// Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C. // // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. // You may obtain a copy of the License at // // http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 // // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. use std::{ convert::TryFrom, matches, sync::{Arc, Mutex}, time::{Duration, Instant}, }; use matrix_sdk_common::{ events::key::verification::{ accept::{ AcceptEventContent, AcceptMethod, AcceptToDeviceEventContent, MSasV1Content as AcceptV1Content, MSasV1ContentInit as AcceptV1ContentInit, }, cancel::{CancelCode, CancelEventContent, CancelToDeviceEventContent}, done::DoneEventContent, key::{KeyEventContent, KeyToDeviceEventContent}, start::{ MSasV1Content, MSasV1ContentInit, StartEventContent, StartMethod, StartToDeviceEventContent, }, HashAlgorithm, KeyAgreementProtocol, MessageAuthenticationCode, Relation, ShortAuthenticationString, VerificationMethod, }, identifiers::{DeviceId, EventId, RoomId, UserId}, uuid::Uuid, }; use olm_rs::sas::OlmSas; use tracing::info; use super::{ event_enums::{ AcceptContent, CancelContent, DoneContent, KeyContent, MacContent, StartContent, }, helpers::{ calculate_commitment, get_decimal, get_emoji, get_emoji_index, get_mac_content, receive_mac_event, SasIds, }, }; use crate::{ identities::{ReadOnlyDevice, UserIdentities}, ReadOnlyAccount, }; const KEY_AGREEMENT_PROTOCOLS: &[KeyAgreementProtocol] = &[KeyAgreementProtocol::Curve25519HkdfSha256]; const HASHES: &[HashAlgorithm] = &[HashAlgorithm::Sha256]; const MACS: &[MessageAuthenticationCode] = &[MessageAuthenticationCode::HkdfHmacSha256]; const STRINGS: &[ShortAuthenticationString] = &[ShortAuthenticationString::Decimal, ShortAuthenticationString::Emoji]; // The max time a SAS flow can take from start to done. const MAX_AGE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60 * 5); // The max time a SAS object will wait for a new event to arrive. const MAX_EVENT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60); #[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub enum FlowId { ToDevice(String), InRoom(RoomId, EventId), } impl FlowId { pub fn room_id(&self) -> Option<&RoomId> { if let FlowId::InRoom(r, _) = &self { Some(r) } else { None } } pub fn as_str(&self) -> &str { match self { FlowId::InRoom(_, r) => r.as_str(), FlowId::ToDevice(t) => t.as_str(), } } } /// Struct containing the protocols that were agreed to be used for the SAS /// flow. #[derive(Clone, Debug)] struct AcceptedProtocols { method: VerificationMethod, key_agreement_protocol: KeyAgreementProtocol, hash: HashAlgorithm, message_auth_code: MessageAuthenticationCode, short_auth_string: Vec, } impl TryFrom for AcceptedProtocols { type Error = CancelCode; fn try_from(content: AcceptV1Content) -> Result { if !KEY_AGREEMENT_PROTOCOLS.contains(&content.key_agreement_protocol) || !HASHES.contains(&content.hash) || !MACS.contains(&content.message_authentication_code) || (!content.short_authentication_string.contains(&ShortAuthenticationString::Emoji) && !content .short_authentication_string .contains(&ShortAuthenticationString::Decimal)) { Err(CancelCode::UnknownMethod) } else { Ok(Self { method: VerificationMethod::MSasV1, hash: content.hash, key_agreement_protocol: content.key_agreement_protocol, message_auth_code: content.message_authentication_code, short_auth_string: content.short_authentication_string, }) } } } #[cfg(not(tarpaulin_include))] impl Default for AcceptedProtocols { fn default() -> Self { AcceptedProtocols { method: VerificationMethod::MSasV1, hash: HashAlgorithm::Sha256, key_agreement_protocol: KeyAgreementProtocol::Curve25519HkdfSha256, message_auth_code: MessageAuthenticationCode::HkdfHmacSha256, short_auth_string: vec![ ShortAuthenticationString::Decimal, ShortAuthenticationString::Emoji, ], } } } /// A type level state machine modeling the Sas flow. /// /// This is the generic struc holding common data between the different states /// and the specific state. #[derive(Clone)] pub struct SasState { /// The Olm SAS struct. inner: Arc>, /// Struct holding the identities that are doing the SAS dance. ids: SasIds, /// The instant when the SAS object was created. If this more than /// MAX_AGE seconds are elapsed, the event will be canceled with a /// `CancelCode::Timeout` creation_time: Arc, /// The instant the SAS object last received an event. last_event_time: Arc, /// The unique identifier of this SAS flow. /// /// This will be the transaction id for to-device events and the relates_to /// field for in-room events. pub verification_flow_id: Arc, /// The SAS state we're in. state: Arc, } #[cfg(not(tarpaulin_include))] impl std::fmt::Debug for SasState { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { f.debug_struct("SasState") .field("ids", &self.ids) .field("flow_id", &self.verification_flow_id) .field("state", &self.state) .finish() } } /// The initial SAS state. #[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct Created { protocol_definitions: MSasV1ContentInit, } /// The initial SAS state if the other side started the SAS verification. #[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct Started { commitment: String, protocol_definitions: MSasV1Content, } /// The SAS state we're going to be in after the other side accepted our /// verification start event. #[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct Accepted { accepted_protocols: Arc, start_content: Arc, commitment: String, } /// The SAS state we're going to be in after we received the public key of the /// other participant. /// /// From now on we can show the short auth string to the user. #[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct KeyReceived { their_pubkey: String, we_started: bool, accepted_protocols: Arc, } /// The SAS state we're going to be in after the user has confirmed that the /// short auth string matches. We still need to receive a MAC event from the /// other side. #[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct Confirmed { accepted_protocols: Arc, } /// The SAS state we're going to be in after we receive a MAC event from the /// other side. Our own user still needs to confirm that the short auth string /// matches. #[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct MacReceived { we_started: bool, their_pubkey: String, verified_devices: Arc<[ReadOnlyDevice]>, verified_master_keys: Arc<[UserIdentities]>, } /// The SAS state we're going to be in after we receive a MAC event in a DM. DMs /// require a final message `m.key.verification.done` message to conclude the /// verificaton. This state waits for such a message. #[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct WaitingForDone { verified_devices: Arc<[ReadOnlyDevice]>, verified_master_keys: Arc<[UserIdentities]>, } /// The SAS state indicating that the verification finished successfully. /// /// We can now mark the device in our verified devices lits as verified and sign /// the master keys in the verified devices list. #[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct Done { verified_devices: Arc<[ReadOnlyDevice]>, verified_master_keys: Arc<[UserIdentities]>, } #[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct Canceled { cancel_code: CancelCode, reason: &'static str, } impl SasState { /// Get our own user id. #[cfg(test)] pub fn user_id(&self) -> &UserId { &self.ids.account.user_id() } /// Get our own device id. pub fn device_id(&self) -> &DeviceId { &self.ids.account.device_id() } #[cfg(test)] pub fn other_device(&self) -> ReadOnlyDevice { self.ids.other_device.clone() } pub fn cancel(self, cancel_code: CancelCode) -> SasState { SasState { inner: self.inner, ids: self.ids, creation_time: self.creation_time, last_event_time: self.last_event_time, verification_flow_id: self.verification_flow_id, state: Arc::new(Canceled::new(cancel_code)), } } /// Did our SAS verification time out. pub fn timed_out(&self) -> bool { self.creation_time.elapsed() > MAX_AGE || self.last_event_time.elapsed() > MAX_EVENT_TIMEOUT } /// Is this verification happening inside a DM. pub fn is_dm_verification(&self) -> bool { matches!(&*self.verification_flow_id, FlowId::InRoom(_, _)) } #[cfg(test)] #[allow(dead_code)] pub fn set_creation_time(&mut self, time: Instant) { self.creation_time = Arc::new(time); } fn check_event(&self, sender: &UserId, flow_id: &str) -> Result<(), CancelCode> { if *flow_id != *self.verification_flow_id.as_str() { Err(CancelCode::UnknownTransaction) } else if sender != self.ids.other_device.user_id() { Err(CancelCode::UserMismatch) } else if self.timed_out() { Err(CancelCode::Timeout) } else { Ok(()) } } } impl SasState { /// Create a new SAS verification flow. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `account` - Our own account. /// /// * `other_device` - The other device which we are going to verify. /// /// * `other_identity` - The identity of the other user if one exists. pub fn new( account: ReadOnlyAccount, other_device: ReadOnlyDevice, other_identity: Option, ) -> SasState { let flow_id = FlowId::ToDevice(Uuid::new_v4().to_string()); Self::new_helper(flow_id, account, other_device, other_identity) } /// Create a new SAS in-room verification flow. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `event_id` - The event id of the `m.key.verification.request` event /// that started the verification flow. /// /// * `account` - Our own account. /// /// * `other_device` - The other device which we are going to verify. /// /// * `other_identity` - The identity of the other user if one exists. pub fn new_in_room( room_id: RoomId, event_id: EventId, account: ReadOnlyAccount, other_device: ReadOnlyDevice, other_identity: Option, ) -> SasState { let flow_id = FlowId::InRoom(room_id, event_id); Self::new_helper(flow_id, account, other_device, other_identity) } fn new_helper( flow_id: FlowId, account: ReadOnlyAccount, other_device: ReadOnlyDevice, other_identity: Option, ) -> SasState { SasState { inner: Arc::new(Mutex::new(OlmSas::new())), ids: SasIds { account, other_device, other_identity }, verification_flow_id: flow_id.into(), creation_time: Arc::new(Instant::now()), last_event_time: Arc::new(Instant::now()), state: Arc::new(Created { protocol_definitions: MSasV1ContentInit { short_authentication_string: STRINGS.to_vec(), key_agreement_protocols: KEY_AGREEMENT_PROTOCOLS.to_vec(), message_authentication_codes: MACS.to_vec(), hashes: HASHES.to_vec(), }, }), } } pub fn as_content(&self) -> StartContent { match self.verification_flow_id.as_ref() { FlowId::ToDevice(s) => StartContent::ToDevice(StartToDeviceEventContent { transaction_id: s.to_string(), from_device: self.device_id().into(), method: StartMethod::MSasV1( MSasV1Content::new(self.state.protocol_definitions.clone()) .expect("Invalid initial protocol definitions."), ), }), FlowId::InRoom(r, e) => StartContent::Room( r.clone(), StartEventContent { from_device: self.device_id().into(), method: StartMethod::MSasV1( MSasV1Content::new(self.state.protocol_definitions.clone()) .expect("Invalid initial protocol definitions."), ), relation: Relation { event_id: e.clone() }, }, ), } } /// Receive a m.key.verification.accept event, changing the state into /// an Accepted one. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `event` - The m.key.verification.accept event that was sent to us by /// the other side. pub fn into_accepted( self, sender: &UserId, content: impl Into, ) -> Result, SasState> { let content = content.into(); self.check_event(&sender, content.flow_id().as_str()) .map_err(|c| self.clone().cancel(c))?; if let AcceptMethod::MSasV1(content) = content.method() { let accepted_protocols = AcceptedProtocols::try_from(content.clone()).map_err(|c| self.clone().cancel(c))?; let start_content = self.as_content().into(); Ok(SasState { inner: self.inner, ids: self.ids, verification_flow_id: self.verification_flow_id, creation_time: self.creation_time, last_event_time: self.last_event_time, state: Arc::new(Accepted { start_content, commitment: content.commitment.clone(), accepted_protocols: accepted_protocols.into(), }), }) } else { Err(self.cancel(CancelCode::UnknownMethod)) } } } impl SasState { /// Create a new SAS verification flow from an in-room /// m.key.verification.start event. /// /// This will put us in the `started` state. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `account` - Our own account. /// /// * `other_device` - The other device which we are going to verify. /// /// * `event` - The m.key.verification.start event that was sent to us by /// the other side. pub fn from_start_event( account: ReadOnlyAccount, other_device: ReadOnlyDevice, other_identity: Option, content: impl Into, ) -> Result, SasState> { Self::from_start_helper(account, other_device, other_identity, &content.into()) } fn from_start_helper( account: ReadOnlyAccount, other_device: ReadOnlyDevice, other_identity: Option, content: &StartContent, ) -> Result, SasState> { if let StartMethod::MSasV1(method_content) = content.method() { let sas = OlmSas::new(); let pubkey = sas.public_key(); let commitment = calculate_commitment(&pubkey, content.clone()); info!( "Calculated commitment for pubkey {} and content {:?} {}", pubkey, content, commitment ); let sas = SasState { inner: Arc::new(Mutex::new(sas)), ids: SasIds { account, other_device, other_identity }, creation_time: Arc::new(Instant::now()), last_event_time: Arc::new(Instant::now()), verification_flow_id: content.flow_id().into(), state: Arc::new(Started { protocol_definitions: method_content.clone(), commitment, }), }; if !method_content .key_agreement_protocols .contains(&KeyAgreementProtocol::Curve25519HkdfSha256) || !method_content .message_authentication_codes .contains(&MessageAuthenticationCode::HkdfHmacSha256) || !method_content.hashes.contains(&HashAlgorithm::Sha256) || (!method_content .short_authentication_string .contains(&ShortAuthenticationString::Decimal) && !method_content .short_authentication_string .contains(&ShortAuthenticationString::Emoji)) { Err(sas.cancel(CancelCode::UnknownMethod)) } else { Ok(sas) } } else { Err(SasState { inner: Arc::new(Mutex::new(OlmSas::new())), creation_time: Arc::new(Instant::now()), last_event_time: Arc::new(Instant::now()), ids: SasIds { account, other_device, other_identity }, verification_flow_id: content.flow_id().into(), state: Arc::new(Canceled::new(CancelCode::UnknownMethod)), }) } } /// Get the content for the accept event. /// /// The content needs to be sent to the other device. /// /// This should be sent out automatically if the SAS verification flow has /// been started because of a /// m.key.verification.request -> m.key.verification.ready flow. pub fn as_content(&self) -> AcceptContent { let accepted_protocols = AcceptedProtocols::default(); let method = AcceptMethod::MSasV1( AcceptV1ContentInit { commitment: self.state.commitment.clone(), hash: accepted_protocols.hash, key_agreement_protocol: accepted_protocols.key_agreement_protocol, message_authentication_code: accepted_protocols.message_auth_code, short_authentication_string: self .state .protocol_definitions .short_authentication_string .clone(), } .into(), ); match self.verification_flow_id.as_ref() { FlowId::ToDevice(s) => { AcceptToDeviceEventContent { transaction_id: s.to_string(), method }.into() } FlowId::InRoom(r, e) => ( r.clone(), AcceptEventContent { method, relation: Relation { event_id: e.clone() } }, ) .into(), } } /// Receive a m.key.verification.key event, changing the state into /// a `KeyReceived` one /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `event` - The m.key.verification.key event that was sent to us by /// the other side. The event will be modified so it doesn't contain any key /// anymore. pub fn into_key_received( self, sender: &UserId, content: impl Into, ) -> Result, SasState> { let content = content.into(); self.check_event(&sender, &content.flow_id().as_str()) .map_err(|c| self.clone().cancel(c))?; let accepted_protocols = AcceptedProtocols::default(); let their_pubkey = content.public_key().to_owned(); self.inner .lock() .unwrap() .set_their_public_key(their_pubkey.clone()) .expect("Can't set public key"); Ok(SasState { inner: self.inner, ids: self.ids, verification_flow_id: self.verification_flow_id, creation_time: self.creation_time, last_event_time: self.last_event_time, state: Arc::new(KeyReceived { we_started: false, their_pubkey, accepted_protocols: Arc::new(accepted_protocols), }), }) } } impl SasState { /// Receive a m.key.verification.key event, changing the state into /// a `KeyReceived` one /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `event` - The m.key.verification.key event that was sent to us by /// the other side. The event will be modified so it doesn't contain any key /// anymore. pub fn into_key_received( self, sender: &UserId, content: impl Into, ) -> Result, SasState> { let content = content.into(); self.check_event(&sender, content.flow_id().as_str()) .map_err(|c| self.clone().cancel(c))?; let commitment = calculate_commitment(content.public_key(), self.state.start_content.as_ref().clone()); if self.state.commitment != commitment { Err(self.cancel(CancelCode::InvalidMessage)) } else { let their_pubkey = content.public_key().to_owned(); self.inner .lock() .unwrap() .set_their_public_key(their_pubkey.clone()) .expect("Can't set public key"); Ok(SasState { inner: self.inner, ids: self.ids, verification_flow_id: self.verification_flow_id, creation_time: self.creation_time, last_event_time: self.last_event_time, state: Arc::new(KeyReceived { their_pubkey, we_started: true, accepted_protocols: self.state.accepted_protocols.clone(), }), }) } } /// Get the content for the key event. /// /// The content needs to be automatically sent to the other side. pub fn as_content(&self) -> KeyContent { match &*self.verification_flow_id { FlowId::ToDevice(s) => KeyToDeviceEventContent { transaction_id: s.to_string(), key: self.inner.lock().unwrap().public_key(), } .into(), FlowId::InRoom(r, e) => ( r.clone(), KeyEventContent { key: self.inner.lock().unwrap().public_key(), relation: Relation { event_id: e.clone() }, }, ) .into(), } } } impl SasState { /// Get the content for the key event. /// /// The content needs to be automatically sent to the other side if and only /// if we_started is false. pub fn as_content(&self) -> KeyContent { match &*self.verification_flow_id { FlowId::ToDevice(s) => KeyToDeviceEventContent { transaction_id: s.to_string(), key: self.inner.lock().unwrap().public_key(), } .into(), FlowId::InRoom(r, e) => ( r.clone(), KeyEventContent { key: self.inner.lock().unwrap().public_key(), relation: Relation { event_id: e.clone() }, }, ) .into(), } } /// Get the emoji version of the short authentication string. /// /// Returns a seven tuples where the first element is the emoji and the /// second element the English description of the emoji. pub fn get_emoji(&self) -> [(&'static str, &'static str); 7] { get_emoji( &self.inner.lock().unwrap(), &self.ids, &self.state.their_pubkey, self.verification_flow_id.as_str(), self.state.we_started, ) } /// Get the index of the emoji of the short authentication string. /// /// Returns seven u8 numbers in the range from 0 to 63 inclusive, those /// numbers can be converted to a unique emoji defined by the spec. pub fn get_emoji_index(&self) -> [u8; 7] { get_emoji_index( &self.inner.lock().unwrap(), &self.ids, &self.state.their_pubkey, self.verification_flow_id.as_str(), self.state.we_started, ) } /// Get the decimal version of the short authentication string. /// /// Returns a tuple containing three 4 digit integer numbers that represent /// the short auth string. pub fn get_decimal(&self) -> (u16, u16, u16) { get_decimal( &self.inner.lock().unwrap(), &self.ids, &self.state.their_pubkey, self.verification_flow_id.as_str(), self.state.we_started, ) } /// Receive a m.key.verification.mac event, changing the state into /// a `MacReceived` one /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `event` - The m.key.verification.mac event that was sent to us by /// the other side. pub fn into_mac_received( self, sender: &UserId, content: impl Into, ) -> Result, SasState> { let content = content.into(); self.check_event(&sender, content.flow_id().as_str()) .map_err(|c| self.clone().cancel(c))?; let (devices, master_keys) = receive_mac_event( &self.inner.lock().unwrap(), &self.ids, self.verification_flow_id.as_str(), sender, &content, ) .map_err(|c| self.clone().cancel(c))?; Ok(SasState { inner: self.inner, verification_flow_id: self.verification_flow_id, creation_time: self.creation_time, last_event_time: self.last_event_time, ids: self.ids, state: Arc::new(MacReceived { we_started: self.state.we_started, their_pubkey: self.state.their_pubkey.clone(), verified_devices: devices.into(), verified_master_keys: master_keys.into(), }), }) } /// Confirm that the short auth string matches. /// /// This needs to be done by the user, this will put us in the `Confirmed` /// state. pub fn confirm(self) -> SasState { SasState { inner: self.inner, verification_flow_id: self.verification_flow_id, creation_time: self.creation_time, last_event_time: self.last_event_time, ids: self.ids, state: Arc::new(Confirmed { accepted_protocols: self.state.accepted_protocols.clone(), }), } } } impl SasState { /// Receive a m.key.verification.mac event, changing the state into /// a `Done` one /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `event` - The m.key.verification.mac event that was sent to us by /// the other side. pub fn into_done( self, sender: &UserId, content: impl Into, ) -> Result, SasState> { let content = content.into(); self.check_event(&sender, &content.flow_id().as_str()) .map_err(|c| self.clone().cancel(c))?; let (devices, master_keys) = receive_mac_event( &self.inner.lock().unwrap(), &self.ids, &self.verification_flow_id.as_str(), sender, &content, ) .map_err(|c| self.clone().cancel(c))?; Ok(SasState { inner: self.inner, creation_time: self.creation_time, last_event_time: self.last_event_time, verification_flow_id: self.verification_flow_id, ids: self.ids, state: Arc::new(Done { verified_devices: devices.into(), verified_master_keys: master_keys.into(), }), }) } /// Receive a m.key.verification.mac event, changing the state into /// a `WaitingForDone` one. This method should be used instead of /// `into_done()` if the verification started with a /// `m.key.verification.request`. /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `event` - The m.key.verification.mac event that was sent to us by /// the other side. pub fn into_waiting_for_done( self, sender: &UserId, content: impl Into, ) -> Result, SasState> { let content = content.into(); self.check_event(&sender, &content.flow_id().as_str()) .map_err(|c| self.clone().cancel(c))?; let (devices, master_keys) = receive_mac_event( &self.inner.lock().unwrap(), &self.ids, &self.verification_flow_id.as_str(), sender, &content, ) .map_err(|c| self.clone().cancel(c))?; Ok(SasState { inner: self.inner, creation_time: self.creation_time, last_event_time: self.last_event_time, verification_flow_id: self.verification_flow_id, ids: self.ids, state: Arc::new(WaitingForDone { verified_devices: devices.into(), verified_master_keys: master_keys.into(), }), }) } /// Get the content for the mac event. /// /// The content needs to be automatically sent to the other side. pub fn as_content(&self) -> MacContent { get_mac_content(&self.inner.lock().unwrap(), &self.ids, &self.verification_flow_id) } } impl SasState { /// Confirm that the short auth string matches. /// /// This needs to be done by the user, this will put us in the `Done` /// state since the other side already confirmed and sent us a MAC event. pub fn confirm(self) -> SasState { SasState { inner: self.inner, verification_flow_id: self.verification_flow_id, creation_time: self.creation_time, last_event_time: self.last_event_time, ids: self.ids, state: Arc::new(Done { verified_devices: self.state.verified_devices.clone(), verified_master_keys: self.state.verified_master_keys.clone(), }), } } /// Confirm that the short auth string matches but wait for the other side /// to confirm that it's done. /// /// This needs to be done by the user, this will put us in the `WaitForDone` /// state where we wait for the other side to confirm that the MAC event was /// successfully received. pub fn confirm_and_wait_for_done(self) -> SasState { SasState { inner: self.inner, verification_flow_id: self.verification_flow_id, creation_time: self.creation_time, last_event_time: self.last_event_time, ids: self.ids, state: Arc::new(WaitingForDone { verified_devices: self.state.verified_devices.clone(), verified_master_keys: self.state.verified_master_keys.clone(), }), } } /// Get the emoji version of the short authentication string. /// /// Returns a vector of tuples where the first element is the emoji and the /// second element the English description of the emoji. pub fn get_emoji(&self) -> [(&'static str, &'static str); 7] { get_emoji( &self.inner.lock().unwrap(), &self.ids, &self.state.their_pubkey, &self.verification_flow_id.as_str(), self.state.we_started, ) } /// Get the index of the emoji of the short authentication string. /// /// Returns seven u8 numbers in the range from 0 to 63 inclusive, those /// numbers can be converted to a unique emoji defined by the spec. pub fn get_emoji_index(&self) -> [u8; 7] { get_emoji_index( &self.inner.lock().unwrap(), &self.ids, &self.state.their_pubkey, self.verification_flow_id.as_str(), self.state.we_started, ) } /// Get the decimal version of the short authentication string. /// /// Returns a tuple containing three 4 digit integer numbers that represent /// the short auth string. pub fn get_decimal(&self) -> (u16, u16, u16) { get_decimal( &self.inner.lock().unwrap(), &self.ids, &self.state.their_pubkey, &self.verification_flow_id.as_str(), self.state.we_started, ) } } impl SasState { /// Get the content for the mac event. /// /// The content needs to be automatically sent to the other side if it /// wasn't already sent. pub fn as_content(&self) -> MacContent { get_mac_content(&self.inner.lock().unwrap(), &self.ids, &self.verification_flow_id) } pub fn done_content(&self) -> DoneContent { match self.verification_flow_id.as_ref() { FlowId::ToDevice(_) => { unreachable!("The done content isn't supported yet for to-device verifications") } FlowId::InRoom(r, e) => { (r.clone(), DoneEventContent { relation: Relation { event_id: e.clone() } }).into() } } } /// Receive a m.key.verification.mac event, changing the state into /// a `Done` one /// /// # Arguments /// /// * `event` - The m.key.verification.mac event that was sent to us by /// the other side. pub fn into_done( self, sender: &UserId, content: impl Into, ) -> Result, SasState> { let content = content.into(); self.check_event(&sender, &content.flow_id().as_str()) .map_err(|c| self.clone().cancel(c))?; Ok(SasState { inner: self.inner, creation_time: self.creation_time, last_event_time: self.last_event_time, verification_flow_id: self.verification_flow_id, ids: self.ids, state: Arc::new(Done { verified_devices: self.state.verified_devices.clone(), verified_master_keys: self.state.verified_master_keys.clone(), }), }) } } impl SasState { /// Get the content for the mac event. /// /// The content needs to be automatically sent to the other side if it /// wasn't already sent. pub fn as_content(&self) -> MacContent { get_mac_content(&self.inner.lock().unwrap(), &self.ids, &self.verification_flow_id) } pub fn done_content(&self) -> DoneContent { match self.verification_flow_id.as_ref() { FlowId::ToDevice(_) => { unreachable!("The done content isn't supported yet for to-device verifications") } FlowId::InRoom(r, e) => { (r.clone(), DoneEventContent { relation: Relation { event_id: e.clone() } }).into() } } } /// Get the list of verified devices. pub fn verified_devices(&self) -> Arc<[ReadOnlyDevice]> { self.state.verified_devices.clone() } /// Get the list of verified identities. pub fn verified_identities(&self) -> Arc<[UserIdentities]> { self.state.verified_master_keys.clone() } } impl Canceled { fn new(code: CancelCode) -> Canceled { let reason = match code { CancelCode::Accepted => { "A m.key.verification.request was accepted by a different device." } CancelCode::InvalidMessage => "The received message was invalid.", CancelCode::KeyMismatch => "The expected key did not match the verified one", CancelCode::Timeout => "The verification process timed out.", CancelCode::UnexpectedMessage => "The device received an unexpected message.", CancelCode::UnknownMethod => { "The device does not know how to handle the requested method." } CancelCode::UnknownTransaction => { "The device does not know about the given transaction ID." } CancelCode::User => "The user cancelled the verification.", CancelCode::UserMismatch => "The expected user did not match the verified user", _ => unimplemented!(), }; Canceled { cancel_code: code, reason } } } impl SasState { pub fn as_content(&self) -> CancelContent { match self.verification_flow_id.as_ref() { FlowId::ToDevice(s) => CancelToDeviceEventContent { transaction_id: s.clone(), reason: self.state.reason.to_string(), code: self.state.cancel_code.clone(), } .into(), FlowId::InRoom(r, e) => ( r.clone(), CancelEventContent { reason: self.state.reason.to_string(), code: self.state.cancel_code.clone(), relation: Relation { event_id: e.clone() }, }, ) .into(), } } } #[cfg(test)] mod test { use std::convert::TryFrom; use matrix_sdk_common::{ events::key::verification::{ accept::{AcceptMethod, CustomContent}, start::{CustomContent as CustomStartContent, StartMethod}, }, identifiers::{DeviceId, UserId}, }; use super::{Accepted, Created, SasState, Started}; use crate::{ verification::sas::{event_enums::AcceptContent, StartContent}, ReadOnlyAccount, ReadOnlyDevice, }; fn alice_id() -> UserId { UserId::try_from("@alice:example.org").unwrap() } fn alice_device_id() -> Box { "JLAFKJWSCS".into() } fn bob_id() -> UserId { UserId::try_from("@bob:example.org").unwrap() } fn bob_device_id() -> Box { "BOBDEVCIE".into() } async fn get_sas_pair() -> (SasState, SasState) { let alice = ReadOnlyAccount::new(&alice_id(), &alice_device_id()); let alice_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&alice).await; let bob = ReadOnlyAccount::new(&bob_id(), &bob_device_id()); let bob_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&bob).await; let alice_sas = SasState::::new(alice.clone(), bob_device, None); let start_content = alice_sas.as_content(); let bob_sas = SasState::::from_start_event(bob.clone(), alice_device, None, start_content); (alice_sas, bob_sas.unwrap()) } #[tokio::test] async fn create_sas() { let (_, _) = get_sas_pair().await; } #[tokio::test] async fn sas_accept() { let (alice, bob) = get_sas_pair().await; let event = bob.as_content(); alice.into_accepted(bob.user_id(), event).unwrap(); } #[tokio::test] async fn sas_key_share() { let (alice, bob) = get_sas_pair().await; let content = bob.as_content(); let alice: SasState = alice.into_accepted(bob.user_id(), content).unwrap(); let content = alice.as_content(); let bob = bob.into_key_received(alice.user_id(), content).unwrap(); let content = bob.as_content(); let alice = alice.into_key_received(bob.user_id(), content).unwrap(); assert_eq!(alice.get_decimal(), bob.get_decimal()); assert_eq!(alice.get_emoji(), bob.get_emoji()); } #[tokio::test] async fn sas_full() { let (alice, bob) = get_sas_pair().await; let content = bob.as_content(); let alice: SasState = alice.into_accepted(bob.user_id(), content).unwrap(); let content = alice.as_content(); let bob = bob.into_key_received(alice.user_id(), content).unwrap(); let content = bob.as_content(); let alice = alice.into_key_received(bob.user_id(), content).unwrap(); assert_eq!(alice.get_decimal(), bob.get_decimal()); assert_eq!(alice.get_emoji(), bob.get_emoji()); let bob_decimals = bob.get_decimal(); let bob = bob.confirm(); let content = bob.as_content(); let alice = alice.into_mac_received(bob.user_id(), content).unwrap(); assert!(!alice.get_emoji().is_empty()); assert_eq!(alice.get_decimal(), bob_decimals); let alice = alice.confirm(); let content = alice.as_content(); let bob = bob.into_done(alice.user_id(), content).unwrap(); assert!(bob.verified_devices().contains(&bob.other_device())); assert!(alice.verified_devices().contains(&alice.other_device())); } #[tokio::test] async fn sas_invalid_commitment() { let (alice, bob) = get_sas_pair().await; let mut content = bob.as_content(); let mut method = match &mut content { AcceptContent::ToDevice(c) => &mut c.method, AcceptContent::Room(_, c) => &mut c.method, }; match &mut method { AcceptMethod::MSasV1(ref mut c) => { c.commitment = "".to_string(); } _ => panic!("Unknown accept event content"), } let alice: SasState = alice.into_accepted(bob.user_id(), content).unwrap(); let content = alice.as_content(); let bob = bob.into_key_received(alice.user_id(), content).unwrap(); let content = bob.as_content(); alice .into_key_received(bob.user_id(), content) .expect_err("Didn't cancel on invalid commitment"); } #[tokio::test] async fn sas_invalid_sender() { let (alice, bob) = get_sas_pair().await; let content = bob.as_content(); let sender = UserId::try_from("@malory:example.org").unwrap(); alice.into_accepted(&sender, content).expect_err("Didn't cancel on a invalid sender"); } #[tokio::test] async fn sas_unknown_sas_method() { let (alice, bob) = get_sas_pair().await; let mut content = bob.as_content(); let mut method = match &mut content { AcceptContent::ToDevice(c) => &mut c.method, AcceptContent::Room(_, c) => &mut c.method, }; match &mut method { AcceptMethod::MSasV1(ref mut c) => { c.short_authentication_string = vec![]; } _ => panic!("Unknown accept event content"), } alice .into_accepted(bob.user_id(), content) .expect_err("Didn't cancel on an invalid SAS method"); } #[tokio::test] async fn sas_unknown_method() { let (alice, bob) = get_sas_pair().await; let mut content = bob.as_content(); let method = match &mut content { AcceptContent::ToDevice(c) => &mut c.method, AcceptContent::Room(_, c) => &mut c.method, }; *method = AcceptMethod::Custom(CustomContent { method: "m.sas.custom".to_string(), data: Default::default(), }); alice .into_accepted(bob.user_id(), content) .expect_err("Didn't cancel on an unknown SAS method"); } #[tokio::test] async fn sas_from_start_unknown_method() { let alice = ReadOnlyAccount::new(&alice_id(), &alice_device_id()); let alice_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&alice).await; let bob = ReadOnlyAccount::new(&bob_id(), &bob_device_id()); let bob_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&bob).await; let alice_sas = SasState::::new(alice.clone(), bob_device, None); let mut start_content = alice_sas.as_content(); let method = match &mut start_content { StartContent::ToDevice(c) => &mut c.method, StartContent::Room(_, c) => &mut c.method, }; match method { StartMethod::MSasV1(ref mut c) => { c.message_authentication_codes = vec![]; } _ => panic!("Unknown SAS start method"), } SasState::::from_start_event( bob.clone(), alice_device.clone(), None, start_content, ) .expect_err("Didn't cancel on invalid MAC method"); let mut start_content = alice_sas.as_content(); let method = match &mut start_content { StartContent::ToDevice(c) => &mut c.method, StartContent::Room(_, c) => &mut c.method, }; *method = StartMethod::Custom(CustomStartContent { method: "m.sas.custom".to_string(), data: Default::default(), }); SasState::::from_start_event(bob.clone(), alice_device, None, start_content) .expect_err("Didn't cancel on unknown sas method"); } }