matrix-rust-sdk/matrix_sdk_crypto/src/key_request.rs

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// Copyright 2020 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
// TODO
//
// handle the case where we can't create a session with a device. clearing our
// stale key share requests that we'll never be able to handle.
//
// If we don't trust the device store an object that remembers the request and
// let the users introspect that object.
use std::{collections::BTreeMap, sync::Arc};
use dashmap::{mapref::entry::Entry, DashMap, DashSet};
use matrix_sdk_common::{
api::r0::to_device::DeviceIdOrAllDevices,
events::{
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forwarded_room_key::ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContent,
room_key_request::{Action, RequestedKeyInfo, RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent},
AnyToDeviceEvent, EventType, ToDeviceEvent,
},
identifiers::{DeviceId, DeviceIdBox, EventEncryptionAlgorithm, RoomId, UserId},
uuid::Uuid,
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_json::value::to_raw_value;
use thiserror::Error;
use tracing::{error, info, trace, warn};
use crate::{
error::{OlmError, OlmResult},
olm::{InboundGroupSession, Session, ShareState},
requests::{OutgoingRequest, ToDeviceRequest},
session_manager::GroupSessionCache,
store::{Changes, CryptoStoreError, Store},
Device,
};
/// An error describing why a key share request won't be honored.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Error, PartialEq)]
pub enum KeyshareDecision {
/// The key request is from a device that we don't own, we're only sharing
/// sessions that we know the requesting device already was supposed to get.
#[error("can't find an active outbound group session")]
MissingOutboundSession,
/// The key request is from a device that we don't own and the device wasn't
/// meant to receive the session in the original key share.
#[error("outbound session wasn't shared with the requesting device")]
OutboundSessionNotShared,
/// The key request is from a device we own, yet we don't trust it.
#[error("requesting device isn't trusted")]
UntrustedDevice,
}
/// A queue where we store room key requests that we want to serve but the
/// device that requested the key doesn't share an Olm session with us.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct WaitQueue {
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requests_waiting_for_session: Arc<
DashMap<(UserId, DeviceIdBox, String), ToDeviceEvent<RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent>>,
>,
requests_ids_waiting: Arc<DashMap<(UserId, DeviceIdBox), DashSet<String>>>,
}
impl WaitQueue {
fn new() -> Self {
Self {
requests_waiting_for_session: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
requests_ids_waiting: Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.requests_ids_waiting.is_empty() && self.requests_waiting_for_session.is_empty()
}
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fn insert(&self, device: &Device, event: &ToDeviceEvent<RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent>) {
let key = (
device.user_id().to_owned(),
device.device_id().into(),
event.content.request_id.to_owned(),
);
self.requests_waiting_for_session.insert(key, event.clone());
let key = (device.user_id().to_owned(), device.device_id().into());
self.requests_ids_waiting
.entry(key)
.or_insert_with(DashSet::new)
.insert(event.content.request_id.clone());
}
fn remove(
&self,
user_id: &UserId,
device_id: &DeviceId,
) -> Vec<((UserId, DeviceIdBox, String), ToDeviceEvent<RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent>)>
{
self.requests_ids_waiting
.remove(&(user_id.to_owned(), device_id.into()))
.map(|(_, request_ids)| {
request_ids
.iter()
.filter_map(|id| {
let key = (user_id.to_owned(), device_id.into(), id.to_owned());
self.requests_waiting_for_session.remove(&key)
})
.collect()
})
.unwrap_or_default()
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub(crate) struct KeyRequestMachine {
user_id: Arc<UserId>,
device_id: Arc<DeviceIdBox>,
store: Store,
outbound_group_sessions: GroupSessionCache,
outgoing_to_device_requests: Arc<DashMap<Uuid, OutgoingRequest>>,
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incoming_key_requests: Arc<
DashMap<(UserId, DeviceIdBox, String), ToDeviceEvent<RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent>>,
>,
wait_queue: WaitQueue,
users_for_key_claim: Arc<DashMap<UserId, DashSet<DeviceIdBox>>>,
}
/// A struct describing an outgoing key request.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct OutgoingKeyRequest {
/// The user we requested the key from
pub request_recipient: UserId,
/// The unique id of the key request.
pub request_id: Uuid,
/// The info of the requested key.
pub info: RequestedKeyInfo,
/// Has the request been sent out.
pub sent_out: bool,
}
impl OutgoingKeyRequest {
fn to_request(&self, own_device_id: &DeviceId) -> Result<OutgoingRequest, serde_json::Error> {
let content = RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent::new(
Action::Request,
Some(self.info.clone()),
own_device_id.to_owned(),
self.request_id.to_string(),
);
wrap_key_request_content(self.request_recipient.clone(), self.request_id, &content)
}
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fn to_cancellation(
&self,
own_device_id: &DeviceId,
) -> Result<OutgoingRequest, serde_json::Error> {
let content = RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent::new(
Action::CancelRequest,
None,
own_device_id.to_owned(),
self.request_id.to_string(),
);
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
wrap_key_request_content(self.request_recipient.clone(), id, &content)
}
}
impl PartialEq for OutgoingKeyRequest {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
self.request_id == other.request_id
&& self.info.algorithm == other.info.algorithm
&& self.info.room_id == other.info.room_id
&& self.info.session_id == other.info.session_id
&& self.info.sender_key == other.info.sender_key
}
}
fn wrap_key_request_content(
recipient: UserId,
id: Uuid,
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content: &RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent,
) -> Result<OutgoingRequest, serde_json::Error> {
let mut messages = BTreeMap::new();
messages
.entry(recipient)
.or_insert_with(BTreeMap::new)
.insert(DeviceIdOrAllDevices::AllDevices, to_raw_value(content)?);
Ok(OutgoingRequest {
request_id: id,
request: Arc::new(
ToDeviceRequest { event_type: EventType::RoomKeyRequest, txn_id: id, messages }.into(),
),
})
}
impl KeyRequestMachine {
pub fn new(
user_id: Arc<UserId>,
device_id: Arc<DeviceIdBox>,
store: Store,
outbound_group_sessions: GroupSessionCache,
users_for_key_claim: Arc<DashMap<UserId, DashSet<DeviceIdBox>>>,
) -> Self {
Self {
user_id,
device_id,
store,
outbound_group_sessions,
outgoing_to_device_requests: DashMap::new().into(),
incoming_key_requests: DashMap::new().into(),
wait_queue: WaitQueue::new(),
users_for_key_claim,
}
}
/// Load stored outgoing requests that were not yet sent out.
async fn load_outgoing_requests(&self) -> Result<Vec<OutgoingRequest>, CryptoStoreError> {
self.store
.get_unsent_key_requests()
.await?
.into_iter()
.filter(|i| !i.sent_out)
.map(|info| info.to_request(self.device_id()).map_err(CryptoStoreError::from))
.collect()
}
/// Our own user id.
pub fn user_id(&self) -> &UserId {
&self.user_id
}
/// Our own device id.
pub fn device_id(&self) -> &DeviceId {
&self.device_id
}
pub async fn outgoing_to_device_requests(
&self,
) -> Result<Vec<OutgoingRequest>, CryptoStoreError> {
let mut key_requests = self.load_outgoing_requests().await?;
let key_forwards: Vec<OutgoingRequest> =
self.outgoing_to_device_requests.iter().map(|i| i.value().clone()).collect();
key_requests.extend(key_forwards);
Ok(key_requests)
}
/// Receive a room key request event.
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pub fn receive_incoming_key_request(
&self,
event: &ToDeviceEvent<RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent>,
) {
let sender = event.sender.clone();
let device_id = event.content.requesting_device_id.clone();
let request_id = event.content.request_id.clone();
self.incoming_key_requests.insert((sender, device_id, request_id), event.clone());
}
/// Handle all the incoming key requests that are queued up and empty our
/// key request queue.
pub async fn collect_incoming_key_requests(&self) -> OlmResult<Vec<Session>> {
let mut changed_sessions = Vec::new();
for item in self.incoming_key_requests.iter() {
let event = item.value();
if let Some(s) = self.handle_key_request(event).await? {
changed_sessions.push(s);
}
}
self.incoming_key_requests.clear();
Ok(changed_sessions)
}
/// Store the key share request for later, once we get an Olm session with
/// the given device [`retry_keyshare`](#method.retry_keyshare) should be
/// called.
fn handle_key_share_without_session(
&self,
device: Device,
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event: &ToDeviceEvent<RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent>,
) {
self.users_for_key_claim
.entry(device.user_id().to_owned())
.or_insert_with(DashSet::new)
.insert(device.device_id().into());
self.wait_queue.insert(&device, event);
}
/// Retry keyshares for a device that previously didn't have an Olm session
/// with us.
///
/// This should be only called if the given user/device got a new Olm
/// session.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `user_id` - The user id of the device that we created the Olm session
/// with.
///
/// * `device_id` - The device id of the device that got the Olm session.
pub fn retry_keyshare(&self, user_id: &UserId, device_id: &DeviceId) {
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if let Entry::Occupied(e) = self.users_for_key_claim.entry(user_id.to_owned()) {
e.get().remove(device_id);
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if e.get().is_empty() {
e.remove();
}
}
for (key, event) in self.wait_queue.remove(user_id, device_id) {
if !self.incoming_key_requests.contains_key(&key) {
self.incoming_key_requests.insert(key, event);
}
}
}
/// Handle a single incoming key request.
async fn handle_key_request(
&self,
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event: &ToDeviceEvent<RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent>,
) -> OlmResult<Option<Session>> {
// Some servers might send to-device events to ourselves if we send one
// out using a wildcard instead of a specific device as a recipient.
//
// Check if we're the sender of this key request event and ignore it if
// so.
if &event.sender == self.user_id()
&& &*event.content.requesting_device_id == self.device_id()
{
return Ok(None);
}
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let key_info = match &event.content.action {
Action::Request => {
if let Some(info) = &event.content.body {
info
} else {
warn!(
"Received a key request from {} {} with a request \
action, but no key info was found",
event.sender, event.content.requesting_device_id
);
return Ok(None);
}
}
// We ignore cancellations here since there's nothing to serve.
Action::CancelRequest => return Ok(None),
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action => {
warn!("Unknown room key request action: {:?}", action);
return Ok(None);
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}
};
let session = self
.store
.get_inbound_group_session(
&key_info.room_id,
&key_info.sender_key,
&key_info.session_id,
)
.await?;
let session = if let Some(s) = session {
s
} else {
info!(
"Received a key request from {} {} for an unknown inbound group session {}.",
&event.sender, &event.content.requesting_device_id, &key_info.session_id
);
return Ok(None);
};
let device =
self.store.get_device(&event.sender, &event.content.requesting_device_id).await?;
if let Some(device) = device {
match self.should_share_key(&device, &session).await {
Err(e) => {
info!(
"Received a key request from {} {} that we won't serve: {}",
device.user_id(),
device.device_id(),
e
);
Ok(None)
}
Ok(message_index) => {
info!(
"Serving a key request for {} from {} {} with message_index {:?}.",
key_info.session_id,
device.user_id(),
device.device_id(),
message_index,
);
match self.share_session(&session, &device, message_index).await {
Ok(s) => Ok(Some(s)),
Err(OlmError::MissingSession) => {
info!(
"Key request from {} {} is missing an Olm session, \
putting the request in the wait queue",
device.user_id(),
device.device_id()
);
self.handle_key_share_without_session(device, event);
Ok(None)
}
Err(e) => Err(e),
}
}
}
} else {
warn!(
"Received a key request from an unknown device {} {}.",
&event.sender, &event.content.requesting_device_id
);
self.store.update_tracked_user(&event.sender, true).await?;
Ok(None)
}
}
async fn share_session(
&self,
session: &InboundGroupSession,
device: &Device,
message_index: Option<u32>,
) -> OlmResult<Session> {
let (used_session, content) =
device.encrypt_session(session.clone(), message_index).await?;
let id = Uuid::new_v4();
let mut messages = BTreeMap::new();
messages.entry(device.user_id().to_owned()).or_insert_with(BTreeMap::new).insert(
DeviceIdOrAllDevices::DeviceId(device.device_id().into()),
to_raw_value(&content)?,
);
let request = OutgoingRequest {
request_id: id,
request: Arc::new(
ToDeviceRequest { event_type: EventType::RoomEncrypted, txn_id: id, messages }
.into(),
),
};
self.outgoing_to_device_requests.insert(id, request);
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Ok(used_session)
}
/// Check if it's ok to share a session with the given device.
///
/// The logic for this currently is as follows:
///
/// * Share any session with our own devices as long as they are trusted.
///
/// * Share with devices of other users only sessions that were meant to be
/// shared with them in the first place, in other words if an outbound
/// session still exists and the session was shared with that user/device
/// pair.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `device` - The device that is requesting a session from us.
///
/// * `session` - The session that was requested to be shared.
async fn should_share_key(
&self,
device: &Device,
session: &InboundGroupSession,
) -> Result<Option<u32>, KeyshareDecision> {
let outbound_session = self
.outbound_group_sessions
.get_with_id(session.room_id(), session.session_id())
.await
.ok()
.flatten();
let own_device_check = || {
if device.trust_state() {
Ok(None)
} else {
Err(KeyshareDecision::UntrustedDevice)
}
};
// If we have a matching outbound session we can check the list of
// users/devices that received the session, if it wasn't shared check if
// it's our own device and if it's trusted.
if let Some(outbound) = outbound_session {
if let ShareState::Shared(message_index) =
outbound.is_shared_with(device.user_id(), device.device_id())
{
Ok(Some(message_index))
} else if device.user_id() == self.user_id() {
own_device_check()
} else {
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Err(KeyshareDecision::OutboundSessionNotShared)
}
// Else just check if it's one of our own devices that requested the key
// and check if the device is trusted.
} else if device.user_id() == self.user_id() {
own_device_check()
// Otherwise, there's not enough info to decide if we can safely share
// the session.
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} else {
Err(KeyshareDecision::MissingOutboundSession)
}
}
/// Check if it's ok, or rather if it makes sense to automatically request
/// a key from our other devices.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `key_info` - The info of our key request containing information about
/// the key we wish to request.
async fn should_request_key(
&self,
key_info: &RequestedKeyInfo,
) -> Result<bool, CryptoStoreError> {
let request = self.store.get_key_request_by_info(&key_info).await?;
// Don't send out duplicate requests, users can re-request them if they
// think a second request might succeed.
if request.is_none() {
let devices = self.store.get_user_devices(self.user_id()).await?;
// Devices will only respond to key requests if the devices are
// verified, if the device isn't verified by us it's unlikely that
// we're verified by them either. Don't request keys if there isn't
// at least one verified device.
if devices.is_any_verified() {
Ok(true)
} else {
Ok(false)
}
} else {
Ok(false)
}
}
/// Create a new outgoing key request for the key with the given session id.
///
/// This will queue up a new to-device request and store the key info so
/// once we receive a forwarded room key we can check that it matches the
/// key we requested.
///
/// This method will return a cancel request and a new key request if the
/// key was already requested, otherwise it will return just the key
/// request.
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `room_id` - The id of the room where the key is used in.
///
/// * `sender_key` - The curve25519 key of the sender that owns the key.
///
/// * `session_id` - The id that uniquely identifies the session.
pub async fn request_key(
&self,
room_id: &RoomId,
sender_key: &str,
session_id: &str,
) -> Result<(Option<OutgoingRequest>, OutgoingRequest), CryptoStoreError> {
let key_info = RequestedKeyInfo::new(
EventEncryptionAlgorithm::MegolmV1AesSha2,
room_id.to_owned(),
sender_key.to_owned(),
session_id.to_owned(),
);
let request = self.store.get_key_request_by_info(&key_info).await?;
if let Some(request) = request {
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let cancel = request.to_cancellation(self.device_id())?;
let request = request.to_request(self.device_id())?;
Ok((Some(cancel), request))
} else {
let request = self.request_key_helper(key_info).await?;
Ok((None, request))
}
}
async fn request_key_helper(
&self,
key_info: RequestedKeyInfo,
) -> Result<OutgoingRequest, CryptoStoreError> {
info!("Creating new outgoing room key request {:#?}", key_info);
let request = OutgoingKeyRequest {
request_recipient: self.user_id().to_owned(),
request_id: Uuid::new_v4(),
info: key_info,
sent_out: false,
};
let outgoing_request = request.to_request(self.device_id())?;
self.save_outgoing_key_info(request).await?;
Ok(outgoing_request)
}
/// Create a new outgoing key request for the key with the given session id.
///
/// This will queue up a new to-device request and store the key info so
/// once we receive a forwarded room key we can check that it matches the
/// key we requested.
///
/// This does nothing if a request for this key has already been sent out.
///
/// # Arguments
/// * `room_id` - The id of the room where the key is used in.
///
/// * `sender_key` - The curve25519 key of the sender that owns the key.
///
/// * `session_id` - The id that uniquely identifies the session.
pub async fn create_outgoing_key_request(
&self,
room_id: &RoomId,
sender_key: &str,
session_id: &str,
) -> Result<(), CryptoStoreError> {
let key_info = RequestedKeyInfo::new(
EventEncryptionAlgorithm::MegolmV1AesSha2,
room_id.to_owned(),
sender_key.to_owned(),
session_id.to_owned(),
);
if self.should_request_key(&key_info).await? {
self.request_key_helper(key_info).await?;
}
Ok(())
}
/// Save an outgoing key info.
async fn save_outgoing_key_info(
&self,
info: OutgoingKeyRequest,
) -> Result<(), CryptoStoreError> {
let mut changes = Changes::default();
changes.key_requests.push(info);
self.store.save_changes(changes).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Get an outgoing key info that matches the forwarded room key content.
async fn get_key_info(
&self,
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content: &ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContent,
) -> Result<Option<OutgoingKeyRequest>, CryptoStoreError> {
let info = RequestedKeyInfo::new(
content.algorithm.clone(),
content.room_id.clone(),
content.sender_key.clone(),
content.session_id.clone(),
);
self.store.get_key_request_by_info(&info).await
}
/// Delete the given outgoing key info.
async fn delete_key_info(&self, info: &OutgoingKeyRequest) -> Result<(), CryptoStoreError> {
self.store.delete_outgoing_key_request(info.request_id).await
}
/// Mark the outgoing request as sent.
pub async fn mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(&self, id: Uuid) -> Result<(), CryptoStoreError> {
let info = self.store.get_outgoing_key_request(id).await?;
if let Some(mut info) = info {
trace!("Marking outgoing key request as sent {:#?}", info);
info.sent_out = true;
self.save_outgoing_key_info(info).await?;
}
self.outgoing_to_device_requests.remove(&id);
Ok(())
}
/// Mark the given outgoing key info as done.
///
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/// This will queue up a request cancellation.
async fn mark_as_done(&self, key_info: OutgoingKeyRequest) -> Result<(), CryptoStoreError> {
// TODO perhaps only remove the key info if the first known index is 0.
trace!("Successfully received a forwarded room key for {:#?}", key_info);
self.outgoing_to_device_requests.remove(&key_info.request_id);
// TODO return the key info instead of deleting it so the sync handler
// can delete it in one transaction.
self.delete_key_info(&key_info).await?;
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let request = key_info.to_cancellation(self.device_id())?;
self.outgoing_to_device_requests.insert(request.request_id, request);
Ok(())
}
/// Receive a forwarded room key event.
pub async fn receive_forwarded_room_key(
&self,
sender_key: &str,
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event: &mut ToDeviceEvent<ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContent>,
) -> Result<(Option<AnyToDeviceEvent>, Option<InboundGroupSession>), CryptoStoreError> {
let key_info = self.get_key_info(&event.content).await?;
if let Some(info) = key_info {
let session = InboundGroupSession::from_forwarded_key(sender_key, &mut event.content)?;
let old_session = self
.store
.get_inbound_group_session(
session.room_id(),
&session.sender_key,
session.session_id(),
)
.await?;
// If we have a previous session, check if we have a better version
// and store the new one if so.
let session = if let Some(old_session) = old_session {
let first_old_index = old_session.first_known_index();
let first_index = session.first_known_index();
if first_old_index > first_index {
self.mark_as_done(info).await?;
Some(session)
} else {
None
}
// If we didn't have a previous session, store it.
} else {
self.mark_as_done(info).await?;
Some(session)
};
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if let Some(s) = &session {
info!(
"Received a forwarded room key from {} for room {} with session id {}",
event.sender,
s.room_id(),
s.session_id()
);
}
Ok((Some(AnyToDeviceEvent::ForwardedRoomKey(event.clone())), session))
} else {
info!(
"Received a forwarded room key from {}, but no key info was found.",
event.sender,
);
Ok((None, None))
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
use std::{convert::TryInto, sync::Arc};
use dashmap::DashMap;
use matrix_sdk_common::{
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api::r0::to_device::DeviceIdOrAllDevices,
events::{
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forwarded_room_key::ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContent,
room::encrypted::EncryptedEventContent,
room_key_request::RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent, AnyToDeviceEvent, ToDeviceEvent,
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},
identifiers::{room_id, user_id, DeviceIdBox, RoomId, UserId},
locks::Mutex,
};
use matrix_sdk_test::async_test;
use super::{KeyRequestMachine, KeyshareDecision};
use crate::{
identities::{LocalTrust, ReadOnlyDevice},
olm::{Account, PrivateCrossSigningIdentity, ReadOnlyAccount},
session_manager::GroupSessionCache,
store::{Changes, CryptoStore, MemoryStore, Store},
verification::VerificationMachine,
};
fn alice_id() -> UserId {
user_id!("@alice:example.org")
}
fn alice_device_id() -> DeviceIdBox {
"JLAFKJWSCS".into()
}
fn bob_id() -> UserId {
user_id!("@bob:example.org")
}
fn bob_device_id() -> DeviceIdBox {
"ILMLKASTES".into()
}
fn alice2_device_id() -> DeviceIdBox {
"ILMLKASTES".into()
}
fn room_id() -> RoomId {
room_id!("!test:example.org")
}
fn account() -> ReadOnlyAccount {
ReadOnlyAccount::new(&alice_id(), &alice_device_id())
}
fn bob_account() -> ReadOnlyAccount {
ReadOnlyAccount::new(&bob_id(), &bob_device_id())
}
fn alice_2_account() -> ReadOnlyAccount {
ReadOnlyAccount::new(&alice_id(), &alice2_device_id())
}
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fn bob_machine() -> KeyRequestMachine {
let user_id = Arc::new(bob_id());
let account = ReadOnlyAccount::new(&user_id, &alice_device_id());
let store: Arc<Box<dyn CryptoStore>> = Arc::new(Box::new(MemoryStore::new()));
let identity = Arc::new(Mutex::new(PrivateCrossSigningIdentity::empty(bob_id())));
let verification = VerificationMachine::new(account, identity.clone(), store.clone());
let store = Store::new(user_id.clone(), identity, store, verification);
let session_cache = GroupSessionCache::new(store.clone());
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KeyRequestMachine::new(
user_id,
Arc::new(bob_device_id()),
store,
session_cache,
Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
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)
}
async fn get_machine() -> KeyRequestMachine {
let user_id = Arc::new(alice_id());
let account = ReadOnlyAccount::new(&user_id, &alice_device_id());
let device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&account).await;
let store: Arc<Box<dyn CryptoStore>> = Arc::new(Box::new(MemoryStore::new()));
let identity = Arc::new(Mutex::new(PrivateCrossSigningIdentity::empty(alice_id())));
let verification = VerificationMachine::new(account, identity.clone(), store.clone());
let store = Store::new(user_id.clone(), identity, store, verification);
store.save_devices(&[device]).await.unwrap();
let session_cache = GroupSessionCache::new(store.clone());
KeyRequestMachine::new(
user_id,
Arc::new(alice_device_id()),
store,
session_cache,
Arc::new(DashMap::new()),
)
}
#[async_test]
async fn create_machine() {
let machine = get_machine().await;
assert!(machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap().is_empty());
}
#[async_test]
async fn re_request_keys() {
let machine = get_machine().await;
let account = account();
let (_, session) =
account.create_group_session_pair_with_defaults(&room_id()).await.unwrap();
assert!(machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap().is_empty());
let (cancel, request) = machine
.request_key(session.room_id(), &session.sender_key, session.session_id())
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(cancel.is_none());
machine.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(request.request_id).await.unwrap();
let (cancel, _) = machine
.request_key(session.room_id(), &session.sender_key, session.session_id())
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(cancel.is_some());
}
#[async_test]
async fn create_key_request() {
let machine = get_machine().await;
let account = account();
let second_account = alice_2_account();
let alice_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&second_account).await;
// We need a trusted device, otherwise we won't request keys
alice_device.set_trust_state(LocalTrust::Verified);
machine.store.save_devices(&[alice_device]).await.unwrap();
let (_, session) =
account.create_group_session_pair_with_defaults(&room_id()).await.unwrap();
assert!(machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap().is_empty());
machine
.create_outgoing_key_request(
session.room_id(),
&session.sender_key,
session.session_id(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(!machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap().is_empty());
assert_eq!(machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap().len(), 1);
machine
.create_outgoing_key_request(
session.room_id(),
&session.sender_key,
session.session_id(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
let requests = machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(requests.len(), 1);
let request = requests.get(0).unwrap();
machine.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(request.request_id).await.unwrap();
assert!(machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap().is_empty());
}
#[async_test]
async fn receive_forwarded_key() {
let machine = get_machine().await;
let account = account();
let second_account = alice_2_account();
let alice_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&second_account).await;
// We need a trusted device, otherwise we won't request keys
alice_device.set_trust_state(LocalTrust::Verified);
machine.store.save_devices(&[alice_device]).await.unwrap();
let (_, session) =
account.create_group_session_pair_with_defaults(&room_id()).await.unwrap();
machine
.create_outgoing_key_request(
session.room_id(),
&session.sender_key,
session.session_id(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
let requests = machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap();
let request = requests.get(0).unwrap();
let id = request.request_id;
machine.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(id).await.unwrap();
let export = session.export_at_index(10).await;
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let content: ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContent = export.try_into().unwrap();
let mut event = ToDeviceEvent { sender: alice_id(), content };
assert!(
machine
.store
.get_inbound_group_session(
session.room_id(),
&session.sender_key,
session.session_id(),
)
.await
.unwrap()
.is_none()
);
let (_, first_session) =
machine.receive_forwarded_room_key(&session.sender_key, &mut event).await.unwrap();
let first_session = first_session.unwrap();
assert_eq!(first_session.first_known_index(), 10);
machine.store.save_inbound_group_sessions(&[first_session.clone()]).await.unwrap();
// Get the cancel request.
let request = machine.outgoing_to_device_requests.iter().next().unwrap();
let id = request.request_id;
drop(request);
machine.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(id).await.unwrap();
machine
.create_outgoing_key_request(
session.room_id(),
&session.sender_key,
session.session_id(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
let requests = machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap();
let request = &requests[0];
machine.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(request.request_id).await.unwrap();
let export = session.export_at_index(15).await;
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let content: ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContent = export.try_into().unwrap();
let mut event = ToDeviceEvent { sender: alice_id(), content };
let (_, second_session) =
machine.receive_forwarded_room_key(&session.sender_key, &mut event).await.unwrap();
assert!(second_session.is_none());
let export = session.export_at_index(0).await;
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let content: ForwardedRoomKeyToDeviceEventContent = export.try_into().unwrap();
let mut event = ToDeviceEvent { sender: alice_id(), content };
let (_, second_session) =
machine.receive_forwarded_room_key(&session.sender_key, &mut event).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(second_session.unwrap().first_known_index(), 0);
}
#[async_test]
async fn should_share_key_test() {
let machine = get_machine().await;
let account = account();
let own_device =
machine.store.get_device(&alice_id(), &alice_device_id()).await.unwrap().unwrap();
let (outbound, inbound) =
account.create_group_session_pair_with_defaults(&room_id()).await.unwrap();
// We don't share keys with untrusted devices.
assert_eq!(
machine
.should_share_key(&own_device, &inbound)
.await
.expect_err("Should not share with untrusted"),
KeyshareDecision::UntrustedDevice
);
own_device.set_trust_state(LocalTrust::Verified);
// Now we do want to share the keys.
assert!(machine.should_share_key(&own_device, &inbound).await.is_ok());
let bob_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&bob_account()).await;
machine.store.save_devices(&[bob_device]).await.unwrap();
let bob_device =
machine.store.get_device(&bob_id(), &bob_device_id()).await.unwrap().unwrap();
// We don't share sessions with other user's devices if no outbound
// session was provided.
assert_eq!(
machine
.should_share_key(&bob_device, &inbound)
.await
.expect_err("Should not share with other."),
KeyshareDecision::MissingOutboundSession
);
let mut changes = Changes::default();
changes.outbound_group_sessions.push(outbound.clone());
changes.inbound_group_sessions.push(inbound.clone());
machine.store.save_changes(changes).await.unwrap();
machine.outbound_group_sessions.insert(outbound.clone());
// We don't share sessions with other user's devices if the session
// wasn't shared in the first place.
assert_eq!(
machine
.should_share_key(&bob_device, &inbound)
.await
.expect_err("Should not share with other unless shared."),
KeyshareDecision::OutboundSessionNotShared
);
bob_device.set_trust_state(LocalTrust::Verified);
// We don't share sessions with other user's devices if the session
// wasn't shared in the first place even if the device is trusted.
assert_eq!(
machine
.should_share_key(&bob_device, &inbound)
.await
.expect_err("Should not share with other unless shared."),
KeyshareDecision::OutboundSessionNotShared
);
// We now share the session, since it was shared before.
outbound.mark_shared_with(bob_device.user_id(), bob_device.device_id());
assert!(machine.should_share_key(&bob_device, &inbound).await.is_ok());
// But we don't share some other session that doesn't match our outbound
// session
let (_, other_inbound) =
account.create_group_session_pair_with_defaults(&room_id()).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
machine
.should_share_key(&bob_device, &other_inbound)
.await
.expect_err("Should not share with other unless shared."),
KeyshareDecision::MissingOutboundSession
);
}
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#[async_test]
async fn key_share_cycle() {
let alice_machine = get_machine().await;
let alice_account = Account { inner: account(), store: alice_machine.store.clone() };
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let bob_machine = bob_machine();
let bob_account = bob_account();
let second_account = alice_2_account();
let alice_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&second_account).await;
// We need a trusted device, otherwise we won't request keys
alice_device.set_trust_state(LocalTrust::Verified);
alice_machine.store.save_devices(&[alice_device]).await.unwrap();
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// Create Olm sessions for our two accounts.
let (alice_session, bob_session) = alice_account.create_session_for(&bob_account).await;
let alice_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&alice_account).await;
let bob_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&bob_account).await;
// Populate our stores with Olm sessions and a Megolm session.
alice_machine.store.save_sessions(&[alice_session]).await.unwrap();
alice_machine.store.save_devices(&[bob_device]).await.unwrap();
bob_machine.store.save_sessions(&[bob_session]).await.unwrap();
bob_machine.store.save_devices(&[alice_device]).await.unwrap();
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let (group_session, inbound_group_session) =
bob_account.create_group_session_pair_with_defaults(&room_id()).await.unwrap();
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bob_machine.store.save_inbound_group_sessions(&[inbound_group_session]).await.unwrap();
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// Alice wants to request the outbound group session from bob.
alice_machine
.create_outgoing_key_request(
&room_id(),
bob_account.identity_keys.curve25519(),
group_session.session_id(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
group_session.mark_shared_with(&alice_id(), &alice_device_id());
// Put the outbound session into bobs store.
bob_machine.outbound_group_sessions.insert(group_session.clone());
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// Get the request and convert it into a event.
let requests = alice_machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap();
let request = &requests[0];
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let id = request.request_id;
let content = request
.request
.to_device()
.unwrap()
.messages
.get(&alice_id())
.unwrap()
.get(&DeviceIdOrAllDevices::AllDevices)
.unwrap();
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let content: RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent =
serde_json::from_str(content.get()).unwrap();
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alice_machine.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(id).await.unwrap();
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let event = ToDeviceEvent { sender: alice_id(), content };
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// Bob doesn't have any outgoing requests.
assert!(bob_machine.outgoing_to_device_requests.is_empty());
// Receive the room key request from alice.
bob_machine.receive_incoming_key_request(&event);
bob_machine.collect_incoming_key_requests().await.unwrap();
// Now bob does have an outgoing request.
assert!(!bob_machine.outgoing_to_device_requests.is_empty());
// Get the request and convert it to a encrypted to-device event.
let requests = bob_machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap();
let request = &requests[0];
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let id = request.request_id;
let content = request
.request
.to_device()
.unwrap()
.messages
.get(&alice_id())
.unwrap()
.get(&DeviceIdOrAllDevices::DeviceId(alice_device_id()))
.unwrap();
let content: EncryptedEventContent = serde_json::from_str(content.get()).unwrap();
bob_machine.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(id).await.unwrap();
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let event = ToDeviceEvent { sender: bob_id(), content };
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// Check that alice doesn't have the session.
assert!(alice_machine
.store
.get_inbound_group_session(
&room_id(),
&bob_account.identity_keys().curve25519(),
group_session.session_id()
)
.await
.unwrap()
.is_none());
let decrypted = alice_account.decrypt_to_device_event(&event).await.unwrap();
if let AnyToDeviceEvent::ForwardedRoomKey(mut e) = decrypted.event.deserialize().unwrap() {
let (_, session) = alice_machine
.receive_forwarded_room_key(&decrypted.sender_key, &mut e)
.await
.unwrap();
alice_machine.store.save_inbound_group_sessions(&[session.unwrap()]).await.unwrap();
} else {
panic!("Invalid decrypted event type");
}
// Check that alice now does have the session.
let session = alice_machine
.store
.get_inbound_group_session(
&room_id(),
&decrypted.sender_key,
group_session.session_id(),
)
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(session.session_id(), group_session.session_id())
}
#[async_test]
async fn key_share_cycle_without_session() {
let alice_machine = get_machine().await;
let alice_account = Account { inner: account(), store: alice_machine.store.clone() };
let bob_machine = bob_machine();
let bob_account = bob_account();
let second_account = alice_2_account();
let alice_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&second_account).await;
// We need a trusted device, otherwise we won't request keys
alice_device.set_trust_state(LocalTrust::Verified);
alice_machine.store.save_devices(&[alice_device]).await.unwrap();
// Create Olm sessions for our two accounts.
let (alice_session, bob_session) = alice_account.create_session_for(&bob_account).await;
let alice_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&alice_account).await;
let bob_device = ReadOnlyDevice::from_account(&bob_account).await;
// Populate our stores with Olm sessions and a Megolm session.
alice_machine.store.save_devices(&[bob_device]).await.unwrap();
bob_machine.store.save_devices(&[alice_device]).await.unwrap();
let (group_session, inbound_group_session) =
bob_account.create_group_session_pair_with_defaults(&room_id()).await.unwrap();
bob_machine.store.save_inbound_group_sessions(&[inbound_group_session]).await.unwrap();
// Alice wants to request the outbound group session from bob.
alice_machine
.create_outgoing_key_request(
&room_id(),
bob_account.identity_keys.curve25519(),
group_session.session_id(),
)
.await
.unwrap();
group_session.mark_shared_with(&alice_id(), &alice_device_id());
// Put the outbound session into bobs store.
bob_machine.outbound_group_sessions.insert(group_session.clone());
// Get the request and convert it into a event.
let requests = alice_machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap();
let request = &requests[0];
let id = request.request_id;
let content = request
.request
.to_device()
.unwrap()
.messages
.get(&alice_id())
.unwrap()
.get(&DeviceIdOrAllDevices::AllDevices)
.unwrap();
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let content: RoomKeyRequestToDeviceEventContent =
serde_json::from_str(content.get()).unwrap();
alice_machine.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(id).await.unwrap();
let event = ToDeviceEvent { sender: alice_id(), content };
// Bob doesn't have any outgoing requests.
assert!(bob_machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap().is_empty());
assert!(bob_machine.users_for_key_claim.is_empty());
assert!(bob_machine.wait_queue.is_empty());
// Receive the room key request from alice.
bob_machine.receive_incoming_key_request(&event);
bob_machine.collect_incoming_key_requests().await.unwrap();
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// Bob doesn't have an outgoing requests since we're lacking a session.
assert!(bob_machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap().is_empty());
assert!(!bob_machine.users_for_key_claim.is_empty());
assert!(!bob_machine.wait_queue.is_empty());
// We create a session now.
alice_machine.store.save_sessions(&[alice_session]).await.unwrap();
bob_machine.store.save_sessions(&[bob_session]).await.unwrap();
bob_machine.retry_keyshare(&alice_id(), &alice_device_id());
assert!(bob_machine.users_for_key_claim.is_empty());
bob_machine.collect_incoming_key_requests().await.unwrap();
// Bob now has an outgoing requests.
assert!(!bob_machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap().is_empty());
assert!(bob_machine.wait_queue.is_empty());
// Get the request and convert it to a encrypted to-device event.
let requests = bob_machine.outgoing_to_device_requests().await.unwrap();
let request = &requests[0];
let id = request.request_id;
let content = request
.request
.to_device()
.unwrap()
.messages
.get(&alice_id())
.unwrap()
.get(&DeviceIdOrAllDevices::DeviceId(alice_device_id()))
.unwrap();
let content: EncryptedEventContent = serde_json::from_str(content.get()).unwrap();
bob_machine.mark_outgoing_request_as_sent(id).await.unwrap();
let event = ToDeviceEvent { sender: bob_id(), content };
// Check that alice doesn't have the session.
assert!(alice_machine
.store
.get_inbound_group_session(
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&room_id(),
&bob_account.identity_keys().curve25519(),
group_session.session_id()
)
.await
.unwrap()
.is_none());
let decrypted = alice_account.decrypt_to_device_event(&event).await.unwrap();
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if let AnyToDeviceEvent::ForwardedRoomKey(mut e) = decrypted.event.deserialize().unwrap() {
let (_, session) = alice_machine
.receive_forwarded_room_key(&decrypted.sender_key, &mut e)
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.await
.unwrap();
alice_machine.store.save_inbound_group_sessions(&[session.unwrap()]).await.unwrap();
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} else {
panic!("Invalid decrypted event type");
}
// Check that alice now does have the session.
let session = alice_machine
.store
.get_inbound_group_session(
&room_id(),
&decrypted.sender_key,
group_session.session_id(),
)
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.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(session.session_id(), group_session.session_id())
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}
}