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crypto: Add a bunch of TODO lines documenting how to refactor stuff further.

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This commit is contained in:
Damir Jelić 2020-07-11 12:05:52 +02:00
parent eb19c19e36
commit 18ccd30c8c
1 changed files with 26 additions and 3 deletions
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29
matrix_sdk_crypto/src/machine.rs
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@ -464,6 +464,9 @@ impl OlmMachine {
continue;
}
// TODO this logic could go into the device struct, especially
// since we're gonna have cross signing identities soon.
if user_id != &device_keys.user_id || device_id != &device_keys.device_id {
warn!(
"Mismatch in device keys payload of device {} from user {}",
@ -545,6 +548,8 @@ impl OlmMachine {
async fn generate_one_time_keys(&self) -> StdResult<u64, ()> {
match &self.uploaded_signed_key_count {
Some(count) => {
// TODO if we store the uploaded key count with the Account all
// this logic could go into the account.
let count = count.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let max_keys = self.account.max_one_time_keys().await;
let max_on_server = (max_keys as u64) / 2;
@ -1039,6 +1044,13 @@ impl OlmMachine {
) -> OlmResult<EncryptedEventContent> {
let identity_keys = self.account.identity_keys();
// TODO most of this could go into the session, the session already
// stores the curve key of the device, if we also store the ed25519 key
// with the session we'll only need to pass in the account to the
// session and all of this can live in the session.
//
// Storing a reference to the account is probably not worth the effort.
let recipient_signing_key = recipient_device
.get_key(KeyAlgorithm::Ed25519)
.ok_or(EventError::MissingSigningKey)?;
@ -1064,7 +1076,6 @@ impl OlmMachine {
.unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!(format!("Can't serialize {} to canonical JSON", payload)));
let ciphertext = session.encrypt(&plaintext).await.to_tuple();
self.store.save_sessions(&[session]).await?;
let message_type: usize = ciphertext.0.into();
@ -1077,6 +1088,8 @@ impl OlmMachine {
content.insert(recipient_sender_key.to_owned(), ciphertext);
self.store.save_sessions(&[session]).await?;
Ok(EncryptedEventContent::OlmV1Curve25519AesSha2(
OlmV1Curve25519AesSha2Content {
sender_key: identity_keys.curve25519().to_owned(),
@ -1136,8 +1149,16 @@ impl OlmMachine {
}
let session_id = megolm_session.session_id().to_owned();
// TODO don't mark the session as shared automatically only, when all
// the requests are done, failure to send these requests will likely end
// up in wedged sessions. We'll need to store the requests and let the
// caller mark them as sent using an UUID.
megolm_session.mark_as_shared();
// TODO the key content creation can go into the OutboundGroupSession
// struct.
let key_content = json!({
"algorithm": Algorithm::MegolmV1AesSha2,
"room_id": room_id,
@ -1167,6 +1188,9 @@ impl OlmMachine {
if let Some(s) = sessions {
let session = &s.lock().await[0];
// TODO once the session has the all the device info, we
// won't need the device anymore to encrypt stuff with the
// session.
user_map.push((session.clone(), device.clone()));
} else {
warn!(
@ -1200,8 +1224,6 @@ impl OlmMachine {
)
.await?;
// TODO enable this again once we can send encrypted event
// contents with ruma.
user_messages.insert(
DeviceIdOrAllDevices::DeviceId(device.device_id().clone()),
serde_json::value::to_raw_value(&encrypted_content)?,
@ -1368,6 +1390,7 @@ impl OlmMachine {
// TODO check the message index.
// TODO check if this is from a verified device.
// TODO move this logic into the group session.
let mut decrypted_value = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&plaintext)?;
let decrypted_object = decrypted_value
.as_object_mut()