// Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. // // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. // You may obtain a copy of the License at // // http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 // // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. #[cfg(feature = "sled_cryptostore")] use std::path::Path; use std::{ collections::{BTreeMap, HashSet}, mem, sync::Arc, }; use dashmap::DashMap; use matrix_sdk_common::{ deserialized_responses::{AlgorithmInfo, EncryptionInfo, SyncRoomEvent, VerificationState}, locks::Mutex, uuid::Uuid, }; use ruma::{ api::client::r0::{ keys::{ claim_keys::{Request as KeysClaimRequest, Response as KeysClaimResponse}, get_keys::Response as KeysQueryResponse, upload_keys, upload_signatures::Request as UploadSignaturesRequest, }, sync::sync_events::{DeviceLists, ToDevice}, }, assign, events::{ room::encrypted::{ EncryptedEventContent, EncryptedEventScheme, EncryptedToDeviceEventContent, }, room_key::RoomKeyToDeviceEventContent, secret::request::SecretName, AnyMessageEventContent, AnyRoomEvent, AnyToDeviceEvent, SyncMessageEvent, ToDeviceEvent, }, DeviceId, DeviceIdBox, DeviceKeyAlgorithm, EventEncryptionAlgorithm, RoomId, UInt, UserId, }; use tracing::{debug, error, info, trace, warn}; #[cfg(feature = "sled_cryptostore")] use crate::store::sled::SledStore; use crate::{ error::{EventError, MegolmError, MegolmResult, OlmError, OlmResult}, gossiping::GossipMachine, identities::{user::UserIdentities, Device, IdentityManager, UserDevices}, olm::{ Account, CrossSigningStatus, EncryptionSettings, ExportedRoomKey, GroupSessionKey, IdentityKeys, InboundGroupSession, OlmDecryptionInfo, PrivateCrossSigningIdentity, ReadOnlyAccount, SessionType, }, requests::{IncomingResponse, OutgoingRequest, UploadSigningKeysRequest}, session_manager::{GroupSessionManager, SessionManager}, store::{ Changes, CryptoStore, DeviceChanges, IdentityChanges, MemoryStore, Result as StoreResult, SecretImportError, Store, }, verification::{Verification, VerificationMachine, VerificationRequest}, CrossSigningKeyExport, ToDeviceRequest, }; /// State machine implementation of the Olm/Megolm encryption protocol used for /// Matrix end to end encryption. #[derive(Clone)] pub struct OlmMachine { /// The unique user id that owns this account. user_id: Arc, /// The unique device id of the device that holds this account. device_id: Arc, /// Our underlying Olm Account holding our identity keys. account: Account, /// The private part of our cross signing identity. /// Used to sign devices and other users, might be missing if some other /// device bootstrapped cross signing or cross signing isn't bootstrapped at /// all. user_identity: Arc>, /// Store for the encryption keys. /// Persists all the encryption keys so a client can resume the session /// without the need to create new keys. store: Store, /// A state machine that handles Olm sessions creation. session_manager: SessionManager, /// A state machine that keeps track of our outbound group sessions. group_session_manager: GroupSessionManager, /// A state machine that is responsible to handle and keep track of SAS /// verification flows. verification_machine: VerificationMachine, /// The state machine that is responsible to handle outgoing and incoming /// key requests. key_request_machine: GossipMachine, /// State machine handling public user identities and devices, keeping track /// of when a key query needs to be done and handling one. identity_manager: IdentityManager, } #[cfg(not(tarpaulin_include))] impl std::fmt::Debug for OlmMachine { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { f.debug_struct("OlmMachine") .field("user_id", &self.user_id) .field("device_id", &self.device_id) .finish() } } impl OlmMachine { /// Create a new memory based OlmMachine. /// /// The created machine will keep the encryption keys only in memory and /// once the object is dropped the keys will be lost. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that owns this machine. /// /// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device that owns this machine. pub fn new(user_id: &UserId, device_id: &DeviceId) -> Self { let store: Box = Box::new(MemoryStore::new()); let device_id: DeviceIdBox = device_id.into(); let account = ReadOnlyAccount::new(user_id, &device_id); OlmMachine::new_helper( user_id, device_id, store, account, PrivateCrossSigningIdentity::empty(user_id.to_owned()), ) } fn new_helper( user_id: &UserId, device_id: DeviceIdBox, store: Box, account: ReadOnlyAccount, user_identity: PrivateCrossSigningIdentity, ) -> Self { let user_id = Arc::new(user_id.clone()); let user_identity = Arc::new(Mutex::new(user_identity)); let store: Arc = store.into(); let verification_machine = VerificationMachine::new(account.clone(), user_identity.clone(), store.clone()); let store = Store::new(user_id.clone(), user_identity.clone(), store, verification_machine.clone()); let device_id: Arc = device_id.into(); let users_for_key_claim = Arc::new(DashMap::new()); let account = Account { inner: account, store: store.clone() }; let group_session_manager = GroupSessionManager::new(account.clone(), store.clone()); let key_request_machine = GossipMachine::new( user_id.clone(), device_id.clone(), store.clone(), group_session_manager.session_cache(), users_for_key_claim.clone(), ); let session_manager = SessionManager::new( account.clone(), users_for_key_claim, key_request_machine.clone(), store.clone(), ); let identity_manager = IdentityManager::new(user_id.clone(), device_id.clone(), store.clone()); OlmMachine { user_id, device_id, account, user_identity, store, session_manager, group_session_manager, verification_machine, key_request_machine, identity_manager, } } /// Create a new OlmMachine with the given [`CryptoStore`]. /// /// The created machine will keep the encryption keys only in memory and /// once the object is dropped the keys will be lost. /// /// If the store already contains encryption keys for the given user/device /// pair those will be re-used. Otherwise new ones will be created and /// stored. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that owns this machine. /// /// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device that owns this machine. /// /// * `store` - A `Cryptostore` implementation that will be used to store /// the encryption keys. /// /// [`Cryptostore`]: trait.CryptoStore.html pub async fn new_with_store( user_id: UserId, device_id: DeviceIdBox, store: Box, ) -> StoreResult { let account = match store.load_account().await? { Some(a) => { debug!(ed25519_key = a.identity_keys().ed25519(), "Restored an Olm account"); a } None => { let account = ReadOnlyAccount::new(&user_id, &device_id); debug!( ed25519_key = account.identity_keys().ed25519(), "Created a new Olm account" ); store.save_account(account.clone()).await?; account } }; let identity = match store.load_identity().await? { Some(i) => { let master_key = i .master_public_key() .await .and_then(|m| m.get_first_key().map(|m| m.to_string())); debug!( master_key =? master_key, "Restored the cross signing identity" ); i } None => { debug!("Creating an empty cross signing identity stub"); PrivateCrossSigningIdentity::empty(user_id.clone()) } }; Ok(OlmMachine::new_helper(&user_id, device_id, store, account, identity)) } /// Create a new machine with the default crypto store. /// /// The default store uses a Sled database to store the encryption keys. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that owns this machine. /// /// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device that owns this machine. #[cfg(feature = "sled_cryptostore")] #[cfg_attr(feature = "docs", doc(cfg(sled_cryptostore)))] pub async fn new_with_default_store( user_id: &UserId, device_id: &DeviceId, path: impl AsRef, passphrase: Option<&str>, ) -> StoreResult { let store = SledStore::open_with_passphrase(path, passphrase)?; OlmMachine::new_with_store(user_id.to_owned(), device_id.into(), Box::new(store)).await } /// The unique user id that owns this `OlmMachine` instance. pub fn user_id(&self) -> &UserId { &self.user_id } /// The unique device id that identifies this `OlmMachine`. pub fn device_id(&self) -> &DeviceId { &self.device_id } /// Get the public parts of our Olm identity keys. pub fn identity_keys(&self) -> &IdentityKeys { self.account.identity_keys() } /// Get the display name of our own device pub async fn dislpay_name(&self) -> StoreResult> { self.store.device_display_name().await } /// Get all the tracked users we know about pub fn tracked_users(&self) -> HashSet { self.store.tracked_users() } /// Get the outgoing requests that need to be sent out. /// /// This returns a list of `OutGoingRequest`, those requests need to be sent /// out to the server and the responses need to be passed back to the state /// machine using [`mark_request_as_sent`]. /// /// [`mark_request_as_sent`]: #method.mark_request_as_sent pub async fn outgoing_requests(&self) -> StoreResult> { let mut requests = Vec::new(); if let Some(r) = self .keys_for_upload() .await .map(|r| OutgoingRequest { request_id: Uuid::new_v4(), request: Arc::new(r.into()) }) { requests.push(r); } for request in self.identity_manager.users_for_key_query().await.into_iter().map(|r| OutgoingRequest { request_id: Uuid::new_v4(), request: Arc::new(r.into()), }) { requests.push(request); } requests.append(&mut self.verification_machine.outgoing_messages()); requests.append(&mut self.key_request_machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await?); Ok(requests) } /// Mark the request with the given request id as sent. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `request_id` - The unique id of the request that was sent out. This is /// needed to couple the response with the now sent out request. /// /// * `response` - The response that was received from the server after the /// outgoing request was sent out. pub async fn mark_request_as_sent<'a>( &self, request_id: &Uuid, response: impl Into>, ) -> OlmResult<()> { match response.into() { IncomingResponse::KeysUpload(response) => { self.receive_keys_upload_response(response).await?; } IncomingResponse::KeysQuery(response) => { self.receive_keys_query_response(response).await?; } IncomingResponse::KeysClaim(response) => { self.receive_keys_claim_response(response).await?; } IncomingResponse::ToDevice(_) => { self.mark_to_device_request_as_sent(request_id).await?; } IncomingResponse::SigningKeysUpload(_) => { self.receive_cross_signing_upload_response().await?; } IncomingResponse::SignatureUpload(_) => { self.verification_machine.mark_request_as_sent(request_id); } IncomingResponse::RoomMessage(_) => { self.verification_machine.mark_request_as_sent(request_id); } }; Ok(()) } /// Mark the cross signing identity as shared. async fn receive_cross_signing_upload_response(&self) -> StoreResult<()> { let identity = self.user_identity.lock().await; identity.mark_as_shared(); let changes = Changes { private_identity: Some(identity.clone()), ..Default::default() }; self.store.save_changes(changes).await } /// Create a new cross signing identity and get the upload request to push /// the new public keys to the server. /// /// **Warning**: This will delete any existing cross signing keys that might /// exist on the server and thus will reset the trust between all the /// devices. /// /// Uploading these keys will require user interactive auth. pub async fn bootstrap_cross_signing( &self, reset: bool, ) -> StoreResult<(UploadSigningKeysRequest, UploadSignaturesRequest)> { let mut identity = self.user_identity.lock().await; if identity.is_empty().await || reset { info!("Creating new cross signing identity"); let (id, request, signature_request) = self.account.bootstrap_cross_signing().await; *identity = id; let public = identity.to_public_identity().await.expect( "Couldn't create a public version of the identity from a new private identity", ); let changes = Changes { identities: IdentityChanges { new: vec![public.into()], ..Default::default() }, private_identity: Some(identity.clone()), ..Default::default() }; self.store.save_changes(changes).await?; Ok((request, signature_request)) } else { info!("Trying to upload the existing cross signing identity"); let request = identity.as_upload_request().await; // TODO remove this expect. let signature_request = identity.sign_account(&self.account).await.expect("Can't sign device keys"); Ok((request, signature_request)) } } /// Should device or one-time keys be uploaded to the server. /// /// This needs to be checked periodically, ideally after every sync request. /// /// # Example /// /// ``` /// # use std::convert::TryFrom; /// # use matrix_sdk_crypto::OlmMachine; /// # use ruma::UserId; /// # use futures::executor::block_on; /// # let alice = UserId::try_from("@alice:example.org").unwrap(); /// # let machine = OlmMachine::new(&alice, "DEVICEID".into()); /// # block_on(async { /// if machine.should_upload_keys().await { /// let request = machine /// .keys_for_upload() /// .await /// .unwrap(); /// /// // Upload the keys here. /// } /// # }); /// ``` #[cfg(test)] async fn should_upload_keys(&self) -> bool { self.account.should_upload_keys().await } /// Get the underlying Olm account of the machine. #[cfg(test)] pub(crate) fn account(&self) -> &ReadOnlyAccount { &self.account } /// Receive a successful keys upload response. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `response` - The keys upload response of the request that the client /// performed. async fn receive_keys_upload_response( &self, response: &upload_keys::Response, ) -> OlmResult<()> { self.account.receive_keys_upload_response(response).await } /// Get the a key claiming request for the user/device pairs that we are /// missing Olm sessions for. /// /// Returns None if no key claiming request needs to be sent out. /// /// Sessions need to be established between devices so group sessions for a /// room can be shared with them. /// /// This should be called every time a group session needs to be shared as /// well as between sync calls. After a sync some devices may request room /// keys without us having a valid Olm session with them, making it /// impossible to server the room key request, thus it's necessary to check /// for missing sessions between sync as well. /// /// **Note**: Care should be taken that only one such request at a time is /// in flight, e.g. using a lock. /// /// The response of a successful key claiming requests needs to be passed to /// the `OlmMachine` with the [`mark_request_as_sent`]. /// /// # Arguments /// /// `users` - The list of users that we should check if we lack a session /// with one of their devices. This can be an empty iterator when calling /// this method between sync requests. /// /// [`mark_request_as_sent`]: #method.mark_request_as_sent pub async fn get_missing_sessions( &self, users: impl Iterator, ) -> StoreResult> { self.session_manager.get_missing_sessions(users).await } /// Receive a successful key claim response and create new Olm sessions with /// the claimed keys. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `response` - The response containing the claimed one-time keys. async fn receive_keys_claim_response(&self, response: &KeysClaimResponse) -> OlmResult<()> { self.session_manager.receive_keys_claim_response(response).await } /// Receive a successful keys query response. /// /// Returns a list of devices newly discovered devices and devices that /// changed. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `response` - The keys query response of the request that the client /// performed. async fn receive_keys_query_response( &self, response: &KeysQueryResponse, ) -> OlmResult<(DeviceChanges, IdentityChanges)> { self.identity_manager.receive_keys_query_response(response).await } /// Get a request to upload E2EE keys to the server. /// /// Returns None if no keys need to be uploaded. /// /// The response of a successful key upload requests needs to be passed to /// the [`OlmMachine`] with the [`receive_keys_upload_response`]. /// /// [`receive_keys_upload_response`]: #method.receive_keys_upload_response /// [`OlmMachine`]: struct.OlmMachine.html async fn keys_for_upload(&self) -> Option { let (device_keys, one_time_keys) = self.account.keys_for_upload().await?; Some(assign!(upload_keys::Request::new(), { device_keys, one_time_keys })) } /// Decrypt a to-device event. /// /// Returns a decrypted `ToDeviceEvent` if the decryption was successful, /// an error indicating why decryption failed otherwise. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `event` - The to-device event that should be decrypted. async fn decrypt_to_device_event( &self, event: &ToDeviceEvent, ) -> OlmResult { let mut decrypted = self.account.decrypt_to_device_event(event).await?; // Handle the decrypted event, e.g. fetch out Megolm sessions out of // the event. if let (Some(event), group_session) = self.handle_decrypted_to_device_event(&decrypted).await? { // Some events may have sensitive data e.g. private keys, while we // want to notify our users that a private key was received we // don't want them to be able to do silly things with it. Handling // events modifies them and returns a modified one, so replace it // here if we get one. decrypted.deserialized_event = Some(event); decrypted.inbound_group_session = group_session; } Ok(decrypted) } /// Create a group session from a room key and add it to our crypto store. async fn add_room_key( &self, sender_key: &str, signing_key: &str, event: &mut ToDeviceEvent, ) -> OlmResult<(Option, Option)> { match event.content.algorithm { EventEncryptionAlgorithm::MegolmV1AesSha2 => { let session_key = GroupSessionKey(mem::take(&mut event.content.session_key)); let session = InboundGroupSession::new( sender_key, signing_key, &event.content.room_id, session_key, None, )?; info!( "Received a new room key from {} for room {} with session id {}", event.sender, event.content.room_id, session.session_id() ); let event = AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomKey(event.clone()); Ok((Some(event), Some(session))) } _ => { warn!( "Received room key with unsupported key algorithm {}", event.content.algorithm ); Ok((None, None)) } } } #[cfg(test)] pub(crate) async fn create_outbound_group_session_with_defaults( &self, room_id: &RoomId, ) -> OlmResult<()> { let (_, session) = self .group_session_manager .create_outbound_group_session(room_id, EncryptionSettings::default()) .await?; self.store.save_inbound_group_sessions(&[session]).await?; Ok(()) } /// Encrypt a room message for the given room. /// /// Beware that a group session needs to be shared before this method can be /// called using the [`share_group_session`] method. /// /// Since group sessions can expire or become invalid if the room membership /// changes client authors should check with the /// [`should_share_group_session`] method if a new group session needs to /// be shared. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `room_id` - The id of the room for which the message should be /// encrypted. /// /// * `content` - The plaintext content of the message that should be /// encrypted. /// /// # Panics /// /// Panics if a group session for the given room wasn't shared beforehand. /// /// [`should_share_group_session`]: #method.should_share_group_session /// [`share_group_session`]: #method.share_group_session pub async fn encrypt( &self, room_id: &RoomId, content: AnyMessageEventContent, ) -> MegolmResult { self.group_session_manager.encrypt(room_id, content).await } /// Invalidate the currently active outbound group session for the given /// room. /// /// Returns true if a session was invalidated, false if there was no session /// to invalidate. pub async fn invalidate_group_session(&self, room_id: &RoomId) -> StoreResult { self.group_session_manager.invalidate_group_session(room_id).await } /// Get to-device requests to share a group session with users in a room. /// /// # Arguments /// /// `room_id` - The room id of the room where the group session will be /// used. /// /// `users` - The list of users that should receive the group session. pub async fn share_group_session( &self, room_id: &RoomId, users: impl Iterator, encryption_settings: impl Into, ) -> OlmResult>> { self.group_session_manager.share_group_session(room_id, users, encryption_settings).await } /// Receive and properly handle a decrypted to-device event. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `sender_key` - The sender (curve25519) key of the event sender. /// /// * `signing_key` - The signing (ed25519) key of the event sender. /// /// * `event` - The decrypted to-device event. async fn handle_decrypted_to_device_event( &self, decrypted: &OlmDecryptionInfo, ) -> OlmResult<(Option, Option)> { let event = match decrypted.event.deserialize() { Ok(e) => e, Err(e) => { warn!("Decrypted to-device event failed to be parsed correctly {:?}", e); return Ok((None, None)); } }; match event { AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomKey(mut e) => { Ok(self.add_room_key(&decrypted.sender_key, &decrypted.signing_key, &mut e).await?) } AnyToDeviceEvent::ForwardedRoomKey(mut e) => Ok(self .key_request_machine .receive_forwarded_room_key(&decrypted.sender_key, &mut e) .await?), AnyToDeviceEvent::SecretSend(mut e) => Ok(( self.key_request_machine.receive_secret(&decrypted.sender_key, &mut e).await?, None, )), _ => { warn!(event_type =? event.event_type(), "Received an unexpected encrypted to-device event"); Ok((Some(event), None)) } } } async fn handle_verification_event(&self, event: &AnyToDeviceEvent) { if let Err(e) = self.verification_machine.receive_any_event(event).await { error!("Error handling a verification event: {:?}", e); } } /// Mark an outgoing to-device requests as sent. async fn mark_to_device_request_as_sent(&self, request_id: &Uuid) -> StoreResult<()> { self.verification_machine.mark_request_as_sent(request_id); self.key_request_machine.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(*request_id).await?; self.group_session_manager.mark_request_as_sent(request_id).await?; self.session_manager.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(request_id); Ok(()) } /// Get a verification object for the given user id with the given flow id. pub fn get_verification(&self, user_id: &UserId, flow_id: &str) -> Option { self.verification_machine.get_verification(user_id, flow_id) } /// Get a verification request object with the given flow id. pub fn get_verification_request( &self, user_id: &UserId, flow_id: impl AsRef, ) -> Option { self.verification_machine.get_request(user_id, flow_id) } /// Get all the verification requests of a given user. pub fn get_verification_requests(&self, user_id: &UserId) -> Vec { self.verification_machine.get_requests(user_id) } fn update_one_time_key_count(&self, key_count: &BTreeMap) { self.account.update_uploaded_key_count(key_count); } async fn handle_to_device_event(&self, event: &AnyToDeviceEvent) { match event { AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomKeyRequest(e) => { self.key_request_machine.receive_incoming_key_request(e) } AnyToDeviceEvent::SecretRequest(e) => { self.key_request_machine.receive_incoming_secret_request(e) } AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationAccept(..) | AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationCancel(..) | AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationKey(..) | AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationMac(..) | AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationRequest(..) | AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationReady(..) | AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationDone(..) | AnyToDeviceEvent::KeyVerificationStart(..) => { self.handle_verification_event(event).await; } AnyToDeviceEvent::Dummy(_) | AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomKey(_) | AnyToDeviceEvent::ForwardedRoomKey(_) | AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomEncrypted(_) => {} _ => {} } } /// Handle a to-device and one-time key counts from a sync response. /// /// This will decrypt and handle to-device events returning the decrypted /// versions of them. /// /// To decrypt an event from the room timeline call [`decrypt_room_event`]. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `to_device_events` - The to-device events of the current sync /// response. /// /// * `changed_devices` - The list of devices that changed in this sync /// response. /// /// * `one_time_keys_count` - The current one-time keys counts that the sync /// response returned. /// /// [`decrypt_room_event`]: #method.decrypt_room_event pub async fn receive_sync_changes( &self, to_device_events: ToDevice, changed_devices: &DeviceLists, one_time_keys_counts: &BTreeMap, ) -> OlmResult { // Remove verification objects that have expired or are done. let mut events = self.verification_machine.garbage_collect(); // Always save the account, a new session might get created which also // touches the account. let mut changes = Changes { account: Some(self.account.inner.clone()), ..Default::default() }; self.update_one_time_key_count(one_time_keys_counts); for user_id in &changed_devices.changed { if let Err(e) = self.identity_manager.mark_user_as_changed(user_id).await { error!("Error marking a tracked user as changed {:?}", e); } } for mut raw_event in to_device_events.events { let event = match raw_event.deserialize() { Ok(e) => e, Err(e) => { // Skip invalid events. warn!( error =? e, "Received an invalid to-device event" ); continue; } }; info!( sender = event.sender().as_str(), event_type = event.event_type(), "Received a to-device event" ); match event { AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomEncrypted(e) => { let decrypted = match self.decrypt_to_device_event(&e).await { Ok(e) => e, Err(err) => { warn!(sender = e.sender.as_str(), error =? e, "Failed to decrypt to-device event"); if let OlmError::SessionWedged(sender, curve_key) = err { if let Err(e) = self .session_manager .mark_device_as_wedged(&sender, &curve_key) .await { error!( sender = sender.as_str(), error =? e, "Couldn't mark device from to be unwedged", ); } } continue; } }; // New sessions modify the account so we need to save that // one as well. match decrypted.session { SessionType::New(s) => { changes.sessions.push(s); changes.account = Some(self.account.inner.clone()); } SessionType::Existing(s) => { changes.sessions.push(s); } } changes.message_hashes.push(decrypted.message_hash); if let Some(group_session) = decrypted.inbound_group_session { changes.inbound_group_sessions.push(group_session); } if let Some(event) = decrypted.deserialized_event { self.handle_to_device_event(&event).await; } raw_event = decrypted.event; } e => self.handle_to_device_event(&e).await, } events.push(raw_event); } let changed_sessions = self.key_request_machine.collect_incoming_key_requests().await?; changes.sessions.extend(changed_sessions); self.store.save_changes(changes).await?; let mut to_device = ToDevice::new(); to_device.events = events; Ok(to_device) } /// Request a room key from our devices. /// /// This method will return a request cancellation and a new key request if /// the key was already requested, otherwise it will return just the key /// request. /// /// The request cancellation *must* be sent out before the request is sent /// out, otherwise devices will ignore the key request. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `room_id` - The id of the room where the key is used in. /// /// * `sender_key` - The curve25519 key of the sender that owns the key. /// /// * `session_id` - The id that uniquely identifies the session. pub async fn request_room_key( &self, event: &SyncMessageEvent, room_id: &RoomId, ) -> MegolmResult<(Option, OutgoingRequest)> { let content = match &event.content.scheme { EncryptedEventScheme::MegolmV1AesSha2(c) => c, _ => return Err(EventError::UnsupportedAlgorithm.into()), }; Ok(self .key_request_machine .request_key(room_id, &content.sender_key, &content.session_id) .await?) } async fn get_encryption_info( &self, session: &InboundGroupSession, sender: &UserId, device_id: &DeviceId, ) -> StoreResult { let verification_state = if let Some(device) = self.get_device(sender, device_id).await?.filter(|d| { d.get_key(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::Curve25519) .map(|k| k == session.sender_key()) .unwrap_or(false) }) { if (self.user_id() == device.user_id() && self.device_id() == device.device_id()) || device.verified() { VerificationState::Trusted } else { VerificationState::Untrusted } } else { VerificationState::UnknownDevice }; let sender = sender.clone(); let device_id = device_id.to_owned(); Ok(EncryptionInfo { sender, sender_device: device_id, algorithm_info: AlgorithmInfo::MegolmV1AesSha2 { curve25519_key: session.sender_key().to_owned(), sender_claimed_keys: session.signing_keys().to_owned(), forwarding_curve25519_key_chain: session.forwarding_key_chain().to_vec(), }, verification_state, }) } /// Decrypt an event from a room timeline. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `event` - The event that should be decrypted. /// /// * `room_id` - The ID of the room where the event was sent to. pub async fn decrypt_room_event( &self, event: &SyncMessageEvent, room_id: &RoomId, ) -> MegolmResult { let content = match &event.content.scheme { EncryptedEventScheme::MegolmV1AesSha2(c) => c, _ => return Err(EventError::UnsupportedAlgorithm.into()), }; let session = self .store .get_inbound_group_session(room_id, &content.sender_key, &content.session_id) .await?; // TODO check if the Olm session is wedged and re-request the key. let session = if let Some(s) = session { s } else { self.key_request_machine .create_outgoing_key_request(room_id, &content.sender_key, &content.session_id) .await?; return Err(MegolmError::MissingSession); }; // TODO check the message index. // TODO check if this is from a verified device. let (decrypted_event, _) = session.decrypt(event).await?; trace!("Successfully decrypted a Megolm event {:?}", decrypted_event); if let Ok(e) = decrypted_event.deserialize() { let event = e.into_full_event(room_id.to_owned()); if let AnyRoomEvent::Message(e) = event { self.verification_machine.receive_any_event(&e).await?; } } let encryption_info = self.get_encryption_info(&session, &event.sender, &content.device_id).await?; Ok(SyncRoomEvent { encryption_info: Some(encryption_info), event: decrypted_event }) } /// Update the tracked users. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `users` - An iterator over user ids that should be marked for /// tracking. /// /// This will mark users that weren't seen before for a key query and /// tracking. /// /// If the user is already known to the Olm machine it will not be /// considered for a key query. pub async fn update_tracked_users(&self, users: impl IntoIterator) { self.identity_manager.update_tracked_users(users).await } /// Get a specific device of a user. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that the device belongs to. /// /// * `device_id` - The unique id of the device. /// /// Returns a `Device` if one is found and the crypto store didn't throw an /// error. /// /// # Example /// /// ``` /// # use std::convert::TryFrom; /// # use matrix_sdk_crypto::OlmMachine; /// # use ruma::UserId; /// # use futures::executor::block_on; /// # let alice = UserId::try_from("@alice:example.org").unwrap(); /// # let machine = OlmMachine::new(&alice, "DEVICEID".into()); /// # block_on(async { /// let device = machine.get_device(&alice, "DEVICEID".into()).await; /// /// println!("{:?}", device); /// # }); /// ``` pub async fn get_device( &self, user_id: &UserId, device_id: &DeviceId, ) -> StoreResult> { self.store.get_device(user_id, device_id).await } /// Get the cross signing user identity of a user. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that the identity belongs to /// /// Returns a `UserIdentities` enum if one is found and the crypto store /// didn't throw an error. pub async fn get_identity(&self, user_id: &UserId) -> StoreResult> { self.store.get_identity(user_id).await } /// Get a map holding all the devices of an user. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `user_id` - The unique id of the user that the devices belong to. /// /// # Example /// /// ``` /// # use std::convert::TryFrom; /// # use matrix_sdk_crypto::OlmMachine; /// # use ruma::UserId; /// # use futures::executor::block_on; /// # let alice = UserId::try_from("@alice:example.org").unwrap(); /// # let machine = OlmMachine::new(&alice, "DEVICEID".into()); /// # block_on(async { /// let devices = machine.get_user_devices(&alice).await.unwrap(); /// /// for device in devices.devices() { /// println!("{:?}", device); /// } /// # }); /// ``` pub async fn get_user_devices(&self, user_id: &UserId) -> StoreResult { self.store.get_user_devices(user_id).await } /// Import the given room keys into our store. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `exported_keys` - A list of previously exported keys that should be /// imported into our store. If we already have a better version of a key /// the key will *not* be imported. /// /// Returns a tuple of numbers that represent the number of sessions that /// were imported and the total number of sessions that were found in the /// key export. /// /// # Examples /// ```no_run /// # use std::io::Cursor; /// # use matrix_sdk_crypto::{OlmMachine, decrypt_key_export}; /// # use ruma::user_id; /// # use futures::executor::block_on; /// # let alice = user_id!("@alice:example.org"); /// # let machine = OlmMachine::new(&alice, "DEVICEID".into()); /// # block_on(async { /// # let export = Cursor::new("".to_owned()); /// let exported_keys = decrypt_key_export(export, "1234").unwrap(); /// machine.import_keys(exported_keys, |_, _| {}).await.unwrap(); /// # }); /// ``` pub async fn import_keys( &self, exported_keys: Vec, progress_listener: impl Fn(usize, usize), ) -> StoreResult<(usize, usize)> { struct ShallowSessions { inner: BTreeMap, u32>, } impl ShallowSessions { fn has_better_session(&self, session: &InboundGroupSession) -> bool { self.inner .get(&session.room_id) .map(|existing| existing <= &session.first_known_index()) .unwrap_or(false) } } let mut sessions = Vec::new(); let existing_sessions = ShallowSessions { inner: self .store .get_inbound_group_sessions() .await? .into_iter() .map(|s| { let index = s.first_known_index(); (s.room_id, index) }) .collect(), }; let total_sessions = exported_keys.len(); for (i, key) in exported_keys.into_iter().enumerate() { let session = InboundGroupSession::from_export(key)?; // Only import the session if we didn't have this session or if it's // a better version of the same session, that is the first known // index is lower. if !existing_sessions.has_better_session(&session) { sessions.push(session) } progress_listener(i, total_sessions) } let num_sessions = sessions.len(); let changes = Changes { inbound_group_sessions: sessions, ..Default::default() }; self.store.save_changes(changes).await?; info!("Successfully imported {} inbound group sessions", num_sessions); Ok((num_sessions, total_sessions)) } /// Export the keys that match the given predicate. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `predicate` - A closure that will be called for every known /// `InboundGroupSession`, which represents a room key. If the closure /// returns `true` the `InboundGroupSession` will be included in the export, /// if the closure returns `false` it will not be included. /// /// # Panics /// /// This method will panic if it can't get enough randomness from the OS to /// encrypt the exported keys securely. /// /// # Examples /// /// ```no_run /// # use matrix_sdk_crypto::{OlmMachine, encrypt_key_export}; /// # use ruma::{user_id, room_id}; /// # use futures::executor::block_on; /// # let alice = user_id!("@alice:example.org"); /// # let machine = OlmMachine::new(&alice, "DEVICEID".into()); /// # block_on(async { /// let room_id = room_id!("!test:localhost"); /// let exported_keys = machine.export_keys(|s| s.room_id() == &room_id).await.unwrap(); /// let encrypted_export = encrypt_key_export(&exported_keys, "1234", 1); /// # }); /// ``` pub async fn export_keys( &self, mut predicate: impl FnMut(&InboundGroupSession) -> bool, ) -> StoreResult> { let mut exported = Vec::new(); let mut sessions: Vec = self .store .get_inbound_group_sessions() .await? .drain(..) .filter(|s| predicate(s)) .collect(); for session in sessions.drain(..) { let export = session.export().await; exported.push(export); } Ok(exported) } /// Get the status of the private cross signing keys. /// /// This can be used to check which private cross signing keys we have /// stored locally. pub async fn cross_signing_status(&self) -> CrossSigningStatus { self.user_identity.lock().await.status().await } /// Export all the private cross signing keys we have. /// /// The export will contain the seed for the ed25519 keys as a unpadded /// base64 encoded string. /// /// This method returns `None` if we don't have any private cross signing /// keys. pub async fn export_cross_signing_keys(&self) -> Option { let master_key = self.store.export_secret(&SecretName::CrossSigningMasterKey).await; let self_signing_key = self.store.export_secret(&SecretName::CrossSigningSelfSigningKey).await; let user_signing_key = self.store.export_secret(&SecretName::CrossSigningUserSigningKey).await; if master_key.is_none() && self_signing_key.is_none() && user_signing_key.is_none() { None } else { Some(CrossSigningKeyExport { master_key, self_signing_key, user_signing_key }) } } /// Import our private cross signing keys. /// /// The export needs to contain the seed for the ed25519 keys as an unpadded /// base64 encoded string. pub async fn import_cross_signing_keys( &self, export: CrossSigningKeyExport, ) -> Result { self.store.import_cross_signing_keys(export).await } } #[cfg(test)] pub(crate) mod test { static USER_ID: &str = "@bob:example.org"; use std::{ collections::BTreeMap, convert::{TryFrom, TryInto}, sync::Arc, }; use http::Response; use matrix_sdk_test::test_json; use ruma::{ api::{ client::r0::keys::{claim_keys, get_keys, upload_keys}, IncomingResponse, }, encryption::OneTimeKey, event_id, events::{ dummy::DummyToDeviceEventContent, room::{ encrypted::EncryptedToDeviceEventContent, message::{MessageEventContent, MessageType}, }, AnyMessageEventContent, AnySyncMessageEvent, AnySyncRoomEvent, AnyToDeviceEvent, AnyToDeviceEventContent, SyncMessageEvent, ToDeviceEvent, Unsigned, }, room_id, uint, user_id, DeviceId, DeviceKeyAlgorithm, DeviceKeyId, MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch, UserId, }; use serde_json::json; use crate::{ machine::OlmMachine, olm::Utility, verification::test::{outgoing_request_to_event, request_to_event}, EncryptionSettings, ReadOnlyDevice, ToDeviceRequest, }; /// These keys need to be periodically uploaded to the server. type OneTimeKeys = BTreeMap; fn alice_id() -> UserId { user_id!("@alice:example.org") } fn alice_device_id() -> Box { "JLAFKJWSCS".into() } fn user_id() -> UserId { UserId::try_from(USER_ID).unwrap() } pub fn response_from_file(json: &serde_json::Value) -> Response> { Response::builder().status(200).body(json.to_string().as_bytes().to_vec()).unwrap() } fn keys_upload_response() -> upload_keys::Response { let data = response_from_file(&test_json::KEYS_UPLOAD); upload_keys::Response::try_from_http_response(data) .expect("Can't parse the keys upload response") } fn keys_query_response() -> get_keys::Response { let data = response_from_file(&test_json::KEYS_QUERY); get_keys::Response::try_from_http_response(data) .expect("Can't parse the keys upload response") } fn to_device_requests_to_content( requests: Vec>, ) -> EncryptedToDeviceEventContent { let to_device_request = &requests[0]; to_device_request .messages .values() .next() .unwrap() .values() .next() .unwrap() .deserialize_as() .unwrap() } pub(crate) async fn get_prepared_machine() -> (OlmMachine, OneTimeKeys) { let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id()); machine.account.inner.update_uploaded_key_count(0); let request = machine.keys_for_upload().await.expect("Can't prepare initial key upload"); let response = keys_upload_response(); machine.receive_keys_upload_response(&response).await.unwrap(); (machine, request.one_time_keys.unwrap()) } async fn get_machine_after_query() -> (OlmMachine, OneTimeKeys) { let (machine, otk) = get_prepared_machine().await; let response = keys_query_response(); machine.receive_keys_query_response(&response).await.unwrap(); (machine, otk) } async fn get_machine_pair() -> (OlmMachine, OlmMachine, OneTimeKeys) { let (bob, otk) = get_prepared_machine().await; let alice_id = alice_id(); let alice_device = alice_device_id(); let alice = OlmMachine::new(&alice_id, &alice_device); let alice_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_machine(&alice).await; let bob_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_machine(&bob).await; alice.store.save_devices(&[bob_device]).await.unwrap(); bob.store.save_devices(&[alice_device]).await.unwrap(); (alice, bob, otk) } async fn get_machine_pair_with_session() -> (OlmMachine, OlmMachine) { let (alice, bob, one_time_keys) = get_machine_pair().await; let mut bob_keys = BTreeMap::new(); let one_time_key = one_time_keys.iter().next().unwrap(); let mut keys = BTreeMap::new(); keys.insert(one_time_key.0.clone(), one_time_key.1.clone()); bob_keys.insert(bob.device_id().into(), keys); let mut one_time_keys = BTreeMap::new(); one_time_keys.insert(bob.user_id().clone(), bob_keys); let response = claim_keys::Response::new(one_time_keys); alice.receive_keys_claim_response(&response).await.unwrap(); (alice, bob) } async fn get_machine_pair_with_setup_sessions() -> (OlmMachine, OlmMachine) { let (alice, bob) = get_machine_pair_with_session().await; let bob_device = alice.get_device(&bob.user_id, &bob.device_id).await.unwrap().unwrap(); let (session, content) = bob_device .encrypt(AnyToDeviceEventContent::Dummy(DummyToDeviceEventContent::new())) .await .unwrap(); alice.store.save_sessions(&[session]).await.unwrap(); let event = ToDeviceEvent { sender: alice.user_id().clone(), content }; let decrypted = bob.decrypt_to_device_event(&event).await.unwrap(); bob.store.save_sessions(&[decrypted.session.session()]).await.unwrap(); (alice, bob) } #[tokio::test] async fn create_olm_machine() { let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id()); assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await); } #[tokio::test] async fn receive_keys_upload_response() { let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id()); let mut response = keys_upload_response(); response.one_time_key_counts.remove(&DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519).unwrap(); assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await); machine.receive_keys_upload_response(&response).await.unwrap(); assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await); response.one_time_key_counts.insert(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519, uint!(10)); machine.receive_keys_upload_response(&response).await.unwrap(); assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await); response.one_time_key_counts.insert(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519, uint!(50)); machine.receive_keys_upload_response(&response).await.unwrap(); assert!(!machine.should_upload_keys().await); response.one_time_key_counts.remove(&DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519); machine.receive_keys_upload_response(&response).await.unwrap(); assert!(!machine.should_upload_keys().await); } #[tokio::test] async fn generate_one_time_keys() { let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id()); let mut response = keys_upload_response(); assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await); machine.receive_keys_upload_response(&response).await.unwrap(); assert!(machine.should_upload_keys().await); assert!(machine.account.generate_one_time_keys().await.is_ok()); response.one_time_key_counts.insert(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519, uint!(50)); machine.receive_keys_upload_response(&response).await.unwrap(); assert!(machine.account.generate_one_time_keys().await.is_err()); } #[tokio::test] async fn test_device_key_signing() { let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id()); let mut device_keys = machine.account.device_keys().await; let identity_keys = machine.account.identity_keys(); let ed25519_key = identity_keys.ed25519(); let utility = Utility::new(); let ret = utility.verify_json( &machine.user_id, &DeviceKeyId::from_parts(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::Ed25519, machine.device_id()), ed25519_key, &mut json!(&mut device_keys), ); assert!(ret.is_ok()); } #[tokio::test] async fn tests_session_invalidation() { let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id()); let room_id = room_id!("!test:example.org"); machine.create_outbound_group_session_with_defaults(&room_id).await.unwrap(); assert!(machine.group_session_manager.get_outbound_group_session(&room_id).is_some()); machine.invalidate_group_session(&room_id).await.unwrap(); assert!(machine .group_session_manager .get_outbound_group_session(&room_id) .unwrap() .invalidated()); } #[tokio::test] async fn test_invalid_signature() { let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id()); let mut device_keys = machine.account.device_keys().await; let utility = Utility::new(); let ret = utility.verify_json( &machine.user_id, &DeviceKeyId::from_parts(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::Ed25519, machine.device_id()), "fake_key", &mut json!(&mut device_keys), ); assert!(ret.is_err()); } #[tokio::test] async fn test_one_time_key_signing() { let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id()); machine.account.inner.update_uploaded_key_count(49); let mut one_time_keys = machine.account.signed_one_time_keys().await.unwrap(); let identity_keys = machine.account.identity_keys(); let ed25519_key = identity_keys.ed25519(); let mut one_time_key = one_time_keys.values_mut().next().unwrap(); let utility = Utility::new(); let ret = utility.verify_json( &machine.user_id, &DeviceKeyId::from_parts(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::Ed25519, machine.device_id()), ed25519_key, &mut json!(&mut one_time_key), ); assert!(ret.is_ok()); } #[tokio::test] async fn test_keys_for_upload() { let machine = OlmMachine::new(&user_id(), &alice_device_id()); machine.account.inner.update_uploaded_key_count(0); let identity_keys = machine.account.identity_keys(); let ed25519_key = identity_keys.ed25519(); let mut request = machine.keys_for_upload().await.expect("Can't prepare initial key upload"); let utility = Utility::new(); let ret = utility.verify_json( &machine.user_id, &DeviceKeyId::from_parts(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::Ed25519, machine.device_id()), ed25519_key, &mut json!(&mut request.one_time_keys.as_mut().unwrap().values_mut().next()), ); assert!(ret.is_ok()); let utility = Utility::new(); let ret = utility.verify_json( &machine.user_id, &DeviceKeyId::from_parts(DeviceKeyAlgorithm::Ed25519, machine.device_id()), ed25519_key, &mut json!(&mut request.device_keys.unwrap()), ); assert!(ret.is_ok()); let mut response = keys_upload_response(); response.one_time_key_counts.insert( DeviceKeyAlgorithm::SignedCurve25519, (request.one_time_keys.unwrap().len() as u64).try_into().unwrap(), ); machine.receive_keys_upload_response(&response).await.unwrap(); let ret = machine.keys_for_upload().await; assert!(ret.is_none()); } #[tokio::test] async fn test_keys_query() { let (machine, _) = get_prepared_machine().await; let response = keys_query_response(); let alice_id = user_id!("@alice:example.org"); let alice_device_id: &DeviceId = "JLAFKJWSCS".into(); let alice_devices = machine.store.get_user_devices(&alice_id).await.unwrap(); assert!(alice_devices.devices().peekable().peek().is_none()); machine.receive_keys_query_response(&response).await.unwrap(); let device = machine.store.get_device(&alice_id, alice_device_id).await.unwrap().unwrap(); assert_eq!(device.user_id(), &alice_id); assert_eq!(device.device_id(), alice_device_id); } #[tokio::test] async fn test_missing_sessions_calculation() { let (machine, _) = get_machine_after_query().await; let alice = alice_id(); let alice_device = alice_device_id(); let (_, missing_sessions) = machine.get_missing_sessions(&mut [alice.clone()].iter()).await.unwrap().unwrap(); assert!(missing_sessions.one_time_keys.contains_key(&alice)); let user_sessions = missing_sessions.one_time_keys.get(&alice).unwrap(); assert!(user_sessions.contains_key(&alice_device)); } #[tokio::test] async fn test_session_creation() { let (alice_machine, bob_machine, one_time_keys) = get_machine_pair().await; let mut bob_keys = BTreeMap::new(); let one_time_key = one_time_keys.iter().next().unwrap(); let mut keys = BTreeMap::new(); keys.insert(one_time_key.0.clone(), one_time_key.1.clone()); bob_keys.insert(bob_machine.device_id().into(), keys); let mut one_time_keys = BTreeMap::new(); one_time_keys.insert(bob_machine.user_id().clone(), bob_keys); let response = claim_keys::Response::new(one_time_keys); alice_machine.receive_keys_claim_response(&response).await.unwrap(); let session = alice_machine .store .get_sessions(bob_machine.account.identity_keys().curve25519()) .await .unwrap() .unwrap(); assert!(!session.lock().await.is_empty()) } #[tokio::test] async fn test_olm_encryption() { let (alice, bob) = get_machine_pair_with_session().await; let bob_device = alice.get_device(&bob.user_id, &bob.device_id).await.unwrap().unwrap(); let event = ToDeviceEvent { sender: alice.user_id().clone(), content: bob_device .encrypt(AnyToDeviceEventContent::Dummy(DummyToDeviceEventContent::new())) .await .unwrap() .1, }; let event = bob.decrypt_to_device_event(&event).await.unwrap().event.deserialize().unwrap(); if let AnyToDeviceEvent::Dummy(e) = event { assert_eq!(&e.sender, alice.user_id()); } else { panic!("Wrong event type found {:?}", event); } } #[tokio::test] async fn test_room_key_sharing() { let (alice, bob) = get_machine_pair_with_session().await; let room_id = room_id!("!test:example.org"); let to_device_requests = alice .share_group_session( &room_id, [bob.user_id().clone()].iter(), EncryptionSettings::default(), ) .await .unwrap(); let event = ToDeviceEvent { sender: alice.user_id().clone(), content: to_device_requests_to_content(to_device_requests), }; let alice_session = alice.group_session_manager.get_outbound_group_session(&room_id).unwrap(); let decrypted = bob.decrypt_to_device_event(&event).await.unwrap(); bob.store.save_sessions(&[decrypted.session.session()]).await.unwrap(); bob.store .save_inbound_group_sessions(&[decrypted.inbound_group_session.unwrap()]) .await .unwrap(); let event = decrypted.deserialized_event.unwrap(); if let AnyToDeviceEvent::RoomKey(event) = event { assert_eq!(&event.sender, alice.user_id()); assert!(event.content.session_key.is_empty()); } else { panic!("expected RoomKeyEvent found {:?}", event); } let session = bob .store .get_inbound_group_session( &room_id, alice.account.identity_keys().curve25519(), alice_session.session_id(), ) .await; assert!(session.unwrap().is_some()); } #[tokio::test] async fn test_megolm_encryption() { let (alice, bob) = get_machine_pair_with_setup_sessions().await; let room_id = room_id!("!test:example.org"); let to_device_requests = alice .share_group_session( &room_id, [bob.user_id().clone()].iter(), EncryptionSettings::default(), ) .await .unwrap(); let event = ToDeviceEvent { sender: alice.user_id().clone(), content: to_device_requests_to_content(to_device_requests), }; let group_session = bob.decrypt_to_device_event(&event).await.unwrap().inbound_group_session; bob.store.save_inbound_group_sessions(&[group_session.unwrap()]).await.unwrap(); let plaintext = "It is a secret to everybody"; let content = MessageEventContent::text_plain(plaintext); let encrypted_content = alice .encrypt(&room_id, AnyMessageEventContent::RoomMessage(content.clone())) .await .unwrap(); let event = SyncMessageEvent { event_id: event_id!("$xxxxx:example.org"), origin_server_ts: MilliSecondsSinceUnixEpoch::now(), sender: alice.user_id().clone(), content: encrypted_content, unsigned: Unsigned::default(), }; let decrypted_event = bob.decrypt_room_event(&event, &room_id).await.unwrap().event.deserialize().unwrap(); if let AnySyncRoomEvent::Message(AnySyncMessageEvent::RoomMessage(SyncMessageEvent { sender, content, .. })) = decrypted_event { assert_eq!(&sender, alice.user_id()); if let MessageType::Text(c) = &content.msgtype { assert_eq!(&c.body, plaintext); } else { panic!("Decrypted event has a mismatched content"); } } else { panic!("Decrypted room event has the wrong type") } } #[tokio::test] #[cfg(feature = "sled_cryptostore")] async fn test_machine_with_default_store() { use tempfile::tempdir; let tmpdir = tempdir().unwrap(); let machine = OlmMachine::new_with_default_store( &user_id(), &alice_device_id(), tmpdir.as_ref(), Some("test"), ) .await .unwrap(); let user_id = machine.user_id().to_owned(); let device_id = machine.device_id().to_owned(); let ed25519_key = machine.identity_keys().ed25519().to_owned(); machine.receive_keys_upload_response(&keys_upload_response()).await.unwrap(); drop(machine); let machine = OlmMachine::new_with_default_store( &user_id, &alice_device_id(), tmpdir.as_ref(), Some("test"), ) .await .unwrap(); assert_eq!(&user_id, machine.user_id()); assert_eq!(&*device_id, machine.device_id()); assert_eq!(ed25519_key, machine.identity_keys().ed25519()); } #[tokio::test] async fn interactive_verification() { let (alice, bob) = get_machine_pair_with_setup_sessions().await; let bob_device = alice.get_device(bob.user_id(), bob.device_id()).await.unwrap().unwrap(); assert!(!bob_device.verified()); let (alice_sas, request) = bob_device.start_verification().await.unwrap(); let event = request_to_event(alice.user_id(), &request.into()); bob.handle_verification_event(&event).await; let bob_sas = bob .get_verification(alice.user_id(), alice_sas.flow_id().as_str()) .unwrap() .sas_v1() .unwrap(); assert!(alice_sas.emoji().is_none()); assert!(bob_sas.emoji().is_none()); let event = bob_sas.accept().map(|r| request_to_event(bob.user_id(), &r)).unwrap(); alice.handle_verification_event(&event).await; let event = alice .verification_machine .outgoing_messages() .first() .map(|r| outgoing_request_to_event(alice.user_id(), r)) .unwrap(); bob.handle_verification_event(&event).await; let event = bob .verification_machine .outgoing_messages() .first() .map(|r| outgoing_request_to_event(bob.user_id(), r)) .unwrap(); alice.handle_verification_event(&event).await; assert!(alice_sas.emoji().is_some()); assert!(bob_sas.emoji().is_some()); assert_eq!(alice_sas.emoji(), bob_sas.emoji()); assert_eq!(alice_sas.decimals(), bob_sas.decimals()); let event = bob_sas .confirm() .await .unwrap() .0 .map(|r| request_to_event(bob.user_id(), &r)) .unwrap(); alice.handle_verification_event(&event).await; assert!(!alice_sas.is_done()); assert!(!bob_sas.is_done()); let event = alice_sas .confirm() .await .unwrap() .0 .map(|r| request_to_event(alice.user_id(), &r)) .unwrap(); assert!(alice_sas.is_done()); assert!(bob_device.verified()); let alice_device = bob.get_device(alice.user_id(), alice.device_id()).await.unwrap().unwrap(); assert!(!alice_device.verified()); bob.handle_verification_event(&event).await; assert!(bob_sas.is_done()); assert!(alice_device.verified()); } }