
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warn!(
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"Error creating new Olm session for {} {}: {}",
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user_id, device_id, e
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);
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continue;
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}
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};
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if let Err(e) = self.store.save_sessions(&[session]).await {
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error!("Failed to store newly created Olm session {}", e);
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continue;
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}
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// TODO if this session was created because a previous one was
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// wedged queue up a dummy event to be sent out.
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// TODO if this session was created because of a key request,
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// mark the forwarding keys to be sent out
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Receive a successful keys query response.
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///
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/// Returns a list of devices newly discovered devices and devices that
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/// changed.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `response` - The keys query response of the request that the client
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/// performed.
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pub async fn receive_keys_query_response(
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&mut self,
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response: &keys::get_keys::Response,
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) -> OlmResult<Vec<Device>> {
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let mut changed_devices = Vec::new();
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for (user_id, device_map) in &response.device_keys {
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self.users_for_key_query.remove(&user_id);
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for (device_id, device_keys) in device_map.iter() {
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// We don't need our own device in the device store.
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if user_id == &self.user_id && device_id == &self.device_id {
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continue;
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}
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if user_id != &device_keys.user_id || device_id != &device_keys.device_id {
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warn!(
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"Mismatch in device keys payload of device {} from user {}",
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device_keys.device_id, device_keys.user_id
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);
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continue;
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}
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let ed_key_id = AlgorithmAndDeviceId(KeyAlgorithm::Ed25519, device_id.to_owned());
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let signing_key = if let Some(k) = device_keys.keys.get(&ed_key_id) {
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k
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} else {
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warn!(
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"Ed25519 identity key wasn't found for user/device {} {}",
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user_id, device_id
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);
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continue;
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};
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if self
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.verify_json(user_id, device_id, signing_key, &mut json!(&device_keys))
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.is_err()
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{
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warn!(
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"Failed to verify the device key signatures for {} {}",
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user_id, device_id
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);
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continue;
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}
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let device = self.store.get_device(&user_id, device_id).await?;
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let device = if let Some(mut d) = device {
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let stored_signing_key = d.get_key(KeyAlgorithm::Ed25519);
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if let Some(stored_signing_key) = stored_signing_key {
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if stored_signing_key != signing_key {
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warn!("Ed25519 key has changed for {} {}", user_id, device_id);
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continue;
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}
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}
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d.update_device(device_keys);
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d
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} else {
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let device = Device::from(device_keys);
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info!("Adding a new device to the device store {:?}", device);
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device
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};
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changed_devices.push(device);
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}
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|
|
let current_devices: HashSet<&DeviceId> = device_map.keys().collect();
|
|
let stored_devices = self.store.get_user_devices(&user_id).await.unwrap();
|
|
let stored_devices_set: HashSet<&DeviceId> = stored_devices.keys().collect();
|
|
|
|
let deleted_devices = stored_devices_set.difference(¤t_devices);
|
|
|
|
for device_id in deleted_devices {
|
|
if let Some(device) = stored_devices.get(device_id) {
|
|
device.mark_as_deleted();
|
|
self.store.delete_device(device).await?;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
self.store.save_devices(&changed_devices).await?;
|
|
|
|
Ok(changed_devices)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Generate new one-time keys.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns the number of newly generated one-time keys. If no keys can be
|
|
/// generated returns an empty error.
|
|
async fn generate_one_time_keys(&self) -> StdResult<u64, ()> {
|
|
match &self.uploaded_signed_key_count {
|
|
Some(count) => {
|
|
let count = count.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
|
|
let max_keys = self.account.max_one_time_keys().await as u64;
|
|
let max_on_server = max_keys / 2;
|
|
|
|
if count >= (max_on_server) {
|
|
return Err(());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let key_count = (max_on_server) - count;
|
|
|
|
let max_keys = self.account.max_one_time_keys().await;
|
|
|
|
let key_count: usize = key_count.try_into().unwrap_or(max_keys);
|
|
|
|
self.account.generate_one_time_keys(key_count).await;
|
|
Ok(key_count as u64)
|
|
}
|
|
None => Err(()),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Sign the device keys and return a JSON Value to upload them.
|
|
async fn device_keys(&self) -> DeviceKeys {
|
|
let identity_keys = self.account.identity_keys();
|
|
|
|
let mut keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
|
|
keys.insert(
|
|
AlgorithmAndDeviceId(KeyAlgorithm::Curve25519, self.device_id.clone()),
|
|
identity_keys.curve25519().to_owned(),
|
|
);
|
|
keys.insert(
|
|
AlgorithmAndDeviceId(KeyAlgorithm::Ed25519, self.device_id.clone()),
|
|
identity_keys.ed25519().to_owned(),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let device_keys = json!({
|
|
"user_id": self.user_id,
|
|
"device_id": self.device_id,
|
|
"algorithms": OlmMachine::ALGORITHMS,
|
|
"keys": keys,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
let mut signatures = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
|
|
let mut signature = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
signature.insert(
|
|
AlgorithmAndDeviceId(KeyAlgorithm::Ed25519, self.device_id.clone()),
|
|
self.sign_json(&device_keys).await,
|
|
);
|
|
signatures.insert(self.user_id.clone(), signature);
|
|
|
|
DeviceKeys {
|
|
user_id: self.user_id.clone(),
|
|
device_id: self.device_id.clone(),
|
|
algorithms: vec![
|
|
Algorithm::OlmV1Curve25519AesSha2,
|
|
Algorithm::MegolmV1AesSha2,
|
|
],
|
|
keys,
|
|
signatures,
|
|
unsigned: None,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Generate, sign and prepare one-time keys to be uploaded.
|
|
///
|
|
/// If no one-time keys need to be uploaded returns an empty error.
|
|
async fn signed_one_time_keys(&self) -> StdResult<OneTimeKeys, ()> {
|
|
let _ = self.generate_one_time_keys().await?;
|
|
let one_time_keys = self.account.one_time_keys().await;
|
|
let mut one_time_key_map = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
|
|
for (key_id, key) in one_time_keys.curve25519().iter() {
|
|
let key_json = json!({
|
|
"key": key,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
let signature = self.sign_json(&key_json).await;
|
|
|
|
let mut signature_map = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
|
|
signature_map.insert(
|
|
AlgorithmAndDeviceId(KeyAlgorithm::Ed25519, self.device_id.clone()),
|
|
signature,
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let mut signatures = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
signatures.insert(self.user_id.clone(), signature_map);
|
|
|
|
let signed_key = SignedKey {
|
|
key: key.to_owned(),
|
|
signatures,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
one_time_key_map.insert(
|
|
AlgorithmAndDeviceId(KeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519, key_id.to_owned()),
|
|
OneTimeKey::SignedKey(signed_key),
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(one_time_key_map)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Convert a JSON value to the canonical representation and sign the JSON
|
|
/// string.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `json` - The value that should be converted into a canonical JSON
|
|
/// string.
|
|
async fn sign_json(&self, json: &Value) -> String {
|
|
let canonical_json = cjson::to_string(json)
|
|
.unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!(format!("Can't serialize {} to canonical JSON", json)));
|
|
self.account.sign(&canonical_json).await
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Verify a signed JSON object.
|
|
///
|
|
/// The object must have a signatures key associated with an object of the
|
|
/// form `user_id: {key_id: signature}`.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns Ok if the signature was successfully verified, otherwise an
|
|
/// SignatureError.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `user_id` - The user who signed the JSON object.
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `device_id` - The device that signed the JSON object.
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `user_key` - The public ed25519 key which was used to sign the JSON
|
|
/// object.
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `json` - The JSON object that should be verified.
|
|
fn verify_json(
|
|
&self,
|
|
user_id: &UserId,
|
|
device_id: &str,
|
|
user_key: &str,
|
|
json: &mut Value,
|
|
) -> Result<(), SignatureError> {
|
|
let json_object = json.as_object_mut().ok_or(SignatureError::NotAnObject)?;
|
|
let unsigned = json_object.remove("unsigned");
|
|
let signatures = json_object.remove("signatures");
|
|
|
|
let canonical_json = cjson::to_string(json_object)?;
|
|
|
|
if let Some(u) = unsigned {
|
|
json_object.insert("unsigned".to_string(), u);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO this should be part of ruma-client-api.
|
|
let key_id_string = format!("{}:{}", KeyAlgorithm::Ed25519, device_id);
|
|
|
|
let signatures = signatures.ok_or(SignatureError::NoSignatureFound)?;
|
|
let signature_object = signatures
|
|
.as_object()
|
|
.ok_or(SignatureError::NoSignatureFound)?;
|
|
let signature = signature_object
|
|
.get(&user_id.to_string())
|
|
.ok_or(SignatureError::NoSignatureFound)?;
|
|
let signature = signature
|
|
.get(key_id_string)
|
|
.ok_or(SignatureError::NoSignatureFound)?;
|
|
let signature = signature.as_str().ok_or(SignatureError::NoSignatureFound)?;
|
|
|
|
let utility = OlmUtility::new();
|
|
|
|
let ret = if utility
|
|
.ed25519_verify(&user_key, &canonical_json, signature)
|
|
.is_ok()
|
|
{
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
} else {
|
|
Err(SignatureError::VerificationError)
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
json_object.insert("signatures".to_string(), signatures);
|
|
|
|
ret
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Get a tuple of device and one-time keys that need to be uploaded.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns an empty error if no keys need to be uploaded.
|
|
pub async fn keys_for_upload(
|
|
&self,
|
|
) -> StdResult<(Option<DeviceKeys>, Option<OneTimeKeys>), ()> {
|
|
if !self.should_upload_keys().await {
|
|
return Err(());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let shared = self.account.shared();
|
|
|
|
let device_keys = if !shared {
|
|
Some(self.device_keys().await)
|
|
} else {
|
|
None
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let one_time_keys: Option<OneTimeKeys> = self.signed_one_time_keys().await.ok();
|
|
|
|
Ok((device_keys, one_time_keys))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Try to decrypt an Olm message.
|
|
///
|
|
/// This try to decrypt an Olm message using all the sessions we share
|
|
/// have with the given sender.
|
|
async fn try_decrypt_olm_message(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
sender: &UserId,
|
|
sender_key: &str,
|
|
message: &OlmMessage,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<Option<String>> {
|
|
let s = self.store.get_sessions(sender_key).await?;
|
|
|
|
// We don't have any existing sessions, return early.
|
|
let sessions = if let Some(s) = s {
|
|
s
|
|
} else {
|
|
return Ok(None);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let mut session_to_save = None;
|
|
let mut plaintext = None;
|
|
|
|
for session in &mut *sessions.lock().await {
|
|
let mut matches = false;
|
|
|
|
// If this is a pre-key message check if it was encrypted for our
|
|
// session, if it wasn't decryption will fail so no need to try.
|
|
if let OlmMessage::PreKey(m) = &message {
|
|
matches = session.matches(sender_key, m.clone()).await?;
|
|
|
|
if !matches {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let ret = session.decrypt(message.clone()).await;
|
|
|
|
if let Ok(p) = ret {
|
|
plaintext = Some(p);
|
|
session_to_save = Some(session.clone());
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Decryption failed with a matching session, the session is
|
|
// likely wedged and needs to be rotated.
|
|
if matches {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Found a matching Olm session yet decryption failed
|
|
for sender {} and sender_key {}",
|
|
sender, sender_key
|
|
);
|
|
return Err(OlmError::SessionWedged);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let Some(session) = session_to_save {
|
|
// Decryption was successful, save the new ratchet state of the
|
|
// session that was used to decrypt the message.
|
|
trace!("Saved the new session state for {}", sender);
|
|
self.store.save_sessions(&[session]).await?;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(plaintext)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn decrypt_olm_message(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
sender: &UserId,
|
|
sender_key: &str,
|
|
message: OlmMessage,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<(EventJson<ToDeviceEvent>, String)> {
|
|
// First try to decrypt using an existing session.
|
|
let plaintext = if let Some(p) = self
|
|
.try_decrypt_olm_message(sender, sender_key, &message)
|
|
.await?
|
|
{
|
|
// Decryption succeeded, de-structure the plaintext out of the
|
|
// Option.
|
|
p
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Decryption failed with every known session, let's try to create a
|
|
// new session.
|
|
let mut session = match &message {
|
|
// A new session can only be created using a pre-key message,
|
|
// return with an error if it isn't one.
|
|
OlmMessage::Message(_) => {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Failed to decrypt a non-pre-key message with all
|
|
available sessions {} {}",
|
|
sender, sender_key
|
|
);
|
|
return Err(OlmError::SessionWedged);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
OlmMessage::PreKey(m) => {
|
|
// Create the new session.
|
|
let session = match self
|
|
.account
|
|
.create_inbound_session(sender_key, m.clone())
|
|
.await
|
|
{
|
|
Ok(s) => s,
|
|
Err(e) => {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Failed to create a new Olm session for {} {}
|
|
from a prekey message: {}",
|
|
sender, sender_key, e
|
|
);
|
|
return Err(OlmError::SessionWedged);
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Save the account since we remove the one-time key that
|
|
// was used to create this session.
|
|
self.store.save_account(self.account.clone()).await?;
|
|
session
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Decrypt our message, this shouldn't fail since we're using a
|
|
// newly created Session.
|
|
let plaintext = session.decrypt(message).await?;
|
|
|
|
// Save the new ratcheted state of the session.
|
|
self.store.save_sessions(&[session]).await?;
|
|
plaintext
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
trace!("Successfully decrypted a Olm message: {}", plaintext);
|
|
|
|
Ok(self.parse_decrypted_to_device_event(sender, &plaintext)?)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Parse a decrypted Olm message, check that the plaintext and encrypted
|
|
/// senders match and that the message was meant for us.
|
|
fn parse_decrypted_to_device_event(
|
|
&self,
|
|
sender: &UserId,
|
|
plaintext: &str,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<(EventJson<ToDeviceEvent>, String)> {
|
|
// TODO make the errors a bit more specific.
|
|
let decrypted_json: Value = serde_json::from_str(&plaintext)?;
|
|
|
|
let encrytped_sender = decrypted_json
|
|
.get("sender")
|
|
.cloned()
|
|
.ok_or_else(|| EventError::MissingField("sender".to_string()))?;
|
|
let encrytped_sender: UserId = serde_json::from_value(encrytped_sender)?;
|
|
let recipient = decrypted_json
|
|
.get("recipient")
|
|
.cloned()
|
|
.ok_or_else(|| EventError::MissingField("recipient".to_string()))?;
|
|
let recipient: UserId = serde_json::from_value(recipient)?;
|
|
|
|
let recipient_keys: BTreeMap<KeyAlgorithm, String> = serde_json::from_value(
|
|
decrypted_json
|
|
.get("recipient_keys")
|
|
.cloned()
|
|
.ok_or_else(|| EventError::MissingField("recipient_keys".to_string()))?,
|
|
)?;
|
|
let keys: BTreeMap<KeyAlgorithm, String> = serde_json::from_value(
|
|
decrypted_json
|
|
.get("keys")
|
|
.cloned()
|
|
.ok_or_else(|| EventError::MissingField("keys".to_string()))?,
|
|
)?;
|
|
|
|
if recipient != self.user_id || sender != &encrytped_sender {
|
|
return Err(EventError::MissmatchedSender.into());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if self.account.identity_keys().ed25519()
|
|
!= recipient_keys
|
|
.get(&KeyAlgorithm::Ed25519)
|
|
.ok_or(EventError::MissingSigningKey)?
|
|
{
|
|
return Err(EventError::MissmatchedKeys.into());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let signing_key = keys
|
|
.get(&KeyAlgorithm::Ed25519)
|
|
.ok_or(EventError::MissingSigningKey)?;
|
|
|
|
Ok((
|
|
serde_json::from_value::<EventJson<ToDeviceEvent>>(decrypted_json)?,
|
|
signing_key.to_owned(),
|
|
))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Decrypt a to-device event.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns a decrypted `ToDeviceEvent` if the decryption was successful,
|
|
/// an error indicating why decryption failed otherwise.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `event` - The to-device event that should be decrypted.
|
|
async fn decrypt_to_device_event(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
event: &ToDeviceEncrypted,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<EventJson<ToDeviceEvent>> {
|
|
info!("Decrypting to-device event");
|
|
|
|
let content = if let EncryptedEventContent::OlmV1Curve25519AesSha2(c) = &event.content {
|
|
c
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn!("Error, unsupported encryption algorithm");
|
|
return Err(EventError::UnsupportedAlgorithm.into());
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let identity_keys = self.account.identity_keys();
|
|
let own_key = identity_keys.curve25519();
|
|
let own_ciphertext = content.ciphertext.get(own_key);
|
|
|
|
// Try to find a ciphertext that was meant for our device.
|
|
if let Some(ciphertext) = own_ciphertext {
|
|
let message_type: u8 = ciphertext
|
|
.message_type
|
|
.try_into()
|
|
.map_err(|_| EventError::UnsupportedOlmType)?;
|
|
|
|
// Create a OlmMessage from the ciphertext and the type.
|
|
let message =
|
|
OlmMessage::from_type_and_ciphertext(message_type.into(), ciphertext.body.clone())
|
|
.map_err(|_| EventError::UnsupportedOlmType)?;
|
|
|
|
// Decrypt the OlmMessage and get a Ruma event out of it.
|
|
let (decrypted_event, signing_key) = self
|
|
.decrypt_olm_message(&event.sender, &content.sender_key, message)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
debug!("Decrypted a to-device event {:?}", decrypted_event);
|
|
|
|
// Handle the decrypted event, e.g. fetch out Megolm sessions out of
|
|
// the event.
|
|
if let Some(event) = self
|
|
.handle_decrypted_to_device_event(
|
|
&content.sender_key,
|
|
&signing_key,
|
|
&decrypted_event,
|
|
)
|
|
.await?
|
|
{
|
|
// Some events may have sensitive data e.g. private keys, while we
|
|
// wan't to notify our users that a private key was received we
|
|
// don't want them to be able to do silly things with it. Handling
|
|
// events modifies them and returns a modified one, so replace it
|
|
// here if we get one.
|
|
Ok(event)
|
|
} else {
|
|
Ok(decrypted_event)
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn!("Olm event doesn't contain a ciphertext for our key");
|
|
Err(EventError::MissingCiphertext.into())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Create a group session from a room key and add it to our crypto store.
|
|
async fn add_room_key(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
sender_key: &str,
|
|
signing_key: &str,
|
|
event: &mut ToDeviceRoomKey,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<Option<EventJson<ToDeviceEvent>>> {
|
|
match event.content.algorithm {
|
|
Algorithm::MegolmV1AesSha2 => {
|
|
let session_key = GroupSessionKey(mem::take(&mut event.content.session_key));
|
|
|
|
let session = InboundGroupSession::new(
|
|
sender_key,
|
|
signing_key,
|
|
&event.content.room_id,
|
|
session_key,
|
|
)?;
|
|
let _ = self.store.save_inbound_group_session(session).await?;
|
|
// TODO ideally we would rewrap the event again just like so
|
|
// let event = EventJson::from(ToDeviceEvent::RoomKey(event.clone()));
|
|
// This saidly lacks a type once it's serialized again, fix
|
|
// this in Ruma.
|
|
let mut json = serde_json::to_value(event.clone())?;
|
|
json.as_object_mut()
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.insert("type".to_owned(), Value::String("m.room_key".to_owned()));
|
|
let event = serde_json::from_value::<EventJson<ToDeviceEvent>>(json)?;
|
|
|
|
Ok(Some(event))
|
|
}
|
|
_ => {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Received room key with unsupported key algorithm {}",
|
|
event.content.algorithm
|
|
);
|
|
Ok(None)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Create a new outbound group session.
|
|
///
|
|
/// This also creates a matching inbound group session and saves that one in
|
|
/// the store.
|
|
async fn create_outbound_group_session(&mut self, room_id: &RoomId) -> OlmResult<()> {
|
|
let session = OutboundGroupSession::new(room_id);
|
|
let identity_keys = self.account.identity_keys();
|
|
|
|
let sender_key = identity_keys.curve25519();
|
|
let signing_key = identity_keys.ed25519();
|
|
|
|
let inbound_session = InboundGroupSession::new(
|
|
sender_key,
|
|
signing_key,
|
|
&room_id,
|
|
session.session_key().await,
|
|
)?;
|
|
let _ = self
|
|
.store
|
|
.save_inbound_group_session(inbound_session)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
let _ = self
|
|
.outbound_group_sessions
|
|
.insert(room_id.to_owned(), session);
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Encrypt a room message for the given room.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Beware that a group session needs to be shared before this method can be
|
|
/// called using the `share_group_session()` method.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Since group sessions can expire or become invalid if the room membership
|
|
/// changes client authors should check with the
|
|
/// `should_share_group_session()` method if a new group session needs to
|
|
/// be shared.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `room_id` - The id of the room for which the message should be
|
|
/// encrypted.
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `content` - The plaintext content of the message that should be
|
|
/// encrypted.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Panics
|
|
///
|
|
/// Panics if a group session for the given room wasn't shared beforehand.
|
|
pub async fn encrypt(
|
|
&self,
|
|
room_id: &RoomId,
|
|
content: MessageEventContent,
|
|
) -> MegolmResult<EncryptedEventContent> {
|
|
let session = self.outbound_group_sessions.get(room_id);
|
|
|
|
let session = if let Some(s) = session {
|
|
s
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!("Session wasn't created nor shared");
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
if session.expired() {
|
|
panic!("Session is expired");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let json_content = json!({
|
|
"content": content,
|
|
"room_id": room_id,
|
|
"type": EventType::RoomMessage,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
let plaintext = cjson::to_string(&json_content).unwrap_or_else(|_| {
|
|
panic!(format!(
|
|
"Can't serialize {} to canonical JSON",
|
|
json_content
|
|
))
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
let ciphertext = session.encrypt(plaintext).await;
|
|
|
|
Ok(EncryptedEventContent::MegolmV1AesSha2(
|
|
MegolmV1AesSha2Content {
|
|
ciphertext,
|
|
sender_key: self.account.identity_keys().curve25519().to_owned(),
|
|
session_id: session.session_id().to_owned(),
|
|
device_id: self.device_id.to_owned(),
|
|
},
|
|
))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Encrypt some JSON content using the given Olm session.
|
|
async fn olm_encrypt(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
mut session: Session,
|
|
recipient_device: &Device,
|
|
event_type: EventType,
|
|
content: Value,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<EncryptedEventContent> {
|
|
let identity_keys = self.account.identity_keys();
|
|
|
|
let recipient_signing_key = recipient_device
|
|
.get_key(KeyAlgorithm::Ed25519)
|
|
.ok_or(EventError::MissingSigningKey)?;
|
|
let recipient_sender_key = recipient_device
|
|
.get_key(KeyAlgorithm::Curve25519)
|
|
.ok_or(EventError::MissingSigningKey)?;
|
|
|
|
let payload = json!({
|
|
"sender": self.user_id,
|
|
"sender_device": self.device_id,
|
|
"keys": {
|
|
"ed25519": identity_keys.ed25519(),
|
|
},
|
|
"recipient": recipient_device.user_id(),
|
|
"recipient_keys": {
|
|
"ed25519": recipient_signing_key,
|
|
},
|
|
"type": event_type,
|
|
"content": content,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
let plaintext = cjson::to_string(&payload)
|
|
.unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!(format!("Can't serialize {} to canonical JSON", payload)));
|
|
|
|
let ciphertext = session.encrypt(&plaintext).await.to_tuple();
|
|
self.store.save_sessions(&[session]).await?;
|
|
|
|
let message_type: usize = ciphertext.0.into();
|
|
|
|
let ciphertext = CiphertextInfo {
|
|
body: ciphertext.1,
|
|
message_type: (message_type as u32).into(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let mut content = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
|
|
content.insert(recipient_sender_key.to_owned(), ciphertext);
|
|
|
|
Ok(EncryptedEventContent::OlmV1Curve25519AesSha2(
|
|
OlmV1Curve25519AesSha2Content {
|
|
sender_key: identity_keys.curve25519().to_owned(),
|
|
ciphertext: content,
|
|
},
|
|
))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Should the client share a group session for the given room.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns true if a session needs to be shared before room messages can be
|
|
/// encrypted, false if one is already shared and ready to encrypt room
|
|
/// messages.
|
|
///
|
|
/// This should be called every time a new room message wants to be sent out
|
|
/// since group sessions can expire at any time.
|
|
pub fn should_share_group_session(&self, room_id: &RoomId) -> bool {
|
|
let session = self.outbound_group_sessions.get(room_id);
|
|
|
|
match session {
|
|
Some(s) => !s.shared() || s.expired(),
|
|
None => true,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO accept an algorithm here
|
|
/// Get to-device requests to share a group session with users in a room.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// `room_id` - The room id of the room where the group session will be
|
|
/// used.
|
|
///
|
|
/// `users` - The list of users that should receive the group session.
|
|
pub async fn share_group_session<'a, I>(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
room_id: &RoomId,
|
|
users: I,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<Vec<ToDeviceRequest>>
|
|
where
|
|
I: IntoIterator<Item = &'a UserId>,
|
|
{
|
|
self.create_outbound_group_session(room_id).await?;
|
|
let megolm_session = self.outbound_group_sessions.get(room_id).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
if megolm_session.shared() {
|
|
panic!("Session is already shared");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let session_id = megolm_session.session_id().to_owned();
|
|
megolm_session.mark_as_shared();
|
|
|
|
let key_content = json!({
|
|
"algorithm": Algorithm::MegolmV1AesSha2,
|
|
"room_id": room_id,
|
|
"session_id": session_id.clone(),
|
|
"session_key": megolm_session.session_key().await,
|
|
"chain_index": megolm_session.message_index().await,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
let mut user_map = Vec::new();
|
|
|
|
for user_id in users {
|
|
for device in self.store.get_user_devices(user_id).await?.devices() {
|
|
let sender_key = if let Some(k) = device.get_key(KeyAlgorithm::Curve25519) {
|
|
k
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"The device {} of user {} doesn't have a curve 25519 key",
|
|
user_id,
|
|
device.device_id()
|
|
);
|
|
// TODO mark the user for a key query.
|
|
continue;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// TODO abort if the device isn't verified
|
|
let sessions = self.store.get_sessions(sender_key).await?;
|
|
|
|
if let Some(s) = sessions {
|
|
let session = &s.lock().await[0];
|
|
user_map.push((session.clone(), device.clone()));
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Trying to encrypt a Megolm session for user
|
|
{} on device {}, but no Olm session is found",
|
|
user_id,
|
|
device.device_id()
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let mut message_vec = Vec::new();
|
|
|
|
for user_map_chunk in user_map.chunks(OlmMachine::MAX_TO_DEVICE_MESSAGES) {
|
|
let mut messages = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
|
|
for (session, device) in user_map_chunk {
|
|
if !messages.contains_key(device.user_id()) {
|
|
messages.insert(device.user_id().clone(), BTreeMap::new());
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let user_messages = messages.get_mut(device.user_id()).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let encrypted_content = self
|
|
.olm_encrypt(
|
|
session.clone(),
|
|
&device,
|
|
EventType::RoomKey,
|
|
key_content.clone(),
|
|
)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
// TODO enable this again once we can send encrypted event
|
|
// contents with ruma.
|
|
user_messages.insert(
|
|
DeviceIdOrAllDevices::DeviceId(device.device_id().clone()),
|
|
serde_json::value::to_raw_value(&encrypted_content)?,
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
message_vec.push(ToDeviceRequest {
|
|
event_type: EventType::RoomEncrypted,
|
|
txn_id: Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
|
|
messages,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(message_vec)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn add_forwarded_room_key(
|
|
&self,
|
|
_sender_key: &str,
|
|
_signing_key: &str,
|
|
_event: &ToDeviceForwardedRoomKey,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<()> {
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
// TODO
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Receive and properly handle a decrypted to-device event.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `sender_key` - The sender (curve25519) key of the event sender.
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `signing_key` - The signing (ed25519) key of the event sender.
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `event` - The decrypted to-device event.
|
|
async fn handle_decrypted_to_device_event(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
sender_key: &str,
|
|
signing_key: &str,
|
|
event: &EventJson<ToDeviceEvent>,
|
|
) -> OlmResult<Option<EventJson<ToDeviceEvent>>> {
|
|
let event = if let Ok(e) = event.deserialize() {
|
|
e
|
|
} else {
|
|
warn!("Decrypted to-device event failed to be parsed correctly");
|
|
return Ok(None);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match event {
|
|
ToDeviceEvent::RoomKey(mut e) => {
|
|
Ok(self.add_room_key(sender_key, signing_key, &mut e).await?)
|
|
}
|
|
ToDeviceEvent::ForwardedRoomKey(e) => {
|
|
self.add_forwarded_room_key(sender_key, signing_key, &e)?;
|
|
Ok(None)
|
|
}
|
|
_ => {
|
|
warn!("Received a unexpected encrypted to-device event");
|
|
Ok(None)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn handle_room_key_request(&self, _: &ToDeviceRoomKeyRequest) {
|
|
// TODO handle room key requests here.
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn handle_verification_event(&self, _: &ToDeviceEvent) {
|
|
// TODO handle to-device verification events here.
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Handle a sync response and update the internal state of the Olm machine.
|
|
///
|
|
/// This will decrypt to-device events but will not touch events in the room
|
|
/// timeline.
|
|
///
|
|
/// To decrypt an event from the room timeline call `decrypt_room_event()`.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `response` - The sync latest sync response.
|
|
#[instrument(skip(response))]
|
|
pub async fn receive_sync_response(&mut self, response: &mut SyncResponse) {
|
|
let one_time_key_count = response
|
|
.device_one_time_keys_count
|
|
.get(&keys::KeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519);
|
|
|
|
let count: u64 = one_time_key_count.map_or(0, |c| (*c).into());
|
|
self.update_key_count(count);
|
|
|
|
for event_result in &mut response.to_device.events {
|
|
let event = if let Ok(e) = event_result.deserialize() {
|
|
e
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Skip invalid events.
|
|
warn!("Received an invalid to-device event {:?}", event_result);
|
|
continue;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
info!("Received a to-device event {:?}", event);
|
|
|
|
match &event {
|
|
ToDeviceEvent::RoomEncrypted(e) => {
|
|
let decrypted_event = match self.decrypt_to_device_event(e).await {
|
|
Ok(e) => e,
|
|
Err(err) => {
|
|
warn!(
|
|
"Failed to decrypt to-device event from {} {}",
|
|
e.sender, err
|
|
);
|
|
// TODO if the session is wedged mark it for
|
|
// unwedging.
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// TODO make sure private keys are cleared from the event
|
|
// before we replace the result.
|
|
*event_result = decrypted_event;
|
|
}
|
|
ToDeviceEvent::RoomKeyRequest(e) => self.handle_room_key_request(e),
|
|
ToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationAccept(..)
|
|
| ToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationCancel(..)
|
|
| ToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationKey(..)
|
|
| ToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationMac(..)
|
|
| ToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationRequest(..)
|
|
| ToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationStart(..) => self.handle_verification_event(&event),
|
|
_ => continue,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Decrypt an event from a room timeline.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `event` - The event that should be decrypted.
|
|
pub async fn decrypt_room_event(
|
|
&mut self,
|
|
event: &EncryptedEvent,
|
|
) -> MegolmResult<EventJson<RoomEvent>> {
|
|
let content = match &event.content {
|
|
EncryptedEventContent::MegolmV1AesSha2(c) => c,
|
|
_ => return Err(EventError::UnsupportedAlgorithm.into()),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let room_id = event.room_id.as_ref().unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let session = self
|
|
.store
|
|
.get_inbound_group_session(&room_id, &content.sender_key, &content.session_id)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
// TODO check if the Olm session is wedged and re-request the key.
|
|
let session = session.ok_or(MegolmError::MissingSession)?;
|
|
|
|
let (plaintext, _) = session.decrypt(content.ciphertext.clone()).await?;
|
|
// TODO check the message index.
|
|
// TODO check if this is from a verified device.
|
|
|
|
let mut decrypted_value = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&plaintext)?;
|
|
let decrypted_object = decrypted_value
|
|
.as_object_mut()
|
|
.ok_or(EventError::NotAnObject)?;
|
|
|
|
// TODO better number conversion here.
|
|
let server_ts = event
|
|
.origin_server_ts
|
|
.duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
|
|
.unwrap_or_default()
|
|
.as_millis();
|
|
let server_ts: i64 = server_ts.try_into().unwrap_or_default();
|
|
|
|
decrypted_object.insert("sender".to_owned(), event.sender.to_string().into());
|
|
decrypted_object.insert("event_id".to_owned(), event.event_id.to_string().into());
|
|
decrypted_object.insert("origin_server_ts".to_owned(), server_ts.into());
|
|
|
|
decrypted_object.insert(
|
|
"unsigned".to_owned(),
|
|
serde_json::to_value(&event.unsigned).unwrap_or_default(),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let decrypted_event = serde_json::from_value::<EventJson<RoomEvent>>(decrypted_value)?;
|
|
trace!("Successfully decrypted Megolm event {:?}", decrypted_event);
|
|
// TODO set the encryption info on the event (is it verified, was it
|
|
// decrypted, sender key...)
|
|
|
|
Ok(decrypted_event)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Update the tracked users.
|
|
///
|
|
/// # Arguments
|
|
///
|
|
/// * `users` - An iterator over user ids that should be marked for
|
|
/// tracking.
|
|
///
|
|
/// This will only not already seen users for a key query and user tracking.
|
|
/// If the user is already known to the Olm machine it will not be
|
|
/// considered for a key query.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Use the `mark_user_as_changed()` if the user really needs a key query.
|
|
pub async fn update_tracked_users<'a, I>(&mut self, users: I)
|
|
where
|
|
I: IntoIterator<Item = &'a UserId>,
|
|
{
|
|
for user in users {
|
|
let ret = self.store.add_user_for_tracking(user).await;
|
|
|
|
match ret {
|
|
Ok(newly_added) => {
|
|
if newly_added {
|
|
self.users_for_key_query.insert(user.clone());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
Err(e) => {
|
|
warn!("Error storing users for tracking {}", e);
|
|
self.users_for_key_query.insert(user.clone());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Should the client perform a key query request.
|
|
pub fn should_query_keys(&self) -> bool {
|
|
!self.users_for_key_query.is_empty()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Get the set of users that we need to query keys for.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Returns a hash set of users that need to be queried for keys.
|
|
pub fn users_for_key_query(&self) -> HashSet<UserId> {
|
|
self.users_for_key_query.clone()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod test {
|
|
static USER_ID: &str = "@bob:example.org";
|
|
static DEVICE_ID: &str = "DEVICEID";
|
|
|
|
use matrix_sdk_common::js_int::UInt;
|
|
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
|
|
use std::convert::TryFrom;
|
|
use std::fs::File;
|
|
use std::io::prelude::*;
|
|
use std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64;
|
|
use std::time::SystemTime;
|
|
|
|
use http::Response;
|
|
use serde_json::json;
|
|
|
|
use crate::machine::{OlmMachine, OneTimeKeys};
|
|
use crate::Device;
|
|
|
|
use matrix_sdk_common::api::r0::{
|
|
keys, to_device::send_event_to_device::Request as ToDeviceRequest,
|
|
};
|
|
use matrix_sdk_common::events::{
|
|
collections::all::RoomEvent,
|
|
room::{
|
|
encrypted::{EncryptedEvent, EncryptedEventContent},
|
|
message::{MessageEventContent, TextMessageEventContent},
|
|
},
|
|
to_device::{AnyToDeviceEvent, ToDeviceEncrypted},
|
|
EventJson, EventType, UnsignedData,
|
|
};
|
|
use matrix_sdk_common::identifiers::{DeviceId, EventId, RoomId, UserId};
|
|
|
|
fn alice_id() -> UserId {
|
|
UserId::try_from("@alice:example.org").unwrap()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn alice_device_id() -> DeviceId {
|
|
"JLAFKJWSCS".to_string()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn user_id() -> UserId {
|
|
UserId::try_from(USER_ID).unwrap()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn response_from_file(path: &str) -> Response<Vec<u8>> {
|
|
let mut file = File::open(path)
|
|
.unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!(format!("No such data file found {}", path)));
|
|
let mut contents = Vec::new();
|
|
file.read_to_end(&mut contents)
|
|
.unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!(format!("Can't read data file {}", path)));
|
|
|
|
Response::builder().status(200).body(contents).unwrap()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn keys_upload_response() -> keys::upload_keys::Response {
|
|
let data = response_from_file("../test_data/keys_upload.json");
|
|
keys::upload_keys::Response::try_from(data).expect("Can't parse the keys upload response")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn keys_query_response() -> keys::get_keys::Response {
|
|
let data = response_from_file("../test_data/keys_query.json");
|
|
keys::get_keys::Response::try_from(data).expect("Can't parse the keys upload response")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn to_device_requests_to_content(requests: Vec<ToDeviceRequest>) -> EncryptedEventContent {
|
|
let to_device_request = &requests[0];
|
|
|
|
let content: EventJson<EncryptedEventContent> = serde_json::from_str(
|
|
to_device_request
|
|
.messages
|
|
.values()
|
|
.next()
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.values()
|
|
.next()
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.get(),
|
|
)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
content.deserialize().unwrap()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn get_prepared_machine() -> (OlmMachine, OneTimeKeys) {
|
|
let mut machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), DEVICE_ID);
|
|
machine.uploaded_signed_key_count = Some(AtomicU64::new(0));
|
|
let (_, otk) = machine
|
|
.keys_for_upload()
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Can't prepare initial key upload");
|
|
let response = keys_upload_response();
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
(machine, otk.unwrap())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn get_machine_after_query() -> (OlmMachine, OneTimeKeys) {
|
|
let (mut machine, otk) = get_prepared_machine().await;
|
|
let response = keys_query_response();
|
|
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_query_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
(machine, otk)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn get_machine_pair() -> (OlmMachine, OlmMachine, OneTimeKeys) {
|
|
let (bob, otk) = get_prepared_machine().await;
|
|
|
|
let alice_id = alice_id();
|
|
let alice_device = alice_device_id();
|
|
let alice = OlmMachine::new(&alice_id, &alice_device);
|
|
|
|
let alice_deivce = Device::from(&alice);
|
|
let bob_device = Device::from(&bob);
|
|
alice.store.save_devices(&[bob_device]).await.unwrap();
|
|
bob.store.save_devices(&[alice_deivce]).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
(alice, bob, otk)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn get_machine_pair_with_session() -> (OlmMachine, OlmMachine) {
|
|
let (mut alice, bob, one_time_keys) = get_machine_pair().await;
|
|
|
|
let mut bob_keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
|
|
let one_time_key = one_time_keys.iter().next().unwrap();
|
|
let mut keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
keys.insert(one_time_key.0.clone(), one_time_key.1.clone());
|
|
bob_keys.insert(bob.device_id.clone(), keys);
|
|
|
|
let mut one_time_keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
one_time_keys.insert(bob.user_id.clone(), bob_keys);
|
|
|
|
let response = keys::claim_keys::Response {
|
|
failures: BTreeMap::new(),
|
|
one_time_keys,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
alice.receive_keys_claim_response(&response).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
(alice, bob)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn get_machine_pair_with_setup_sessions() -> (OlmMachine, OlmMachine) {
|
|
let (mut alice, mut bob) = get_machine_pair_with_session().await;
|
|
|
|
let session = alice
|
|
.store
|
|
.get_sessions(bob.account.identity_keys().curve25519())
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.lock()
|
|
.await[0]
|
|
.clone();
|
|
|
|
let bob_device = alice
|
|
.store
|
|
.get_device(&bob.user_id, &bob.device_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let event = ToDeviceEncrypted {
|
|
sender: alice.user_id.clone(),
|
|
content: alice
|
|
.olm_encrypt(session, &bob_device, EventType::Dummy, json!({}))
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
bob.decrypt_to_device_event(&event).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
(alice, bob)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn create_olm_machine() {
|
|
let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), DEVICE_ID);
|
|
assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn receive_keys_upload_response() {
|
|
let mut machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), DEVICE_ID);
|
|
let mut response = keys_upload_response();
|
|
|
|
response
|
|
.one_time_key_counts
|
|
.remove(&keys::KeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519)
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
|
|
response.one_time_key_counts.insert(
|
|
keys::KeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519,
|
|
UInt::try_from(10).unwrap(),
|
|
);
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
|
|
response.one_time_key_counts.insert(
|
|
keys::KeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519,
|
|
UInt::try_from(50).unwrap(),
|
|
);
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(!machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn generate_one_time_keys() {
|
|
let mut machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), DEVICE_ID);
|
|
|
|
let mut response = keys_upload_response();
|
|
|
|
assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
assert!(machine.generate_one_time_keys().await.is_err());
|
|
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await);
|
|
assert!(machine.generate_one_time_keys().await.is_ok());
|
|
|
|
response.one_time_key_counts.insert(
|
|
keys::KeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519,
|
|
UInt::try_from(50).unwrap(),
|
|
);
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(machine.generate_one_time_keys().await.is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_device_key_signing() {
|
|
let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), DEVICE_ID);
|
|
|
|
let mut device_keys = machine.device_keys().await;
|
|
let identity_keys = machine.account.identity_keys();
|
|
let ed25519_key = identity_keys.ed25519();
|
|
|
|
let ret = machine.verify_json(
|
|
&machine.user_id,
|
|
&machine.device_id,
|
|
ed25519_key,
|
|
&mut json!(&mut device_keys),
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(ret.is_ok());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_invalid_signature() {
|
|
let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), DEVICE_ID);
|
|
|
|
let mut device_keys = machine.device_keys().await;
|
|
|
|
let ret = machine.verify_json(
|
|
&machine.user_id,
|
|
&machine.device_id,
|
|
"fake_key",
|
|
&mut json!(&mut device_keys),
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(ret.is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_one_time_key_signing() {
|
|
let mut machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), DEVICE_ID);
|
|
machine.uploaded_signed_key_count = Some(AtomicU64::new(49));
|
|
|
|
let mut one_time_keys = machine.signed_one_time_keys().await.unwrap();
|
|
let identity_keys = machine.account.identity_keys();
|
|
let ed25519_key = identity_keys.ed25519();
|
|
|
|
let mut one_time_key = one_time_keys.values_mut().next().unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let ret = machine.verify_json(
|
|
&machine.user_id,
|
|
&machine.device_id,
|
|
ed25519_key,
|
|
&mut json!(&mut one_time_key),
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(ret.is_ok());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_keys_for_upload() {
|
|
let mut machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), DEVICE_ID);
|
|
machine.uploaded_signed_key_count = Some(AtomicU64::default());
|
|
|
|
let identity_keys = machine.account.identity_keys();
|
|
let ed25519_key = identity_keys.ed25519();
|
|
|
|
let (device_keys, mut one_time_keys) = machine
|
|
.keys_for_upload()
|
|
.await
|
|
.expect("Can't prepare initial key upload");
|
|
|
|
let ret = machine.verify_json(
|
|
&machine.user_id,
|
|
&machine.device_id,
|
|
ed25519_key,
|
|
&mut json!(&mut one_time_keys.as_mut().unwrap().values_mut().next()),
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(ret.is_ok());
|
|
|
|
let ret = machine.verify_json(
|
|
&machine.user_id,
|
|
&machine.device_id,
|
|
ed25519_key,
|
|
&mut json!(&mut device_keys.unwrap()),
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(ret.is_ok());
|
|
|
|
let mut response = keys_upload_response();
|
|
response.one_time_key_counts.insert(
|
|
keys::KeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519,
|
|
UInt::new_wrapping(one_time_keys.unwrap().len() as u64),
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_upload_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let ret = machine.keys_for_upload().await;
|
|
assert!(ret.is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_keys_query() {
|
|
let (mut machine, _) = get_prepared_machine().await;
|
|
let response = keys_query_response();
|
|
let alice_id = UserId::try_from("@alice:example.org").unwrap();
|
|
let alice_device_id = "JLAFKJWSCS".to_owned();
|
|
|
|
let alice_devices = machine.store.get_user_devices(&alice_id).await.unwrap();
|
|
assert!(alice_devices.devices().peekable().peek().is_none());
|
|
|
|
machine
|
|
.receive_keys_query_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let device = machine
|
|
.store
|
|
.get_device(&alice_id, &alice_device_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(device.user_id(), &alice_id);
|
|
assert_eq!(device.device_id(), &alice_device_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_missing_sessions_calculation() {
|
|
let (mut machine, _) = get_machine_after_query().await;
|
|
|
|
let alice = alice_id();
|
|
let alice_device = alice_device_id();
|
|
|
|
let missing_sessions = machine
|
|
.get_missing_sessions([alice.clone()].iter())
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
assert!(missing_sessions.contains_key(&alice));
|
|
let user_sessions = missing_sessions.get(&alice).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(user_sessions.contains_key(&alice_device));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_session_creation() {
|
|
let (mut alice_machine, bob_machine, one_time_keys) = get_machine_pair().await;
|
|
|
|
let mut bob_keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
|
|
let one_time_key = one_time_keys.iter().next().unwrap();
|
|
let mut keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
keys.insert(one_time_key.0.clone(), one_time_key.1.clone());
|
|
bob_keys.insert(bob_machine.device_id.clone(), keys);
|
|
|
|
let mut one_time_keys = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
one_time_keys.insert(bob_machine.user_id.clone(), bob_keys);
|
|
|
|
let response = keys::claim_keys::Response {
|
|
failures: BTreeMap::new(),
|
|
one_time_keys,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
alice_machine
|
|
.receive_keys_claim_response(&response)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let session = alice_machine
|
|
.store
|
|
.get_sessions(bob_machine.account.identity_keys().curve25519())
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
assert!(!session.lock().await.is_empty())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_olm_encryption() {
|
|
let (mut alice, mut bob) = get_machine_pair_with_session().await;
|
|
|
|
let session = alice
|
|
.store
|
|
.get_sessions(bob.account.identity_keys().curve25519())
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.lock()
|
|
.await[0]
|
|
.clone();
|
|
|
|
let bob_device = alice
|
|
.store
|
|
.get_device(&bob.user_id, &bob.device_id)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let event = ToDeviceEncrypted {
|
|
sender: alice.user_id.clone(),
|
|
content: alice
|
|
.olm_encrypt(session, &bob_device, EventType::Dummy, json!({}))
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let event = bob.decrypt_to_device_event(&event).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
if let AnyToDeviceEvent::Dummy(e) = event.deserialize().unwrap() {
|
|
assert_eq!(e.sender, alice.user_id);
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!("Event had the wrong type");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_room_key_sharing() {
|
|
let (mut alice, mut bob) = get_machine_pair_with_session().await;
|
|
|
|
let room_id = RoomId::try_from("!test:example.org").unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let to_device_requests = alice
|
|
.share_group_session(&room_id, [bob.user_id.clone()].iter())
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let event = ToDeviceEncrypted {
|
|
sender: alice.user_id.clone(),
|
|
content: to_device_requests_to_content(to_device_requests),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let alice_session = alice.outbound_group_sessions.get(&room_id).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let event = bob.decrypt_to_device_event(&event).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
if let AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomKey(e) = event.deserialize().unwrap() {
|
|
assert_eq!(e.sender, alice.user_id);
|
|
assert!(e.content.session_key.is_empty())
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!("Event had the wrong type");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let session = bob
|
|
.store
|
|
.get_inbound_group_session(
|
|
&room_id,
|
|
alice.account.identity_keys().curve25519(),
|
|
alice_session.session_id(),
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
|
|
assert!(session.unwrap().is_some());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn test_megolm_encryption() {
|
|
let (mut alice, mut bob) = get_machine_pair_with_setup_sessions().await;
|
|
let room_id = RoomId::try_from("!test:example.org").unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let to_device_requests = alice
|
|
.share_group_session(&room_id, [bob.user_id().clone()].iter())
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let event = ToDeviceEncrypted {
|
|
sender: alice.user_id().clone(),
|
|
content: to_device_requests_to_content(to_device_requests),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
bob.decrypt_to_device_event(&event).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let plaintext = "It is a secret to everybody";
|
|
|
|
let content = MessageEventContent::Text(TextMessageEventContent::new_plain(plaintext));
|
|
|
|
let encrypted_content = alice.encrypt(&room_id, content.clone()).await.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let event = EncryptedEvent {
|
|
event_id: EventId::new("example.org").unwrap(),
|
|
origin_server_ts: SystemTime::now(),
|
|
room_id: Some(room_id.clone()),
|
|
sender: alice.user_id().clone(),
|
|
content: encrypted_content,
|
|
unsigned: UnsignedData::default(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let decrypted_event = bob
|
|
.decrypt_room_event(&event)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap()
|
|
.deserialize()
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let decrypted_event = match decrypted_event {
|
|
RoomEvent::RoomMessage(e) => e,
|
|
_ => panic!("Decrypted room event has the wrong type"),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
assert_eq!(&decrypted_event.sender, alice.user_id());
|
|
assert_eq!(&decrypted_event.room_id, &Some(room_id));
|
|
if let MessageEventContent::Text(c) = &decrypted_event.content {
|
|
assert_eq!(&c.body, plaintext);
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!("Decrypted event has a missmatched content");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|